Editorial Note: While this paper was originally written in 2010, it brings about important perspectives on the developments of India’s internal and foreign relations. For this reason, we found merit in publishing this previously unpublished paper, even though it does not account for developments post 2010.

By Sabina Yasmin Rahman, 15th May 2013 

In the year 1991-92, under the then Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, India launched its “Look East” Policy (LEP), an active economic policy of engagement with Southeast Asia to be implemented as an official initiative in achieving two objectives: the encouragement of trade links with individual partners and to provide foreign employment for India’s own expanding work force. This paper is an attempt to critically analyze the various underpinnings of this policy and study the impact it has been able to make so far with special reference to the context of the North-east of India.

Backdrop of the Policy:

With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and the onset of the era of globalization and economic liberalization, the need to secure international trade and encourage foreign investments was felt strongly by nations all over the world. The 1990s was a period seeing rapid economic development and growth of Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia came to be recognized a region with vast economic potential and the Indian sub-continent was fast emerging as an economic and political force to be reckoned with. This is when the Indian leadership came up with the concept of “Look East”. India sought to create and expand regional markets for trade, investments and industrial development. It also began strategic and military cooperation with nations concerned by the expansion of China’s economic and strategic influence. Thus, from the very start, India’s strategy has focused on forging close economic and commercial ties, increasing strategic and security cooperation with emphasis on historic cultural and ideological links.

According to Eric Koo Peng Kuan (2005), “The origin of the ‘Look East’ policy arose from political consciousness, focusing primarily on forging mutually beneficial ties between India with South East Asia and Japan. At the end of World War II, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tried to engage Asia by supporting anti-colonial struggles, advocating pan-Asianism, and a new international order based on not choosing sides during the Cold War. It can also be said that the ‘Look East Policy’ for India is an indirect expression of wishing to return to a continuation of India’s historical behaviour.” However, India’s border defeat by China in 1962 became a setback of India’s foreign policies and was viewed as an unimpressive military and diplomatic performance record from the South East Asian (SEA) perspective. Moreover, India’s pro-Soviet attitude alienated it from other SEA countries, culminating in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, which earned India even more distrust. Until the 1990s, ASEAN and Japan in general did not share high opinions about India, with not very attractive impressions of a corrupt government and a population yielding generally poor work ethics and sloth, resulting in low quality products and services- a perception that India was determined to change.

North Eastern Region (NER) in India’s LEP:

The ‘Look East’ policy was a major shift in terms of India’s policy prioritization because up till then, India never really had a concrete strategy to create an economic hub in its North Eastern Region by exploring the trade and commerce prospects with its ASEAN neighbors. Since this point onward, the government, especially the ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region (DoNER) decided to take certain initiatives in order to reinvent the economy of the North Eastern Region (NER) by relying heavily on central funding. Initially, when India launched this policy, the thrust was not set toward the geographical proximity between its NER and Southeast Asia. According to Yogender Singh, Research Officer of Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, the lack of adequate physical connectivity between India’s Northeast and Southeast Asia- an outcome of skeptic mindset of the Indian policy makers- is one of the most important factors that hindered the possibilities of garnering regional economic complementarities. He further examines that there has been increasing realization on the part of the Indian policy makers, especially after the inclusion of Myanmar into ASEAN as full member in 1997, that development of physical connectivity between NER and Southeast Asia is a prerequisite to utilize the opportunities provided by LEP. This has led India to lay greater emphasis on enhancing connectivity through all the possible modes of infrastructural development like land routes, railways, air connectivity, waterways, energy infrastructure development both in field of hydroelectric and hydrocarbon and telecommunication linkages. As a result, India has initiated certain bilateral projects and also become party to some multilateral projects, aimed at enhancing connectivity between the Northeast and Southeast Asia. The important ongoing and potential infrastructure projects in this regard are Moreh -Tamu–Kalewa Road, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Trans Asian Highway, India-Myanmar rail linkages, Kaladan Multimodal project, the Stilwell road, Myanmar-India-Bangladesh gas and/or oil pipeline, Tamanthi Hydroelectricity project and optical fiber network between Northeast India and Southeast Asia. However, these existing possibilities for the process of enhancing connectivity between India’s Northeast and Southeast Asia is not an easy task; there are geographical, technical, political and security challenges that might limit or stunt the process of infrastructural development.

The former Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee had India’s LEP in mind when he proposed the holding of an India-ASEAN car rally in the ASEAN-India Bali summit of 2003. Some of the rationales behind such an event according to him were, “to draw dramatic attention to our geographical proximity…draw commercial interest in infrastructure…promote tourism and development”. On the occasion of the first India-ASEAN car rally on 23^rd of November, 2004, in Guwahati, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh mentioned that the country was rediscovering age old ties. During his visit to the Northeast in November 2004, Dr. Singh described the NER as the “gateway” to India’s engagement with the Association for South East Asian Nations and with the sub-regional grouping, BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand- Economic Cooperation). According to Dr. Suvrokamal Datta, if the concerned governments, especially that of India, Burma, and Thailand, and the local authorities of these countries are serious about their intentions then these new initiatives are indeed going to bring about desirable development in various spheres for India. However, the NER is still in a state of limbo in terms of it economic development, and most debates on the development scene of region centre around relation between economic development on one side and conflict, insurgency, counter insurgency and widespread unrest on the other. Already much has been spoken and written on whether peace must precede development or success brought by development would pave the way for the resolution of all conflicts. Now, an answer to such a situation cannot be easy and yet a lot depends upon what India as a sovereign, secular, socialist, democratic, republic perceives as ‘development’, keeping in mind the diversity that exists in the unity that the country is so proud of.

Till now India’s policy of strengthening ties with the eastern neighbors have been confined to counter insurgency efforts where the LEP is being used as a means to drive out ‘insurgents’ taking shelter in neighboring countries like Bhutan and Myanmar, without sincere political negotiations. Such negotiations as various scholars have rightly pointed out must involve the civil society and all the contending parties, as an exclusive negotiation with any one might antagonize the other. Moreover, it is crucial to realize by now that a militaristic approach to insurgency would not result in healthy and lasting solutions. So far, the role of the North-eastern states has been negligible, and the LEP seems to be dictated by the central government. Besides, the huge amounts of grants and subsidies have not generated any substantial economic growth, but given rise to an age of rampant corruption and the current glitch of the Indian polity, namely, “Kleptocracy” or ‘the rule of thieves’, a term used by Bezboruah (2009), who highlights the various projects that exist on the papers but benefits none except for the ones who manage to steal the government allocated funds to fill their pockets. The most popular schemes for such siphoning business are the different government plans for guaranteeing rural development under NREGA. Although it does not take special skills to deduce that this kind of extensive corruption takes place due to negligent State machinery, Bezboruah clearly states that siphoning of money has remained so easy year after year, despite mandatory audits because this is precisely what the providers of the funds want; they too are the beneficiaries of this systemic corrupt order. Further, with special emphasis on the necessity of improved governance and the centre’s notion of economic justice, he says thus:

“The difference in the Northeast is that in addition to this form of kleptocracy, there is also the input of terrorism (commonly referred to euphemistically as ‘insurgency’) to make the game a little more exciting. In fact, in the Northeast, where there has been so little of industrial activity in the last 30 years, people have managed to turn terrorism into an industry. It got started as a cottage industry, but has now become a medium-scale industry of sorts. If we give it a few more years, we shall probably see terrorism turned into a heavy industry. This is what happens when the benevolent Centre keeps on giving huge dollops of grants to States even when the States fail to show any performance or even to establish convincingly how and where the money was spent. Contractors in flood-prone Assam who build embankments that collapse unfailingly every year are engaged year after year with no punishment of any kind because they have godfathers among the ministers who protect them. The fact that they cause a great deal of human misery and some deaths every year seems to be of no consequence at all. The blue-eyed boys remain in place, quite immune to the laws of the land for cheating, fraud, causing injury and damage and even for murder.”

There is therefore a school of thought amongst various scholars and intellectuals that what the centre must be doing is ensuring that people are provided with manual and cerebral skills which will enable them to be self-reliant, and not crippling their potentials by providing opportunities to amass easy wealth in the form of huge grants which vanish unaccounted for. What the region requires is an opportunity to generate its own economy for its own sustenance, an opportunity that is not offered in its entirety by the paternalistic attitude adopted by the Centre towards this region. It is not merely act of chance, therefore, that such an approach bears striking similarity with the one adopted by the Imperialists when they try to extend their authority over a territory as their colony and disempower its natives, so that they can never become the masters of their own land or their own fate, and have to constantly return to colonizers for their survival as colonial subjects. Thus, the situation that one is made to witness is not so much of postcolonial as it is “Neo-colonial”, where the foreign administrators are replaced by indigenous administrators but the colonial attitudes and exploitative regimes continue.

The World Bank describes the conditions of this region as a low-level equilibrium of poverty, nondevelopment, civil conflict, and lack of trust in political leadership. The history of the NER as a frontier, and the negligence of the policy makers to contradictions rooted in this context, explains the shortfalls of democracy, development and peace. Historically, there was a peculiar dynamics in the relations between the non-state spaces of the hills in this part of the world with the labor-starved low land states, which provided the grounds for a world of multiple languages and cultures which were different and yet in close proximity with each other. The transformation of the non-state spaces into state-controlled spaces gave way for many of the conflicts pertaining to the Northeast of India. This transformation has provoked varied forms of resistance, and the exceptionally diverse ethnic landscape of this region has created a politics of sorts, with multiple competing agendas. In addition, this region has seen substantial immigration from other parts of the subcontinent which makes managing indigenous-settlers tensions a priority. Cross-border migration has continued besides interstate migration from other parts of India, and the partition of the country in 1947 did not seem to suddenly alter the logic of a frontier and snap the flow from one densely populated area to a relatively sparsely populated region, once open to new settlements but now separated by an international border.

Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have become a part and parcel of daily life. Apart from counterinsurgency operations, the Indian response has included massive infusion of development funds and variety of ill-perceived and unscrupulous designs for conflict management and resolution, one of them being Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA),  1958, which gives sweeping powers to the security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations, including immunity against prosecution if any suspect is killed. This law has lead to numerous extra-judicial killings and uncountable atrocities in different parts of the North-east. It violates international human rights norms, and is vehemently criticized by national and international human rights organizations. According to Sanjib Baruah (2009), these are the measures or “certain authoritarian trappings that India’s democratic institutions have acquired in order to maintain a permanent counterinsurgency capacity.” The aforementioned law today provides the legal framework for counterinsurgency operations against numerous armed rebellions in this region. The law has been amended a number of times to accommodate changes in the names and the number of states, and it now applies to the whole of North-east (It was repealed in some parts of Manipur in 2004). The protests against the AFSPA raise serious doubts about the claim that the fight against insurgencies in the North-east was being won. It is certainly more difficult to claim that the triumph was over the battle for hearts and minds of the people. The “naked protest” in Manipur which was widely reported must have made many Indian citizens wonder. Feminist writer, Butalia wrote: “…how humiliated, how violated, how angry must a woman feel to think that this is the only way she can make people listen?” However, such sentiments were not enough to get the Indian establishment to re-conceptualize its policy toward the North-east. As Baruah mentions, “For India, the display and use of military power has become a routine way of asserting State sovereignty in the North-east.”

The reality is, therefore, in sharp contrast to the popular national narratives of “India Shining” – a slogan that celebrates India’s democracy, high economic growth rates, and a new found recognition in the global arena. While India and China remain strategic rivals, India’s “Look East” policy has included significant rapprochement with China. Since 1993, India began holding high-level talks with Chinese leaders and established confidence-building measures. However, it is important to reiterate here, that India never perceived a threat emanating from the Asia-Pacific except China. India’s defence capabilities are formidable and its economy is also one of the fastest growing, and it is the only country in this region that can match up to China in terms of its size and military power. In 2006, China and India opened the Nathu La Pass for cross-border trade for the first time since the 1962 war. However, China’s close relations with Pakistan and border disputes in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh have threatened the improvement in bilateral relations. Security becomes a very important consideration according to the realist perspective of India’s Look East strategy. A successful Look East Policy is thereby also required to provide India with ammunition to thwart China’s projection of power in the regions conceived as being crucial for India’s national interest. India’s insecurity with regards to China is another reason why counterinsurgency operations refuse to cease in the NER. There is a dominant viewpoint amongst political pundits that India and ASEAN has a common aim of Chinese containment in the Southeast Asian economies, due to which India should strengthen its relation with this grouping. However, with the Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government which succeeded the BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) the liberal thinkers seem to feel little differently. According to C.S. Kuppuswamy, “…there is no point in creating an impression that India is in competition with China. This is unnecessary and counter productive. The economic potential of this region should be a more compelling factor than this subsidiary aim.” The extended LEP builds on the same understanding that there is no benefit in antagonizing China, and thus, in contradiction with the geo-strategic attempts to counter Chinese influence, there have been parallel attempts to normalize relations with China and explore possibilities of cooperation.

Besides, the above mentioned realist and neo-liberal perspectives of the LEP, there also exists a third dimension which can be explored for maximized positive impact, and that is the communitarian approach. According to Shibashis Chatterjee, “It requires a voluntarist account where the participants, particularly the people of India’s North-east states- from where the Look East vision should be actively launched- are not understood either as blind supporters of the policy or as uncritical recipients of oddly invisible benefits of statist wisdom, but are legally and politically empowered to look east for and of themselves.” Chatterjee emphasizes the relevance of the NER in the context of India’s LEP. It is clear that India is willing to pursue closer trade relations with its eastern neighbors, and this carries various prospects for the NER, provided the trade traffic moves through the land routes. However, roads and rail linkages in the east has remained subject to mutual fear of insurgency, terrorism and/or Chinese expansion, due to which most of India’s trade expansion with the Southeast Asia has taken place via seaports. Thus, once again NER has got marginalized and despite the potential, trade through the Manipur-Myanmar route has remained meager and insignificant to the regional economy. Moreover, the trade routes between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet are still closed in the absence of a border agreement, and links to Yunnan through Manipur, Mizoram or via Myanmar are not even in the sphere of discussion. It is seen that India has not been very keen at involving with China multilaterally, although it has been striving to improvise at bilateral fronts. At the multilateral level, India prefers the trans-national and regional initiatives like the Ganga-Mekong sub-region and BIMST-EC which do not include China, over BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Regional Economic Forum). Similarly, on the road building fronts too, there is reluctance in rebuilding the Stillwell Road that could connect the NER to the Yunnan-Northern Myanmar-Southeast Asia corridor. Therefore, Chatterjee points out, “So long as China is kept at a distance…steps towards cross border region building cannot gain momentum”.

However, it is not entirely true that the NER is a landlocked ‘state’ (Verghese 2001) and that the lack of access to the ocean is the main reason for the region’s unrelenting underdevelopment. Historically, this region was placed along the Silk Road, which was in use till the nineteenth century, and facilitated the spread of Buddhism from India across Asia, along with trade of silk and other commodities. Assamese towns like Hajo and Sualkuchi were important trading centers and pilgrimages for Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists. Hence, Sanjib Baruah argues, “North-east region’s recent history as a remote, underdeveloped and troubled hinterland is neither inevitable nor unchangeable”. It is in fact, very necessary to give a ‘continental orientation’ to the LEP by providing direct roles to the North-eastern states. India can make use of the North-east’s history and culture as a ‘soft power resource’ (Chatterjee 2007). As Indians talk about Buddhism, Angkor Vat and the Ramayana in stressing their shared cultural affinities with Southeast Asia, it is a rare occurrence that they refer to the Southeast Asian roots of the Tai Ahoms (Saikia 2005, Chatterjee 2007) or the Khasis, and acknowledge that Balinese Hinduism and art forms are probably more close to Manipur than to those of the Hindi heartland. Therefore, it is necessary for the LEP to have a continental thrust and include a trans-national region-building vision if it wishes to become the pathway to NER’s peace and prosperity. According to Chatterjee, a genuine radical LEP, “calls for communitization of space as a zone of social communication”, and that seems beyond the capacity of IndianState to deliver.

As we realize that the LEP provides an invaluable opening for the NER to overcome its state of developmental and economic dormancy, it would also be helpful to view this policy as a vital opportunity for the Indian State to shed off its tendency toward parochial territoriality after years and years of marginalizing the region and committing atrocities on its people. The integration of the NER within a dense economic framework spreading over Myanmar to Korea through Bangladesh, Thailand and the new ASEAN states, “might ultimately help the marginalized region to transcend the historical tyranny of fixed borders and allow its inhabitants the fullest possible benefits in the process of economic exchanges qua the Look East move” (Chatterjee 2007). Thus, by investing on community building and soft border exercises, the LEP could envisage a successful economic transformation of the North-east. This vision of community formation is diametrically opposed to that of the realist discourse, and is unperturbed by the statist and the mainstream security deliberations. It is not hostile to the liberalist conception of space but it certainly places the thoughts of the community above those of the market. Till the Indian government is ready with a clear conceptual map of the policy, and reorganizes its priorities in terms of power, prosperity and community as it articulates its desired end, the Look East Policy would continue to be an unproductive tussle over approaches, depending on the policy makers from time to time.

The views expressed are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect InPEC’s editorial position. 

Sabina Yasmin Rahman is an M.Phil student at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.

Bibliography:

• Asher, Mukul G., Srivastava, Sadhana (2003) India and the Asian Economic Community, NationalUniversity of Singapore
• Baruah, Sanjib (2007) Post frontier Blues: Toward a New Policy Framework for Northeast India, WashingtonD.C.: East-West CenterWashington
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• Bezboruah, D.N. (2009) The Economy of Kleptocracy, Dialogue (A quarterly journal of Astha Bharati), January-March 10(3)
• Chatterjee, Shibashis (2007) Conception of Space in India’s Look East Policy: Order, Cooperation or Community, South Asian Survey, 14(1):65-81, Sage Publications
• Das, H.N. (2008) Economic Consequences of Insurgency in the North-East, Dialogue (A quarterly journal of Astha Bharati), April-June 9(4)
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• Mooshahari, R.S. (2005) India’s Look East Policy Integrating the North Eastern Region, Assam Information Commission, Guwahati, from www.sicassam.in
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By Siddharth Singh, 24th April, 2013

On a recent RTCC article, I begin,

“(The Prime Minister made…) bold promises about India’s commitment to the (renewable energy) cause. These include a goal to double India’s renewable energy capacity from 25000 MW in 2012 to 55000 MW by 2017.

This in turn includes, for instance, the National Solar Mission which has an objective of developing 22000 MW of solar capacity by the year 2022. These are a part of India’s commitment to reduce the energy intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020.”

I present a few reasons why India may find it hard to keep up with these promises. Two of these are, 1. general delays in project implementation and 2. the overbearing fiscal deficit. From the article:

“(…) it is commonplace to find projects delayed across sectors. According to a study by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, as of May 2012, 42% of the infrastructure projects in consideration were delayed.

Another issue is the precarious fiscal situation of the government.(…) The impact of this may go either way for the renewables sector. On the one hand, lowering fossil fuel subsidies and the rise of overall electricity prices (by the ways of a loan restructuring arrangement with state electricity companies) may make renewables more competitive with traditional sources.”

To read this article in its entirety, please visit RTCC by clicking here.

Siddharth Singh is an economic analyst based in New Delhi. He is the Editor of InPEC. He can be found on Twitter here.

The provocative rhetoric coming from North Korea could hide a faint sense of desperation.

By Gulshan Roy, 3rd April, 2013

On Saturday 30^th March, a statement released by the highest North Korean command warned that it was entering “a state of war” with its feuding southern neighbour. As Koreans on both sides watched the unfolding drama being broadcast on every major international television news channel, Mr Kim Jong-un managed to conjure an even more spectacular artifice by releasing photographs of him discussing with his senior commanders under the backdrop of a ‘Plan to Hit the U.S Mainland’ written in bold. News channels are not often presented with opportunities for such great TV. Yet, Mr Kim’s moment of teeth-showing turned into bathos once it reached its intended audience: instead of injecting any sense of panic on the other side of the Pacific, the images received in Washington were swiftly turned into material fit for some banter over bourbon.

The escalation of tensions between North Korea and the Seoul-Washington axis tends to occur each time the South elects a new chief of government. So when Madame Park Geun-hye was recently inaugurated South Korea’s new president, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) ensured that tradition was duly respected. Furthermore, the situation was not helped by the fact that her inauguration came just before the annual US- South Korea joint military exercise which also triggers the North’s fuming fits.

President Obama’s administration would have half-expected this flourish from the hermit kingdom. Since the scenes showing the overzealous emotion with which North-Koreans wept over the death of the ‘Dear Leader’ Kim Jong-il, his son has had to work out a way of asserting himself as the new Supreme Leader, one that would at least emulate the isolationist achievements of his lineage. In other words, he has needed a way of rallying his people behind him. Mr Kim (Junior) did not need to seek the counsel of Iran’s president to understand that the most effective way to achieve that aim was to openly display some petulance towards everybody’s favourite old foe- the United States. By showing some verbal muscle this weekend, he might think his ploy will pay dividends at home but he has in fact taken an unnecessary gamble, for the last vestiges supporting his regime outside his half of the peninsula are beginning to disappear.

After the United Nations brokered an armistice between the two halves of Korea in 1953, the South rested on firm U.S support. In the decades that followed, it adopted a model of economic growth that favoured trade and openness to foreign investment, penetrating notoriously impervious markets with aplomb (the automobile industry for instance). Seoul’s diplomats quickly mastered international geo-political subtleties through its economic success and its show of good faith towards the said universal values enshrined in the UN Charter.

In contrast, its neighbour made of isolationism its leitmotif, with the exception of the relations it cultivated with its allies of the communist bloc. Mr Kim Junior’s father in particular had carefully woven a close tie with Beijing over the years. After the fall of the Soviet bloc, and more recently in 2002 since it began having nuclear aspirations (earning itself a place in Monsieur George Bush Junior’s ‘Axis of Evil’- Star Wars stuff), North Korea has had to increasingly rely on Chinese support to the point that it would today crumble without it: 32% of its population is undernourished and its per capita GDP is at par with some of the lowest in the world. Without China as its éminence grise, the Pyongyang model would end in tragedy, highlighting why Mr Kim Junior may have committed a blunder by affording himself a little too much wit.

In an article in the East Asia Forum, Professor Kia Qingguo of the School of International Studies, Peking University, argues that there are several reasons why China might be tempted to unplug its life-saving drip to its long-term protégé. Until now, Beijing’s policy has been to find a delicate balancing act between North Korea’s denuclearization (as no one enjoys the sight of a nuke in the neighbour’s backyard) and its stability (as Pyongyang’s collapse would lead to a considerable influx of refugees coming into Chinese territory), while ensuring that its relationship with a state with a 1.2million-strong army remains a serene one. Until now, the emphasis for Beijing had been on North Korea’s stability but the tables have turned. The inauguration of China’s new president Xi Jinping marks a radical departure from its traditional Pyongyang policy, as the North Korean Ambassador would best know, having received a stern telling-off from the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi following the most recent nuclear test coming from the peninsula.

Yet, China’s fading support for Kim Jong-un is by no means the main reason behind America’s humorous reception of his masquerade. On 28^th March, after North Korea had cut off its hotline with the South, the United States conducted air drills with stealth B-2 bombers on a close-by island stating they could conduct long-range strikes (including nuclear ones) swiftly and with precision. Since the end of the Second World War, nobody has quite matched Uncle Sam’s polished military biceps and Mr Kim’s arsenal still looks faintly plump and rotund in comparison: he has plans to strike the U.S mainland but his long-range ballistic missiles can only reach Alaska (and even that is questionable). Should he intend to further escalate into conflict, rest assured even the first U.S president to ever win the Nobel Peace Prize would not hesitate one second to press the red button inside his nuclear suitcase (remember Hiroshima).

In a sense, the Supreme Leader could scarce have afforded not to riposte to America’s stealthy B-2 quip. He would have appeared weak while his people would have reminisced on past days of supposed glory under his father and grandfather and would have more importantly felt that the foundations of their model were being shaken. But we outside the DPRK know just how fragile these bases really are. With the freshest round of UN sanctions and China’s hand stroking the plug, the young leader is facing what are probably the most testing times in his country’s history. Thus, the thunderous roar from the north of the Korean peninsula that should have made the calm Pacific tremble and Mr Obama shiver sounds more like a weak squealing plea of help.

Sparing a thought for the victims of the 30^th March Floods in Mauritius.

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin. He can be followed on twitter here.

By Yayaati Joshi, 12th March 2013

To begin with, I deem it appropriate to describe the proposed reforms and the purported merits of those reforms in the financial, energy and retail sectors of India, and mention briefly, the state of the affairs of the Indian economy. The growth of the GDP in the last 5 years has been less than encouraging, to say the least. Looking at the trend of the GDP from 2004—that’s when the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the key figure of the 1991 Economic Reform, has been shouldering the responsibility of running the country—it has resembled a sine curve, with the crests and troughs rising and falling dramatically in 2010 onwards.

One would have satisfied oneself by imagining, that the crests and troughs represent the inevitable movements of the business cycle, but the cycle seems to be moving only in one direction after 2010: downward. The GDP growth fell sharply from 9.6% in 2010 to 6.9% in 2011, and the growth rate slipped to a dismal 5.5% during the first quarter of 2012.

In response to the slowing of the growth rate, the government of India has decided to take a few measures to revive the economy. Chief amongst them is the plan to change the regulatory structure of the financial markets. Currently, there are as many as four regulators in the Indian financial markets, namely: the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) and the Pension Fund and Regulatory Development Authority (PERDA). However, the efficacy of SEBI, the most important of the regulators, has been under question ever since it was found that a whole-time member of SEBI acted as a whistle blower regarding its inability to handle effectively the cases of corruption against some players in the market. To address this, the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC), recommended reducing the number of regulators to just one.  Under the proposed plan, a sole regulatory body will help integrate the regulations of the entire market, thereby ensuring expediency in doing business and in facilitating free exchange of liquid capital assets. This will be important, as capital is increasingly becoming more stateless, in the sense that the world is moving towards the concept of Capitalism 3.0, and “integration” is now the key to not only regional, but also global economic prosperity.

This reduction in the number of regulators is most interesting, as its effect will not be limited to the financial sector.  Recently, the government has, amid much hullabaloo, approved infusion of foreign capital. Simply put, this decision will open up India to companies like Walmart (a multi-brand retail operation) as well as IKEA (a single-brand retail operation). Despite all the optimism, the fact that the organised retail sector accounts for only 5% of the entire retail market cannot be ignored. By encouraging foreign investment, India is looking to be at par with other countries in Asia such as Japan, where organised retail sector accounts for over 60% of the retail market. In the long run, the growth in the organised sector will produce externalities, which will be beneficial for the economy as a whole.

Liberalisation of the energy sector remains to be a key reform in the country.  The power failure in Northern India in July 2012, an indelible blot on the face of the Indian government, gave impetus to the predominant policy of attracting foreign investments. The privatisation of the energy production sector through foreign direct investments (FDI) is intended to ensure reliable and consistent access to power. About three months later, the government proposed the restructuring of the debts owed by the states in India. Although the power producers and the states themselves breathed a sigh of relief, government intervention in debt payment showed the inability of the states to produce electricity in such a way that the demand does not outstrip the supply. While the government itself knows that there can be no, “one step solution” to the problem of electricity, foreign investments have been earmarked as essential.

Re-examining the events that led to the economic reforms in 1991, we can surmise that the reforms were as much a result of IMF’s suggestion as they were of the Finance Ministry’s own volition. Notably, a Balance of Payments crisis occurred in 1991, forcing the government to take IMF’s advice of suspending import tariffs, moving from a fixed to a floating exchange rate as well as deregulating the industrial sector. As per the plan, Quantitative Easing was implemented, and profit-making public sector undertakings were promoted and prevented from being privatised. Now, 22 years later, the government faces a similar situation — that of fiscal deficit — and people are looking at Mr. Singh’s prowess to redeem the Indian economy once again. The (literally) million-dollar question is – will liberalisation work a second time?

In a speech, Prime Minister Singh stated that the government had been voted twice “to protect the interests of the aam aadmi” (Hindi for common man). In the same speech, he made it a point to remind the nation that “money does not grow on trees”— a reference to the growing fiscal deficit and the obligations that it places on the government. In order to finance those obligations, the government needs to make certain unpopular decisions, i.e. increasing fuel prices. This rise in prices is a self-defeating policy for an Economist who claims his approach to be inclusive growth.

Similarly, it is quite clear, that despite Mr. Singh’s assurances, foreign direct investments in retail would hamper the well-being of the local retail trade. Walmart would look to backward and forward integrate its processes, and eventually, to eliminate any middleman costs and supply chain debacles that they face. Perhaps, realising this himself, Mr. Singh has given veto power to the state governments, whether they want to fling open their doors to foreign investment in their respective retail sector. By doing this, he has, on paper, done the right thing as far as the economy is concerned.  Politically too, he has done the right thing, by letting the states decide for themselves — if they want to prioritise local retail industry over the foreign retail giants.

India is composed of various states, differing in culture, economy, geographical conditions and connectivity, and even more so, on the merits and pitfalls of foreign capital.  This never ending struggle that the government faces of choosing either its votes – by making decisions which will not help the economy from bouncing back – or its economic principles, following which, is the only way to improve the state of affairs. Stuck in this quandary, the government will always have to temper its difficult decisions by including more populist elements in the strategy, such as this one in which it is the state governments that ultimately decide the fate of foreign investment.

The reforms that have been planned by the government are all long-term measures, as opposed to some slapdash policy meant to create only momentary benefits. However, the chances of the same government being re-elected are slim, owing to the media exposés of various scandals involving some government ministers.

For instance, FDI in the retail industry, while presumably dampening the local retail industry to begin with, will in the long run, produce more jobs, result in higher wages and reverse the effects of the vicious circle of poverty. Therefore, for these reforms to be truly effective, the common man will have to get rid of the myopic view he has of “growth”. In fairness, the concept of delayed gratification is hard to explain to a nation, with 40% of its people earning a daily income of less than $1.25.  More importantly, the common man, for whom the government claims to be working for, will have to forget and forgive its misdeeds and give the government another chance to prove itself.

One remembers former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan when he said that “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” Mr. Singh needs to be re-elected in order to finish what he started. Sadly, due to the political machinations, it is believed that even if the UPA is re-elected, Mr. Singh, the Oxford economist, is unlikely to become the Prime Minister again.

In the absence of a figure who can oversee and truly understand the implementation of the economic reforms and policies discussed above, chances are the benefits from the reforms will remain an unrealised dream, and their effects will be limited, and will tend to favour only those who possess the wherewithal to see the bigger picture. And that’s akin to making a medicine, that will cure a disease, but only of those who have some special, innately endowed, genetic advantages.

The views are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial position of InPEC. 

Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: “A quarter of Iran’s Nuclear Energy scientists are women.” The photograph shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of Tehran’s research reactor.
Photo courtesy Wikimedia Commons

As talks have resumed over Iran’s nuclear program in Almaty, the failure of the sanctions regime raises serious questions about mainstream diplomatic commonplaces. Far from being the favour it is portrayed to be, the rapprochement effort towards Tehran from the P5+1 is borne out of necessity.

By Gulshan Roy, 8th March 2013

“Iran won’t retreat one iota from its nuclear program” was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s declaration on Iranian national television on the 9th of November 2011. The Iranian President is used to defiant flourishes as evidenced by his repeated promises to ‘finish off’ Israel. To his credit, however, his resolve not to sink in the face of gradually increasing pressure from the West has been steadfast. His country is weathering a deadly sanctions regime that has all but crippled the Iranian economy. Last week, the two sides met in Almaty, Kazakhstan in a desperate attempt to salvage the worsening situation. And as a beaming Mr Ali Baqeri (Iran’s deputy chief negotiator) left the fruitless round of negotiations with the P5+1 (the five permanent Security Council members and Germany), sanction-fanatics in the West were uncomfortably loosening their ties and scratching their moist foreheads. They ought to.

The regime under Ayatollah Khomeini is dispelling a myth that has emerged in mainstream diplomatic spheres over the last decades- that if you use the stick of sanctions hard and often enough, you will eventually obtain what you want from the other side. G.C Hufbauer, J. Scott and K.A. Elliott examined the history of sanctions between 1914 and 1990 and found them to be effective in only one-third of cases. Robert Pape, a Stanford political scientist, argues that this figure ought to be brought down to an eighth. I suspect a rotund silhouette somewhere in the north of the Korean peninsula would silently nod in agreement.

In the case of Iran, one need not delve too much into scholarly readings about coercive diplomacy to understand why the model failed. A set of strenuous economic sanctions has caused the Rial to free-fall against the US dollar over the past two years, hurting ordinary Iranians as they pay more for everyday imports. Several humanitarian agencies have been ringing the alarm bells over the dearth of medical supplies coming into Iran, a situation that is threatening many lives. As the country’s relative wealth shrinks, Iranians are more than ever fuming at the West. The regime has cleverly suited the situation to its ends, adopting the Indomitable Gauls narrative with evident success. Iran is showing no signs of ceding ground and the return of diplomats at Almaty is a sign that the rest of the world is waking up to that reality.

There is another, slightly more complex argument to be made for the P5+1 group to redefine its relationship with Tehran, and it involves Damascus. Sunni-Shia tensions in this part of the world have not often been this fragile, as we have seen from the recent bombings in Pakistan. Last Thursay, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister went so far as warning that an opposition victory for the Sunni majority in Syria would spill-over causing sectarian violence in both his country and Lebanon. He has a point. Iran has consistently backed Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawite (a group akin to Shia Islam) regime and has been accused of arming Hezbollah in the conflict. It is not difficult to see why: The volume of trade between the two countries is just over US $16 billion. In the last 3 years Iran and Syria have agreed a gas pipeline deal worth US $10 billion, a US $5 billion-deal for a Centre for Strategic Research to be opened in Iran and another one for a jointly-owned bank to be opened in Damascus. If, or rather when, Bashar Al-Assad falls, Iran’s influence in the country might fall with him- a disaster for an already limping economy.

Hence, a paper published by Loren White of the Atlantic Council, a think tank, argues that genuine diplomacy might be the most efficient way of approaching the Iran nuclear quandary. Mr Ahmadinejad has hinted at being open to the idea of Syria becoming a mediator in the negotiations over its nuclear disarmament while there is little doubt that he would be anxious to ensure Alawite representation in a transitional Syrian government. These two presents for Persia could just aid the rapprochement effort with Tehran.

Henry Kissinger recently stated at Davos that a war with Iran could happen in “the very foreseeable future.” The deadline for a resolution is set for the day Iran’s uranium enrichment reaches 20% which, according to the International Atomic and Energy Agency would enable it to use its nuclear power for non-civilian purposes. At the current trend, it should be able to reach those levels before the end of 2013. Hasan Danaie-Far, an Iranian ambassador, did little to help temper minds when he declared on the 24th of January that “the only card remaining on the table is war.” Do not be conned, however, as for all the bicep-flexing both sides know that war is a last resort. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps is severely wounded by asset-freezes while neither Europe nor America would rub their hands at the idea of another prolonged intervention in these troubled times. How Israel will respond as we approach the 20% D-day is unknown, though one may guess.

In 53 BCE, Crassus, a Roman famed for his wealth led a 40,000-strong army of centurions into the large empty plains of Carrhae (modern Harran) in Persia certain he would only meet negligible resistance. The Romans confronted 10,000 Parthian horsemen archers. After a few days’ fight, all that remained of the Romans were some 500 captured survivors, while the head of the legendary Crassus was sent to the Parthian King Orodes for some courtly fun and games.

This is a part of the world that has seldom buckled under outside pressure. Though Western diplomats are at pains to make their return to the negotiating table sound as a favour, what transpires is that they are doing it out of necessity and a faint sense of panic. Meanwhile, the Ayatollah’s regime stoically refuses to budge. One would venture making the argument that the country the historian Michael Axworthy calls ‘the Empire of the Mind’ presently just about holds the edge in a fascinating battle of wits. The question is for how long?

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin.

He can be followed on twitter here.

The drone program has considerably intensified under the Obama administration. As the American press and congress are only now waking up to this fact, the silent response from the White House shows the president is not quite the peacekeeper he projects himself to be.

By Gulshan Roy, 26th February 2013

Drones. You hear about them spying from everywhere though you can never see them. At last, however, you may now luckily read quite a lot about them in the written press. On February 6th, The New York Times revealed that air-strikes conducted in Yemen came from unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs) from an American military base in Saudi Arabia. Since, every hawk and every dove of every state in America made sure to have their screeching and cooing heard on the issue, drowning the debate in their deafening staccato. Why so much agitation, you may ask?

The role of UAV’s in U.S defence strategy has been steadily growing and could soon become its most important component. Under President Obama, the use of drones has already increased more than twofold than under his predecessor Monsieur Bush. Their numbers have increased from fifty-four in October 2001 to more than 4000 today. America intends to invest a further $17.9 billion on them over the next ten years.

It is not only their numbers that have increased, but also their loci of influence. Aside from the most frequent drone strikes you hear coming from North Waziristan and Yemen, UAVs have also been caught spying on Iran and late on Saturday, it was announced that 100 American soldiers would be deployed to set up a drone base in Niger. It seems U.S security strategists are obediently abiding by Napoleon’s old adage that ‘war is above all a business of positions’.

Yet, the clearest indication of this administration’s love of remote-controlled flying machines came with the appointment of John Brennan as the new CIA chief. Brennan had until now been in charge of the secret kill-list of Al-Qaeda insurgents under the Obama administration- he wrote down the names, the drones killed. The obdurate intensification of the program shows that the president finds something deeply enticing with the UAVs.

Think about it: drones enable you to peer down onto the enemy’s base without anyone being inside the machines. They also come much cheaper and require less coordination than a ground infantry operation. Today, the United States is able to assist France in their Malian operation through drones deployed from Niger- not one American life will be at risk. Yet, their greatest advantage, we are told, is that they can take down an enemy with minute precision with zero collateral damage, that is, with no civilian casualty. Or can they?

Take the case of Salem Ahmed bin Ali Jaber, for instance, who was a cleric denouncing Al-Qaeda in his village mosque in eastern Yemen. He was killed as a drone missile shot down its target, an insurgent with whom Mr Jaber and other men were arguing under a cluster of palm trees. Over 3,500 people have been killed, just like them, in 420 drone strikes under Obama. I will concede that the case of Mr Jaber does not in itself question the accuracy of the UAVs, but questions instead the judgement of those who have decided to strike.

How do a group of men arguing under a cluster of trees in Yemen constitute a direct and imminent threat to U.S national security? The American hawks and doves were quite happy to avoid this inconvenient question until two Predator drones shot down Hellfire missiles on Anwar Al-Awlaqi’s vehicle in September 2011. Al-Awlaqi was a U.S citizen alleged to have helped the former UCL student Umar Abdulmutallab in his bomb attempt on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 in December 2009. The killing of a U.S citizen was thrown into the lions’ den of the American press and suddenly, killing clerics in faraway mountains was not quite OK anymore. And what of the emperor? Was it OK for him to execute his own subjects at will?

Only now is Congress waking up to the reality of the true extent of the drone program. It is still unsure how to respond to all this partly because just like us, it is treading into largely unknown territory. In the absence of any light coming from the White House, congressmen have timidly whispered for greater checks on the president’s prerogative in the form of a ‘drone court’, composed of judges, to decide whether to give a green light to the president’s shooting-down order. Neal Katyal of the New York Times thinks it is a bad idea. I think it is an absurd one.

But congress must conjure something to impose a check on the president’s prerogative. For unilateral action has never been well received among liberal democrats (remember Bush). Saskia Sassen of Columbia University, an authority, even goes so far as arguing on Al-Jazeera that the drones program signals a new era for liberal democracies, “where the executive branch gains power partly through its increasingly international activities.”

It is difficult to disagree. As the debate over the program rages in the press and in Congress, drone bases continue to be built far to the East and the silence from the White House remains religious. One can hardly eschew the conclusion that Mr Obama’s mantle of liberal Nobel Peace Prize winner hides a far more ruthless commander-in-chief.

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin.

He can be followed on twitter here.

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By Hemley Gonzalez, 21st February, 2013

The Kumbh Mela is a Hindu religious pilgrimage that takes place every twelve years at one of four places: Allahabad, Haridwar, Ujjain and Nashik in India. More than 100 million people are to attend the 2013 Kumbha mela.

The major event of the festival is ritual bathing at the banks of the Ganga river. Other activities include religious discussions, devotional singing, mass feeding of holy men and women and the poor, and religious assemblies where doctrines are debated and standardized.

Kumbh Mela is the most sacred of all the pilgrimages. Thousands of holy men and women attend, and the auspiciousness of the festival is in part attributable to this. The sadhus are seen clad in saffron sheets with Vibhuti ashes dabbed on their skin as per the requirements of ancient traditions. Some, called naga sanyasis, may not wear any clothes even in severe winter.

1. Organised workers carry what was rumored to be a dead body of a lady. 

2. Pilgrims take a dip in the river.

3. A member of the Disaster Relief Force helps co-ordinate the holy dips.

4. The pilgrims on any given day were in the millions.
5. On the banks of the Ganga.6. The pilgrims.7. A naked sadhu – smeared with ashes – seen on a horse.8. A sadhu.9. Photographers throng the banks of the river to take photos of the known faces. 

10. A sadhu reaches out to Hemley. 

11. A security guard looks on. 

12. The holy dip.

by Farid Marjai and Mehrnaz Shahabi, 4th February 2013.

“Iranian Mothers for Peace,” in an open letter of January 2013 to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, and Dr. Margaret Chan, the Director General of the World Heath Organization, have alerted the responsible world bodies and human rights organizations to the critical shortage of vital medication due to the US/EU-led sanctions on Iran and their deadly impact on the lives and health of the Iranian population.

Iranian Mothers for Peace is a non-profit forum, well known and respected in Iran’s civil society.  In 2006 a number of social activists came together to form this forum.  Mothers for Peace is not a political party and organisationally it has a flexible structure.  Mothers for Peace takes pride that its 700 participants come from very diverse political backgrounds and different social classes.  It affirmatively celebrates diversity which it considers a reflection of the tolerance the group espouses.

With the ideal of peace in mind, Mothers for Peace is open to all participants who take a stand against any form of violence, poverty, and oppression.

“In our campaigns to protect the environment, we encourage measures that reduce the impact of human violence against it.  We take solid steps to eliminate and mitigate gender inequality.  Over the years, our projects have focused on welfare of addicts and prisoners, and publicizing their rights.

“The scope of our vision and work is to achieve social security and permanent peace.  Hence, this non-profit institution has a wider definition of the concept of ‘peace’; it refutes the narrow perspective of ‘peace’ as mere absence of external military violence and confrontation.  And it is precisely in this context that we view the Western-imposed crippling sanctions on the people of Iran as a form of structural violence — a silent, yet a predatory war.

“The everyday reality we observe on the ground in Iran has convinced us that the draconian sanctions are victimizing the very fabric of the society we intend to strengthen.

Presently, a number of the core group members of ‘Mothers for Peace’ are suffering from cancer.  Sadly, they are having a difficult time obtaining the medicines needed for their treatment, and like many of their compatriots they suffer from unnecessary additional anxiety that might further deteriorates their precarious health condition.”

Below is the text of the open letter (published at mothersofpeace-iran.com/?p=1049) in English.

* * *

Farid Marjai is a contributor to Reformist newspapers in Iran.  Mehrnaz Shahabi is an anti-war activist and independent researcher.

This week marks the 40th anniversary of Roe vs. Wade, the landmark decision by the US Supreme Court on the issue of abortion. Claire Beckenstein, a political consultant in Washington DC, looks at the political culture surrounding the issue to discuss how far American women have come and how far they still have to go.

By Claire Beckenstein, 22nd January, 2013

Abortion is an issue that evokes visceral responses from people at both ends of the spectrum.  This issue has the ability to divide a nation and separate a family.  It is so powerful that people will even kill in the name of the cause.  On the 40^th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, one could exhaust themselves for days thinking of the questions and assumptions around what America would be like without legalised abortion.  If we continue to fight the issues from our past we cannot move forward.  Therefore, it is best to focus on the present and note how monumental this decision has been for women and their health, especially to those women who view abortion as a choice, a freedom and as a right to take control of their future.

What strikes me the most about this issue is that everyone has an opinion; most notably those that have never had an abortion or have ever attempted to walk in another’s shoes.  Let’s be clear, no one wants the procedure and no one wakes up excited to have one. It is not a decision people make lightly.  It is painful in every sense of the word and there is no single reason for why people have an abortion.  When you talk to women who have had one, their personal view is overshadowing by a national stigma against it.  They are seen as selfish, promiscuous or unwilling to take personal responsibility with no respect for the sanctity of life.  I believe that when you sit down and really listen to women who have gone through the medical procedure, the response you will get is so far from that stigma.  You find a brave women who made the best decision based on the situation they were dealt.  You may even see hope and a sigh of relief that they had the option to put their life and well-being first.

I have heard a lot of chatter recently in anticipation for the anniversary of Roe v. Wade, mainly chatter focused on the decline of the “pro-choice” women’s movement and their inability to mobilize the base.  While I agree with this decline and think that the movement only sees resurgence when they are under attack, I also believe we must change our perspective on a day that means so much for so many.  We need to shift our attention away from the decline in the “pro-choice” movement and onto the lives changed and saved in the past 40 years from the legalization of abortion.  This is about reproductive justice and the freedom to control our bodies.  People need to accept that this is a medical option you can take without fear of being shunned.  We need to use our voices and proclaim this is real and is happening as we speak.  We can only do this by removing the curtain that stigmatises abortion and celebrate the progress we have made.  Abortion has a face and that face belongs to your mother, sister, friend, aunt, neighbor, mentor or maybe even you.

This day should remind us all of how far we have come and how far we still need to go.  It should not focus on a movement’s failures, generational divides or lack of energy, but celebrate the victories in the women’s movement that have led us to this moment.  I hope that the women from 40 years ago marching for our rights would be proud of where we have come, and I hope I am proud of the next generation to hold the torch.  Most importantly, I want everyone to take a second and pause today to think of what the world will look like as a woman 40 years from now, and what the progress we have yet to make will look like.

Children playing football in Mali (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

On January 11, 2013, French President François Hollande sent a military expedition to rescue Dioncounda Traoré’s government from the “imminent terrorist threat”. Camille Maubert, a security analyst, explores this turn of events. 

By Camille Maubert, 16th January, 2013

Five days after the French “surprise” intervention in Mali, it is – to say the least – not clear what operation Serval is all about. Brandishing UN Article 51 (which proclaims the individual and collective right to protect a member subjected to armed aggression), French President François Hollande sent a military expedition to rescue Dioncounda Traoré’s government from the “imminent terrorist threat”.  750 ground troops, 30 tanks and several Rafale combat planes have thus been mobilised to strike Islamist strongholds in the North and West of Malian territory, making, according to “security sources”, important damage to the groups’ bases and leadership.

However, doubts are rising as to what the ins and outs of the intervention are in a context where reliable information is scarce. Indeed, most of the information publically available relies on two sources. On the one hand there are the official communiqués published by the various actors’ communication outlets which are often politically biased, and which are therefore unreliable and/or contradictory. For instance, while French defence spokesperson announces 60 terrorist casualties, the Malian army increases their number to “hundreds” and Islamic groups refuse to make any statements. On the other hand, the local press predominantly relies on witness accounts from the population and “local officials”. The weakness of such sources is patent, as they are based on what people saw, or think they saw, and therefore produces subjective and incomplete interpretations.

Keeping these limitations in mind, here are a few facts and thoughts that may shade some light on this disconcerting chain of events.

A recent national survey (Ifop) revealed that 63% of French citizens from all political backgrounds support the French armed intervention in Mali. Such “unanimous” rallying of the political intelligentsia at the bugle call is a worrying sign that Hollande’s decision to engage in the conflict was taken hastily, without real political debate. Ex-Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, who proclaimed France’s opposition to the Iraq War, deplored the “unison of warmongers”, asking how, from Afghanistan to Libya and Mali, France became “infected by the neoconservative virus” and came to take the lead in hazardous interventionist policies. Far-left representative Jean-Luc Mélanchon also expressed concerns about the legitimacy of the operation, condemning Hollande’s disregard of Parliament in his decision-making process. Others denounce the intervention as a reinstatement of the infamous “Françafrique”, which favoured the Metropole’s role as gendarme in its ex-colonies.

Yet, in his first Presidential speech in Africa, Hollande claimed his presidential term would break away from such noxious relationships and prioritise African sovereignty and political independence. On this ground, he declared as early as last October that no French troops would be involved in the Malian crisis, preferring an African solution to an African problem, dialogue to conflict. Hollande also announced a total pull-out from Afghanistan and strict reduction of France’s military budget for the years to come, in an attempt to fill the country’s debt gap. Why then, would he engage in a costly military intervention (assumed to cost 400 000€ per day)?

The justification invoked by Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault for France’s intervention is the support of his Malian ally, the commitment to the fight against terrorism, and the implementation of 22 December UNSC resolution 2085 which supports the creation of an international assistance force (MISMA). In some déjà-vu scenario, UN recommendations – specifically emphasising the importance of political negotiation among African counterparts – were however ignored in favour of unilateral military intervention by a Western army claiming to interfere “for a few weeks” to restore order and re-install a democratic government.

But this time, François Hollande appears to have committed to eradicate terrorism in Mali on his own. Despite an apparent consensus on the necessity to contain and defeat an Islamist entrenchment in Mali, the international community seems to position itself very cautiously vis-à-vis a crisis which ins and outs are not clear yet. Indeed, although ECOWAS countries pledged to send ground troops (Nigeria mobilised 600 men, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Togo 500 men each, and Benin 300) in the near future, it may take several months for them to prepare and take over control of the operations. In addition, Western states like the US, UK, Belgium and Germany only committed to provide the Malian army with medical and transport aid but no military assistance.

Moreover, France has no solid partner in Mali. The Malian army is still divided by the power struggles that toppled President Amadou Oumani Touré last January, numerous soldiers deserted, and the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) maintains its claims to the Northern half of Malian territory, restricting anti-terrorist operations in the area. On the contrary, the French intervention may possibly reinforce the Islamist groups which, until now, were divided along ideological allegiances and political agendas. French troops might provide them with a common enemy to fight and any civilian casualty they cause will be used to mobilise the population on their side.

As a result, French troops may well have embarked in a long and difficult campaign in Northern Mali. After almost a week, Operation Serval shows no sign of any serious strategic vision. As mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to obtain intelligence about events in this area and, although air raids on Islamist strongholds do restrain the groups’ room of manoeuver, one should not forget that militants are experimented and well equipped fighters with a good knowledge of the terrain – a desert territory larger than France.

France thus became the major actor in a crisis which complexities might well reach beyond expectations.

Firstly, the identity, structure, capabilities and support base of the groups it is confronted to are particularly uncertain, as are the intra and inter-group relationships and agendas. The absence of clear understanding of who the so-called terrorists are and how their activities fits in the wider regional dynamics is a major weakness of the French plan of action and may lead to unexpected setbacks in the future.

Secondly, the abovementioned amalgamation of the diverse Malian actors under the single label “terrorists” wrongly conveys the simplified idea that French troops are up against one unified enemy. Quite the opposite; they are moving into a multifaceted society where allegiances are shifting and prominently based on (cross-border) tribal structures.

Lastly, and most importantly, by taking such strong stance in Mali, France may further jeopardise its interests in the West African region. Paradoxically indeed, by intervening directly against Islamist militants, it increased its perception as an “enemy of Islam” and thus became more vulnerable to attacks. The menace against French nationals is particularly  significant in Mali itself where 6000 residents remains, but also in the wider region where Al Qaeda detains 8 hostages to date and threatened to retaliate if the operation were to go on.

Camille Maubert is an international security researcher based in London. Her work focuses on security, intelligence and counter-insurgency, with a specific interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. She has completed a Masters degree in International Studies and Diplomacy from SOAS, London, and is currently pursuing a Masters degree at King’s College War Studies Department.

By Raghu Kalra, 22nd December, 2012

Raghu Kalra writes,

“The situation was tense. Most of the crowd comprised of school and college students demanding justice for the 23 year old rape victim. This protest was not guided by any leaders. It was a spontaneous gathering of a lot of people who were angered and shaken up by what had happened in the capital only a few days ago. The protest was peaceful for most part of the day until a few tried to go over the weak barricading put up by the police, which ultimately led to the tear gassing and use of water cannons. This made the situation worse. It is expected that the crowds of protesters will grow on Sunday.”

Protesters climb poles on the Raj Path in Delhi. In the background is the North Block, in which the Ministry of Home Affairs is situated.

A policeman looks on.

The sign in Hindi reads, “Down down Delhi Police”. Although the Delhi Police did manage to nab all the suspects, people criticised the response they gave to the media, and the use of force against the crowds at this protest.

Tear gas shells disperse crowds on the Raj Path in Delhi.

A Delhi Police man wearing a motorcycle helmet for protection.

A few protesters show the middle finger, while others walk with torches.

Protesters mock Sheila Dikshit, the Chief Minister of Delhi. While the Delhi Police is not under her control (it is managed by the central Ministry of Home Affairs), she was criticized for her response to the media. In the past, she controversially said that women shouldn’t venture out in the night for their safety.
NOTE: InPEC does not endorse the use of such a possibly deliberate mis-spelling of the Chief Minister’s name in order to mock her. However, we believe it was important to display this photograph as it shows the extent to which a few protesters are ready to go in their dislike of the government.

Arvind Gaur, a theatre personality and activist addresses the crowd.

Brinda Karat, a Member of Parliament of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) among the protesters.

The sign in Hindi reads “monstrosity deserves death by hanging” (non-literal translation).

A protester on a pole with the North Block with the Ministry of Home Affairs in the background. The sign below is of a black dot on a white board. This sign was used on social media as profile pictures as a way to protest and raise awareness of the Delhi gang rape.

A police barricade at the Raisina Hill, with the Parliament in the far background.

The central government ministry buildings in the background.

A verbal confrontation between the protesters and a policeman.

Broken pieces of glass on the Raj Path.

A student carries a board by the AISA – the All India Students’ Association – which is an organization associated with the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

Raghu Kalra is a Photographer doing his Masters in Convergent Journalism from Jamia Millia Islamia University, Delhi. He has been a photographer for over 8 years and specialises in Wide Field Astrophotography. He can be contacted at raghukalra@aaadelhi.org

In this post, InPEC has also included Akshan’s background notes, which gives the reader a look into the process of infographic design.

By Akshan Ish, 19th December, 2012

[Click on the infographic to see a larger version]

The designer’s background notes:

Education is one of the most complex systems to deal with. I say this with conviction because I’m working on a project related to student evaluation in schools. Documentation in progress, here. India is one of the fastest developing countries, part of the G20, and is poised at a very crucial stage. We enjoy the benefit of what is called a ‘demographic dividend’–where most of our population is young and able to join the workforce. But due to a shaky education system, a major portion of India’s population is found incompetent even with fundamental skills. Literacy rates are increasing across India, currently at 74%; but as I found out after digging out the data, that literacy doesn’t necessarily mean that one can read or write.

I started off with the OECD report on Improving Access and Quality in the Indian Education System, which provided an overview of the scenario. It gave country comparisons  and I was quite disappointed to see that India comes under the category of Low Education Development Index (EDI), ranked 102 in the world. Further probing into the reports from various sources, mainly the Annual Status of Education Report (2011), showed me why. India’s Educational Deficit stems from the fact that primary schooling is very weak. I found that although enrollment rates were high at the primary level, only about 40% of those students make it secondary school, and only 12% go on to college. Class absenteeism, high pupil-teacher ratio, low involvement of parents, multi-grade classes and gender disparities are a few of the reasons why.

What intrigued me the most was that 75% of the students who moved from one grade to another could not read their previous grade’s textbooks. And another 75% of these who moved on to the next grade, would not be able to do so in another year of schooling. This means that one in three students finishes primary schooling without being able to read a grade 2 textbook; but is termed literate since she is being schooled. And to make matters worse, these learning rates have been declining in most states across India, even after the Right to Education Act was passed in 2009. The objectives of which are to provide free and compulsory education to all children between the ages of six and fourteen. It might seem that the focus shifted from quality to quantity after the act was implemented; but that is only a thought.

There was just so much going on in the data, and so many factors like caste, gender, mother’s education, region, religion and economic burden that came into play that I could not possibly visualize the entire thing. I had to narrow down to something. I wanted to explore a form of storytelling with this infographic, so I thought it would be interesting if I could portray the story of India through a six year old girl’s journey. What are the odds that she will finish schooling? Where is she most likely to study? What are the different factors affecting her learning?

The infograhic itself is in a web-scroll format (heavily influenced by the New York Times visualizations). I have tried to keep it as simple as possible–enabling the reader to move from one section to another like in a book or a story, so as to give the reader an overview of the current Indian Education scenario, moving on to quality of learning and then the factors affecting learning.

[I have learned] to strip down the issue at hand to its core and then build on it from there. I have also become much more careful with the visuals I use now. People do not question a visual like they would question a piece of written text. The visual is like automatic truth that is assimilated subconsciously.

Akshan Ish is a computer science engineer and currently a graphic design student at the National Institute of Design, Ahmedabad, India.

Filed under: Articles, India ]]> http://inpec.in/2012/12/22/infographic-literacy-in-india/feed/ 0 akshan By Akshan Ish IMG_5668 copy IMG_5680 copy IMG_5669 copy IMG_5677 copy http://inpec.in/2012/12/17/the-impact-of-sanctions-on-iranian-society-and-artists/ http://inpec.in/2012/12/17/the-impact-of-sanctions-on-iranian-society-and-artists/#comments Mon, 17 Dec 2012 09:38:27 +0000 InPEC Contributor http://inpec.in/?p=2718 Economic sanctions are not only shattering the lives of the Iranian people but also strangling Iran’s social and cultural development. Iran is headed for a humanitarian catastrophe unless steps are taken to avert it. [This article is based on a talk presented by independent researcher Mehrnaz Shahabi on November 17 at the Nour Festival of Arts in London, which seeks to celebrate, explore and promote culture and arts in the Middle East and North Africa.]

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Economic sanctions are not only shattering the lives of the Iranian people but also strangling Iran’s social and cultural development. Iran is headed for a humanitarian catastrophe unless steps are taken to avert it.

[This article is based on a talk presented by independent researcher Mehrnaz Shahabi on November 17 at the Nour Festival of Arts in London, which seeks to celebrate, explore and promote culture and arts in the Middle East and North Africa.]

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By Mehrnaz Shahabi, 17th December, 2012

For 33 years now, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has been the target of US economic sanctions, which have increased in scope and severity over time. The impact of sanctions on populations is not always quantifiable and can be contradictory. Despite their negative impact in isolating and hindering Iran’s economic progress, and the tragic loss of life due to the boycott of spare parts for the aging Iranian airline, in so far as necessity is the mother of invention, sanctions in many instances have acted as an impetus for technological progress; and the experience of success and survival through adversity has infused a collective sense of empowerment and self-confidence.

When I was asked in July to talk about the impact of sanctions on Iranian society, the idea was to place some emphasis on the arts and artists. Since then, the reality of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding as a result of the economic warfare on Iran has shifted the emphasis, by necessity, from the artists to their audience, since it is inconceivable to think of arts separately from the audience at which it is directed.

The current sanctions by the US and the EU, under the pretext of a manufactured dispute over Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, are comprehensive sanctions against Iran’s economy for inflicting intentional collective punishment. The damage to the economy and the injury inflicted on the lives of the population in all respects is unambiguous and lethal.

Impact on Healthcare

These sanctions, which went into effect at the end of July 2012, target, amongst other things, Iran’s banking and export of oil. Export of oil comprises 80 percent of Iran’s foreign revenue which finances infrastructural work, social and welfare services, hospitals, schools, universities, state employees’ salaries and pensions. The value of Iranian currency has declined by 80 percent in the past year. The prices of imported machinery, medicine, and many types of foodstuff have risen beyond the reach of ordinary people. Many factories and businesses have folded, and unemployment is mounting.

However, the most critical impact of sanctions is on the availability of drugs and the health of the population. Iran is making 97 percent of its needed drugs domestically, and pharmaceuticals are heavily subsidised. The devalued currency means that raw materials imported for drug production are now a lot more expensive. In many cases, the raw material cannot even be paid for because of the banking sanctions, particularly as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), in compliance with the EU sanctions has stopped its electronic communication services for Iranian financial institutions and transactions from Iran. As a result, even domestically-produced drugs are becoming unavailable. Two drug manufacturing companies closed this October, and pharmacies are experiencing widespread closures and bankruptcies.

The most advanced life saving drugs cannot be made in generic form.These include drugs for heart disease, lung problems, kidney disease and dialysis, multiple sclerosis, thalassemia, haemophilia and many forms of cancer.

All of the surgeries for thousands of haemophilic patients have been cancelled because a shortage of coagulant drugs. A 15-year-old child died at the end of October due to the absence of coagulant medication. The head of Iran’s Haemophilia Society has said, “This is a blatant hostage-taking of the most vulnerable people by countries which claim they care about human rights. Even a few days of delay can have serious consequences like haemorrhage and disability.”

The drugs for many forms of cancer, particularly leukaemia, which is rife in Iran, cannot be imported, and this absence of drugs is happening in a context where the number of cancer patients in Iran has risen dramatically. It is predicted that by 2015 there will be a “cancer tsunami” in Iran.

In Iraq, a UNICEF survey estimated that 500,000 children under five had died, as a result of sanctions on the country, between 1991 and 1998. One can presume that by the time of the 2003 invasion, and under deteriorating conditions of poor water sanitation, malnutrition, disease, and the near absence of medication, many more would have died in the entire population. With millions of lives currently at risk in Iran, it is predicted that the death rate there could dwarf the casualties in Iraq.

I was in Iran recently and returned last Tuesday. Whilst there, this dire humanitarian situation was confirmed by medics and chemists with whom I spoke. Also, some students in medical chemistry told me that they can no longer afford the ingredients to make the drugs required for their doctorate work.

The Effect on Culture and Arts

There is no doubt about the direct or indirect detrimental effects of these sanctions on Iranian society at economic, political, social, cultural and artistic levels. I attended the re-launch of the magazine Danesh va Mardom (Science and People). The writers, poets, translators, and scientists present there were unanimously concerned about the impact of sanctions. I was told how the price of paper had multiplied more than fivefold. In fact, the publishers syndicate has recently warned that publishing is no longer viable.

The double impact of the devalued currency and financial sanctions have made it very difficult to access scientific and other academic papers to keep abreast with the most recent developments and to have effective scientific and cultural exchanges with those outside of Iran. I heard repeatedly from very bright graduates that there was no prospect for jobs and no budget for research, and that there is an unprecedented flood of “brain drain” out of the country.

An example of a visible impact on the arts is the virtual winding up of the National Symphony Orchestra, which according to its young conductor, Barda Kiaros, has not practiced and whose musicians have not been paid for over two months. He says that the Tehran Symphony Orchestra too does not receive the recognition it deserves and has not performed the work of great composers in concert for two years.

Abdolhossein Mokhtabaad, a famous composer and traditional singer, commented on the effects of sanctions and expressed the belief that the economic situation is not conducive to arts. He said that artists are not supported and likened artistic work in Iran to the work of a tightrope artist — always walking on a thin line.

For an insecure, debilitated, and hand-to-mouth population, artistic appreciation and artistic expression become a rare luxury, even irrelevant on the hierarchy of their people’s priorities. Not only do sanctions destroy the infrastructure for cultural and artistic development, they also create a state of economic and political siege directed at forced regime change, which is intensifying the securitization of Iranian society with dire consequences for civil and political rights, including artistic expression.

The strangulation of Iran’s rights and silencing of its voice on the international scene then finds its parallel in the strangulation and silencing of Iranians’ rights and voice, including artistic expression, at the domestic level. As in Iraq, sanctions are not only destroying the most vulnerable sections of the population but are devastating and weakening the middle class in Iran as the historical engine for creativity and scientific and cultural progress.

No one amongst the leaders or the grassroots of Iran’s legitimate domestic opposition has called for sanctions on Iran. In fact, they have warned that sanctions and war will be the biggest blow to the civil society and democratic aspirations in Iran.

Artistic expressions may defy political repression and economic poverty and find channels and forms of expression, as exemplified by the proud achievements of Iranian cinema. However, there is a tipping point when hardship does not strengthen but destroys the cultural and artistic development, in the long-term and at a societal level.

The economic sanctions on Iran are illegal under the international law and meet the UN definition of genocide. Nonetheless, US Congressman Brad Sherman has said “Critics [of the sanctions] argued that these measures will hurt the Iranian people. Quite frankly, we need to do just that.” Similarly, Congressman Gary Ackerman said, “The goal…is to inflict crippling, unendurable economic pain over there.” These sentiments to target the population to feel the pain of the sanctions are echoed by other Western statesmen.

The UN Convention on Genocide defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such…[including] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; [and] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” How else are we to interpret the sanctions affecting the import of baby milk and tetanus vaccine, and the announcement by Iran’s Ministry of Health that Iran’s medical drug reserves will run out within two months?

Denis Halliday, who resigned as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq after 34 years of service for the UN in protest against the impact of economic sanctions on the people of Iraq, described the sanctions as genocidal. Another humanitarian catastrophe and another genocide is now unfolding in Iran. Iranian society and Iranian artists are being strangulated into silence and a collective silent death, unless we intervene boldly in true artistic spirit.

Update: Iran’s Ministry of Health announced on November 30 that with the Central Bank’s release of $130 million of its foreign currency reserves at a relatively cheap emergency exchange rate, the import of urgently-needed pharmaceutical drugs had begun. The Central Bank also agreed to allocate $1.5 to 2 billion from its foreign currency reserves to cover the pharmaceutical needs of the population for the next year.

The emergency health crisis, however, will only be temporarily abated. On the same day as the announcement of Iran’s Ministry of Health on November 30, the US Senate approved another round of draconian sanctions against Iran’s economy. These sanctions, which came as an amendment to the US National Defense Authorization Act, further target Iran’s ports, shipbuilding, shipping, and energy sectors. In violation of the international trade law, the sanctions also attempt to deplete Iran’s foreign currency reserve by penalizing countries who make payments of gold or other precious metals in exchange for Iran’s gas and oil, as Turkey did this year when it reportedly paid $6.4 billion in gold for Iranian natural gas.

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This article was originally published in the Fair Observer.

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Mehrnaz Shahabi is an anti-war activist and independent researcher. She lives in the UK. She can be reached on mshahabi@blueyonder.co.uk

Filed under: Articles, Iran, Iran-West Negotiations, Sanctions, United States ]]>

Fuente: Amada Santos Sánchez

En esta entrevista, la abogada chilena Patsilí Toledo nos presenta sus perspectivas en torno a los feminicidios en América Latina, después de haber investigado sobre estos fenómenos durante algunos años. La abogada comparte con nosotros su visión sobre la actual política anti-drogas que, lejos de disminuir el conflicto que existe con el narcotráfico, contribuye a aumentarlo.

Alba Franco,  10 de diciembre de 2012

Patsilí Toledo nace en Chile en 1976. Es Licenciada en Derecho por la Universidad de Barcelona y Doctorada en Derecho Público por la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. Su tesis está dedicada a la investigación de la tipificación del feminicidio-femicidio en países latinoamericanos, haciendo investigación de campo en Costa Rica, Guatemala, Colombia y Chile.

Entrevista concedida en fecha 10 de octubre 2012 en el bar “La candela”, Barcelona.

P. ¿Podría explicarnos qué es feminicidio?

R. Es un término que viene del inglés femicide y ha sido especialmente desarrollado por antropólogas y sociólogas feministas. La primera que lo usó fue Diana E. H. Russell, en un artículo escrito junto a Jane Caputi: Femicide; Speaking the Unspeakable. Después Russell escribió junto con Jill Radford el libro Femicide. The politics of Woman Killing donde definieron femicide como un concepto muy amplio que engloba toda la violencia o discriminación contra la mujer, incluyendo toda una variedad de agresiones físicas y verbales que desembocan en la muerte. El desarrollo posterior que ha dado lugar a las palabras feminicidio o femicidio (los dos son aceptados) aluden principalmente a los ’asesinatos misóginos de mujeres cometidos por hombres’. La implantación de dichos conceptos así como su significado ha ido variando con el paso de los años. Durante mucho tiempo se ha distinguido, a nivel latinoamericano, entre feminicidio y femicidio por la impunidad de los asesinatos cometidos, siendo la impunidad algo que se ha incluido en el concepto de feminicidio y no en el de femicidio. Actualmente es un tema que está, más o menos, zanjado, porque se usa uno u otro casi indistintamente, aunque teóricamente durante mucho tiempo se distinguían por la existencia o no de impunidad.

P. Hablamos de 595 mujeres asesinadas en 2010 en el Estado de Chihuahua, México –donde está Ciudad Juárez. ¿Cuál es realmente la diferencia entre los crímenes cometidos en México y los cometidos aquí?

R. La primera y principal diferencia está en la magnitud de la violencia, que en los últimos años, en algunas regiones de México, ha aumentado de manera exorbitante.

Otra diferencia fundamental radica en la impunidad. En general, en España se investigan los homicidios de mujeres y se condena a los culpables. Sin embargo, en algunos países de Latinoamérica –como México y Guatemala- hay graves problemas de investigación, y se señala que las tasas de impunidad son de más del 90%. Los índices de homicidios y feminicidios son tan elevados que, en algunos lugares, ni siquiera hay capacidad para investigar todos los casos.

Esto se agrava por la banalización de la violencia –ya sea física, económica o social- y la discriminación hacia las mujeres en diversos países que, en muchos casos, deriva en que los casos no se investiguen porque se “asume” que se trata de mujeres prostitutas o “de mala vida”. Es la misma razón por la cual no se investigaron los casos como el de “Campo Algodonero”, en Ciudad Juárez, donde fueron encontrados ocho cuerpos de mujeres cuyas desapariciones no se habían investigado.

La violencia de género tal como se entiende en España es más limitada porque sólo contempla las agresiones que ejerce la pareja o ex pareja a la mujer. No obstante, la violencia de género como se entiende en América Latina y en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos es cualquier violencia que se ejerce contra la mujer por motivos de género, con independencia de si dicha violencia es  obra de conocidos o desconocidos. Esto supone entender que no toda la violencia contra las mujeres es igual ni todos los feminicidios/femicidios son iguales. Y, evidentemente, al existir casos distintos, las medidas que se deben tomar para prevenir la violencia y los diversos tipos de femicidios/feminicidios son diferentes. En ese sentido, en general, es mucho más compleja la prevención de la violencia contra las mujeres que cometen hombres que son desconocidos para las víctimas.

P. ¿Cuáles son las verdaderas causas del feminicidio?

R. Los asesinatos de mujeres en los diversos países responden a una pluralidad de factores, y éstos también varían en los diversos contextos en que se presentan: no son iguales los asesinatos de mujeres en Argentina o España, que en Guatemala o México. Sin duda, la causa común a todos los casos y en todos los países, es la discriminación estructural de las mujeres, pero hay muchos factores adicionales específicos que afectan a determinados países o regiones.

Por ejemplo, si nos centramos en México, observamos que desde que el ex presidente Felipe Calderón empezó la guerra contra el narcotráfico se ha producido un incremento exponencial de los homicidios en general y también de los homicidios de mujeres: en Chihuahua, durante el período del 2008 al 2010  se cometieron más homicidios de mujeres por año que los cometidos en toda una década (entre 1993 y 2002).

La discriminación estructural de las mujeres en nuestras sociedades otorga más fuerza y poder –familiar, económico, social y cultural- a los hombres. E históricamente ha sido avalado por las leyes, tanto en Europa como en Latinoamérica y el resto del mundo.

A esto también se suman componentes que aumentan la vulnerabilidad de las mujeres en ciertos lugares. Por ejemplo, Ciudad Juárez es una ciudad industrial a la que llega gran cantidad de inmigrantes tanto de México como de países centroamericanos en busca de trabajo, sobre todo en las llamadas maquiladoras- fábricas sitas en la frontera con Estados Unidos (EE. UU.), con una alta presencia de mujeres en los puestos de trabajo. Muchas de las desapariciones y asesinatos de mujeres denunciados desde la década de 1990 tienen lugar en los alrededores de las plantas maquiladoras. Esto es interesante porque al parecer, a menudo las mujeres que se empoderan en los sistemas patriarcales están más expuestas al peligro por no seguir los cánones culturales y sociales dominantes, o por poner en cuestión la autoridad masculina. De modo que mujeres migrantes que llegan a vivir y a trabajar en Ciudad Juárez, así como mujeres que –en países como España o muchos otros- deciden poner fin a una relación de pareja que consideran abusiva,  corren mayor riesgo de ser víctimas de ser víctimas de violencia de género.

P. ¿Son las mujeres las principales víctimas del narcotráfico?

R. La mayoría de las víctimas de la violencia en general, y de la violencia vinculada al narcotráfico y la criminalidad organizada, son hombres. En las cifras globales, la mayor parte de los homicidios son cometidos por hombres contra hombres.

Sin embargo, los homicidios de mujeres en contextos de alta violencia relacionada con la criminalidad organizada o también en contexto de conflicto armado, tienen características particulares, tanto por su incremento como por la crueldad con que son cometidos.  Muchas veces, los homicidios de mujeres son utilizados como medio o bien como forma de amenaza hacia los hombres que son sus parejas o maridos, o también como parte de rituales de iniciación en grupos armados como ocurre con las “maras” en Centroamérica. En muchos casos, las mujeres son un instrumento de guerra dentro de la violencia que ejerce la criminalidad organizada vinculada al narcotráfico. En todos esos casos se asesina a las mujeres por razones de género, porque es “propiedad del otro”, de aquél a quien se quiere hacer daño o amenazar. De la misma manera que en España, por ejemplo, un marido mata a su mujer porque “es suya” y no puede ser de otro, en algunos países de Latinoamérica se mata, en muchos casos, a la mujer porque “es de otro” al que se quiere enviar un mensaje o ajustar cuentas. Al considerar a la mujer como objeto de propiedad de los hombres, asesinatos de mujeres en contextos y países diferentes guardan cierto parecido.

P.  ¿Y por qué la muerte de las mujeres es especialmente cruel?

R. Los asesinatos son especialmente crueles porque la violencia contra las mujeres suele ser utilizada con fines simbólicos. Los actos crueles pueden ser una forma específica de “castigar” a mujeres que se considera que no cumplen con su papel tradicional. De ahí que en muchas ocasiones se las exponga de alguna manera, como ha ocurrido cuando las mujeres son abandonadas desnudas (situación que prácticamente no ocurre en los asesinatos de hombres) y con mensajes escritos en sus cuerpos. Es una violencia que se ejerce como castigo por una conducta que se considera “incorrecta” por parte de ellas (que puede ser desde su manera de vestir hasta haber dejado una relación con un hombre). También los narcotraficantes suelen utilizar la muerte de mujeres como venganza; de ahí que los asesinatos sean crueles. Para atacar o presionar a un hombre, violan, matan o torturan a sus mujeres, lo que de alguna manera pone en cuestión la masculinidad de aquél: no ha podido defender “lo suyo”. En otros casos es complicado de explicar tal crueldad, a menudo vinculada con el odio o con la intención de destruir lo que ella es y representa.

En el caso de las pandillas, el acto de crueldad tiene otro significado: genera unión entre todos aquellos que ejercen la misma violencia, es una forma de generar cohesión dentro de un grupo armado o criminal. A veces el crimen cometido contra mujeres es simplemente para entrar en una banda y demostrar valentía. Hay que tener en cuenta que en las pandillas y en los ejércitos ilegales existe una exageración de los estereotipos de género; con ello me refiero a que se exige de los hombres una masculinidad y una dominación, mientras que de las mujeres se exige que sean sumisas y dependientes; de ahí que se ensañen con los cuerpos de ellas.

P. ¿Existe un organismo a nivel de todos los Estados de la República de México encargado de prevenir, frenar y castigar la violencia contra las mujeres?

R. Como en todos los países,  las fiscalías y los organismos judiciales están para investigar los asesinatos y sancionarlos, más que para evitarlos ya que no son organismos que actúen en la prevención de delitos. Sin embargo, el sistema de justicia en México tiene unas tasas de impunidad muy elevadas, lo que quiere decir que no está funcionando. El problema está en que en muchos casos la propia corrupción del sistema –por la fuerte presencia del crimen organizado- hace imposible una verdadera justicia ya que, probablemente nadie seguiría investigando un asesinato si recibe amenazas de muerte.

Todos los Estados castigan los homicidios; pero cuando existen tasas elevadas de impunidad, significa que se castiga sobre papel, en la ley, pero no en la práctica. En el caso de Guatemala, por ejemplo, en los últimos años se están llevando a cabo más investigaciones para tratar de cambiar el sistema judicial aunque en un panorama bastante adverso debido a la prevalencia de altos índices de corrupción. Hay que ver si realmente aumentando la justicia se van a detener los asesinatos porque no necesariamente va a ser así. Existen varios elementos de fondo que tienen relación con la altísima violencia que existe actualmente en el país, y que tiene que ver, en último término, con cuestiones globales como la regulación del comercio de drogas.

P.  ¿Qué tiene que ver la regulación del comercio de drogas con el feminicidio?

R. El contexto de alta violencia que actualmente viven varios países latinoamericanos, especialmente en Centroamérica y México, produce inevitablemente el aumento de la violencia contra las mujeres, al igual que ocurre en los conflictos armados. Por ello,  organizaciones feministas latinoamericanas han comenzado a exigir la regulación del comercio de drogas como paso fundamental para comenzar a reducir la violencia extrema contra las mujeres y el feminicidio. También hay gobiernos latinoamericanos que promueven esta idea, como ocurre con los actuales gobiernos de Colombia, Bolivia y Guatemala, entre otros. Son intentos para abrir el debate a la regularización de las drogas; pero hasta ahora no se han conseguido avances. A muchos les conviene la ilegalidad; los narcotraficantes quieren la ilegalidad y los países receptores también. Además, el negocio de las drogas genera inevitablemente beneficios asociados con la exportación y venta de armas: el comercio de armas es el segundo negocio más rentable después del de las drogas, y es legal. Es legal vender armas, excepto venderlas a países que están en conflicto armado, por eso la situación de extrema violencia que se vive en ciertas regiones de México o Centroamérica nunca será calificada como conflicto armado. La grave situación que vivimos en la actualidad  sólo podrá cambiar en el momento en que se revise la actual política anti-drogas, pues mientras las drogas sigan sin legalizarse, seguirán favoreciéndose también otras actividades ilícitas como el tráfico de armas y la trata de personas. Consecuentemente, seguirá la violencia que se manifiesta en el incremento de los feminicidios.

Sin embargo, hay señales esperanzadoras, como por ejemplo la recién legalización del comercio de marihuana en dos estados de Estados Unidos, que puede abrir la vía para el comienzo de la regulación del comercio de drogas, al igual que se hace con el tabaco y el alcohol.

En general, en Norteamérica y Europa se pierde la conexión con lo que ocurre en Latinoamérica y no hay que olvidar que lo que ocurre en México, Centroamérica y en el resto de países del continente está fuertemente relacionado con las políticas globales. También Europa debería mostrar su compromiso con los derechos humanos y abrir el debate sobre una posible legalización; sólo así se podrá detener el desproporcionado incremento de la violencia en algunas regiones latinoamericanas, y que está afectando desproporcionadamente a las mujeres.

Alba Franco es Licenciada en Periodismo por la Facultad de Comunicación Blanquerna, de la Universidad Ramón Llull, y posee un Máster en Comunicación de Conflictos Sociales e Internacionales por la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The world has the money needed to address climate change; it is the will that is lacking, says the Rafto winner Nnimmo Bassey in this interview with Karina Reigstad. He believes renewable energy in small-scale energy systems will play an important role in Africa – and is strongly opposed to oil exploration in the Arctic.

Nnimmo Bassey was last Sunday awarded the Rafto Prize of 2012 for his longstanding commitment to the environment and human rights in Nigeria. Bassey is also chairman of the organization Friends of the Earth International. I met him for an interview in connection with his visit to Bergen, Norway, to receive the prize at an event at the National Theatre. The winner was also honored with a torchlight parade through the city.

By Karina Reigstad, 12th November, 2012.

Reigstad: First and foremost, congratulations on receiving the Rafto Prize of 2012. I would like to start off by asking you a few questions about your opinion on the international climate negotiations coming up in the next few weeks. What do you think will be the outcome of COP18 in Doha? Will we finally reach concession on an international agreement post Kyoto and 2012?

Bassey: It was after the negotiations reached in Copenhagen it really started going downhill. Ambitious began to disappear and governments took up the hypocritical position of agreeing nothing and pretending to be doing something. We saw it happen in Cancun and then in Durban last year. We ended up having a Durban-platform more about what was not been said than what was being said. I think this pattern is going to continue in Doha. I would be fooling myself if I said anything positive came out of Doha. The energy level is going to be very low and the policymakers in the rich countries are going to have their way again and come away not making empty promises but probably making no promises at all. I would think that with the increasing intensity of weather events in the world today, the rhetoric level would be higher than it was in Durban. But in Durban, the day before the conference took place, many people lost their lives due to human-induced climate change right there in the city without it being referenced to at all.

Reigstad: Who do you think will have the most impact, if any impact, during these negotiations?

Bassey: I think the only level at which there will be debate would be in terms of the historical need for ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. There will still be debate on this because it is an issue of justice, historical justice for political wrongs. I am of the opinion that rich countries, say China, India and the rest, must have equal responsibilities. That I believe is the faulty basis for negotiations and for reaching agreement. Historical wrongs must always be admitted and accepted. It cannot be swept under the carpet. When it comes to other substantial things, I doubt that there will be any big debate. There may be a debate about who contributes what to the Climate Fund because the climate institutions have become more like a trading floor. Developing countries will try and get what benefits they can get and developed countries will see what little they can give. Hence, people are not really looking at the critical trend that we see in the world today on the climate front, and the real challenge facing both the rich and the poor countries. Some people think they are immune to climate impacts but increasingly we are seeing that this is not true. Global warming and climate impact is something that nobody is really prepared for.

Reigstad: In terms of equity in climate negotiations, what do you believe is the best way to engage all parties in committing to emissions reductions and to reach an agreement?

Bassey: I think the foundation-word was weakened right from Kyoto in 1997. When the ambition was at such a low level it was clear that even if everybody kept to it there would be no resolution, there would be no real impact in tackling global warming. The solution where countries think of their narrow self-interest has not really made room for global action that would tackle this global problem. I think the basic part that would help to do something positive would be for all the countries to reflect on what was agreed by peoples of this world in Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2010, where they came up with a Peoples agreement that stated a few things that can be done that would tackle global warming, including recognizing that we cannot afford a temperature increase of 2-3 degrees or more. Because that would simply roast places like Africa and put the Small Island States under water completely. The changes in the weather patterns would be catastrophic for everybody. We don’t want the tropics at the North Pole, for example. I think that agreement also gave a very good political background that can be accept the climate debt should be accepted as the real debt that needs to be paid. The major problem is that the governments don’t want to do anything about it. It is not a lack of revenue, not a lack of income, not a lack of money to tackle these problems. It is a lack of incentive.

Reigstad: Do you also believe that the developing countries should contribute?

Bassey: Oh, yes. I think every country has to play some part in tackling global warming. We have to build resilience, in terms of climate mitigation. Unfortunately, we are in the position we are in now. We rely on someone else to take all the responsibility. But the historical responsibilities should not be ignored. That is why ‘the climate debt’ would be a good way to generate revenue for the Green Climate Fund, as well as a slash in the military budget. I mean, rich countries can spend so much money on nucleus war equipment. Why doesn’t a fraction of that being put into fighting global warming, which is at worst an even more serious security. It’s a bigger security issue than war, than military war. Here, we fight for very few resources if you took away a few oil wells.

Reigstad: I agree. This kind of leads to my next question as well. As a Norwegian and actively contributing to the climate debate, in regards to the position Norway is in, being an energy security supplier and with economic ties to the production of fossil fuels, how do you suggest Norway “leave the oil in the soil”? What kind of mitigation policies do you see Norway could take on?

Bassey: I think Norway has the technological know-how, required to make the shift from fossil fuel extraction to other more sustainable and clean energy sources. Norway could very early in the day quickly shift and modify or legalize the technological know-how they had in the shipping sector to now support the political sector. So its very possible, and I think Norway also have this stock of revenue. They have a lot of wealth and recognition to invest more in order to make the shift to renewable energy and show the whole world that this is the direction to go, that this is possible to do. I think that kind of shift is needed, but Norway should not keep on expanding the oil frontier and shouldn’t engage in investment in detrimental energy with other countries. They shouldn’t persist in carbon offsetting track that is nothing but a false solution to global warming, just feeling good absolutely doing nothing. So I think what Norway has to do is to utilize skills, capacity to actually take real action, including, and very importantly, emission reductions at home and not export it elsewhere. And they should show other countries: stop pretending that we are doing something by carry out activities elsewhere, or by hoping that you can keep on polluting and then engage in carbon capture and sequestration, future technologies or geo-engineering or everyone of these assortments people are proposing, which are compound not just to the climate situation but also the political, social situation in the world, especially in vulnerable countries.

Reigstad: I have spent some time the last couple of years looking at Norway’s interest in expanding the oil frontier into the Arctic and High North region. Briefly, what do you think of this development?

Bassey: If anybody should talk about the Arctic, it should be Norway saying “don’t go there, don’t touch it”.

Reigstad: What has to be done to reach a low carbon development in Africa as a whole? Could development of such renewable energy sources as solar power see Africa rise to this challenge? And what would it take for this to spur?

Bassey: Africa is a very challenged continent but it is also a continent of opportunities, at many levels. This is one reason why we campaign on many fronts in Africa. I personally campaign against the expansion of genetic engineering into Africa. In all of Latin America and the United States this type of engineering has destroyed a lot of environments already. So when it comes to energy production also, the fossil fuel industry must be brought to a halt, because clearly this is what is driving global warming, and it is also destroying communities and livelihoods, that bring about huge abuses of human rights and also affecting African political systems because dictators brings oil companies, and the oil companies brings dictators even to this day. People are trying to modify constitutions that still are in power because they are expecting a lot of revenue to come from the petroleum sector. I think renewable energy and discrete energy systems, more small-scale energy systems would build more resilience on the continent of Africa. We don’t need massive national or continental grid lines. Just learning from one storm in New York, sees the city in darkness for one week or so, should be a big lesson that these massive energy systems are not very resilient. We should learn and make more autonomous systems which will build more resilient communities at neighborhood level and eventually at national level.

Reigstad: And finally, what can we as individuals in a global society do to influence the outcome of climate change despite its inevitability?

Bassey: Yes, I think a lot of “ordinary” people worldwide are doing a lot to influence political engineering already. We have seen the change in Tunisia, the change in Egypt. We see how people are involved, and we have seen many political movements in North America. We are seeing resistance in Latin America, and all across the world. People are standing up saying that we need to take our destiny in our hands. And so my word to the people in Norway and in Europe would be, look, we have one planet; we are all in this together. Inaction in one place would bring impact on everybody. We might be more vulnerable in Africa, but nobody can escape from this. It is time to stand together as one, with one voice, and demand our policymakers to stop playing policy on climate change, but to take real actions. Stop pretending that carbon offsetting can do anything, stop pretending that bio-fuels can take the place and become the dominant energy contributor. Stop investing in coal, stop investing in tar sand, invest in clean energy. This is what we need to demand. Make this a demand when people are seeking election. Ask them a direct question about global warming. We must not allow them to pretend this is not an ecological problem or a political problem. It is a political problem! If we are going to preserve the planet for our children, grandchildren, and future generations, we need to direct investments from war and military activities towards tackling global warming.

Reigstad: Thank you so much for your time and inspiring answers. I hope you have a lovely time here in Bergen. Good luck for the award ceremony on Sunday, I am looking forward to see you at the conference tomorrow.

Karina Reigstad is a lecturer and a freelance writer on energy and climate politics

One year ago on an October morning InPEC went live. What began as a forum for discussing international politics evolved into a platform for bringing contributors together from across the world. During this period we have published 128 articles from 33 different authors. Thank-you all for making this possible and for your continued participation in the InPEC project. We have reached our first milestone and hope to have many more.

InPEC has been mentioned on international news networks and has gained world exclusives. Hopefully this is only the start. Yesterday we had our 40,000th hit on the site. Here is to making the coming year even more successful.

Thanks from all of us here at InPEC

InPEC has obtained the first polling data from the host of the first US Presidential debate, the University of Denver.  This is the first website outside of the US to break this polling data.

NEW UNIVERSITY OF DENVER POLL:

OBAMA HOLDS NARROW LEAD IN COLORADO; VOTERS OVERWHELMINGLY SAY ROMNEY WON FIRST DEBATE

Strong Debate Performance Improves Voters’ Impressions of GOP Nominee

DENVER – The University of Denver, host of the first Presidential debate on Oct. 3, today released poll results that found President Barack Obama leading Governor Mitt Romney among likely voters in Colorado, 47-43. Four percent said that they would vote for someone else, and five percent noted that they remain undecided. The poll also found that President Obama is currently leading among independent voters, 48-31.

Despite President Obama’s current lead in Colorado, respondents have improving impressions of Gov. Romney. Those who said that they watched or heard about the debate believe that Gov. Romney won by a huge margin, 68-19. That includes almost half of Obama supporters (47 percent), with just 37 percent of the President’s supporters saying he did the better job. In addition, 38 percent of likely Colorado voters said their impression of Gov. Romney is improving, while 18 percent of respondents felt the same way about President Obama.

“Two important lessons from the polls are, first, there are very few undecided voters left in Colorado, and second, Gov. Romney has improved his position to win them over in the closing days of the race,” said University of Denver political scientist Dr. Peter Hanson. “President Obama is maintaining a narrow lead in the state, but the major question is how much movement we can expect in the polls in coming weeks with not many voters left for the candidates to persuade.”

A huge majority of Colorado’s likely voters paid close attention the debate. Eighty-one percent said they watched the debate and another 14 percent said they had heard about it.  When asked an open-ended question about where the debate took place, 74 percent correctly identified the University of Denver (35 percent said “the University of Denver,” 21 percent said “Denver University,” and 18 percent said “DU”).

Nationwide, the debate was viewed by 67.2 million people, according to recent Nielsen ratings. The debate’s major effect was reinforcing existing views of likely voters rather than changing them. Sixty-nine percent of debate watchers became more strongly committed to their candidate, while only 7 percent became less strongly committed to their candidate.  Five percent of debate watchers reported changing their minds.

Fifty-nine percent of respondents said jobs and the economy were the most important issues in the election – and by a margin of 50-45, they said Gov. Romney would do a better job. Significantly, among voters who cited jobs and the economy as their top concerns, Gov. Romney leads President Obama, 56-32.

“The poll found a significant amount of polarization in the Colorado electorate in regards to the economy,” noted University of Denver political scientist Dr. Seth Masket. “Democrats are much more likely to see the economy and their overall economic situation to have improved over the past year. Republicans, meanwhile, have strongly negative views of the economy and their own economic situation over the past year. Independents are more likely to say that the economy has gotten worse over the past year.”

Here are other key findings related to several issues specific to Colorado:

Immigration: Sixty-three percent of respondents favor a policy that allows illegal immigrants living and working in the United States the chance to keep their jobs and apply for legal status. Sixty-eight percent of respondents favor the President Obama’s policy to allow illegal immigrants who came to the United States as children to obtain work permits and not face deportation.

Same-Sex Marriage: Seventy-three percent of respondents support legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Forty-nine percent of respondents support legalizing same-sex marriage, while 24 percent prefer to legalize civil unions.  Twenty-three percent said no legal recognition should be given to same-sex relationships.

Marijuana Legalization: Fifty percent of likely voters said they support Colorado Amendment 64 to decriminalize marijuana, compared to 40 percent who oppose it. Twenty-one percent said it should never be legal, 47 percent said it should be regulated like alcohol and 28 percent said it should be legal for medicinal uses only.

Concealed Weapons on College Campuses: Forty-nine percent favor the current law allowing students to carry concealed weapons on college campuses, while 46 percent do not favor such legislation.

Led by Dr. Hanson, Dr. Masket and J. Ann Selzer of Selzer & Company, the poll was conducted on Oct. 4 and 5 via telephone with 604 Colorado residents who are 18 years of age or older. To qualify as likely Colorado voters, respondents had to say that they live in Colorado and would definitely vote in the upcoming Presidential election. Responses were adjusted by age, race, and educational attainment to reflect the general population based on recent Census data. The poll included a margin of error of +/- 4 percentage points. To view the complete poll findings and full description of the methodology, please click here: http://debate2012.du.edu/archive/stories/poll.

In this essay, Rithika Nair looks at the under-performing education sector in India and asks whether an increase in allocation in the education budget can guarantee better quality of education. She exaplains that sheer finance alone will be unable to rectify the structural problems of the system and that development will need to play a larger role in the future of India if it is to become a true world power for decades to come.

By Rithika Nair, 5th October, 2012

“Can an increase in allocation in the education budget, guarantee better quality of education?”

India is under-performing in education.  Earlier this year, when the then Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee (who is now India’s President) declared the budget for the year 2012-2013, there rose a tumultuous wave of applause, and with that a tirade of  criticism, as he allocated a budget of $11.9 billion (Rs. 61,407 crore) to education – an increase of 18% when compared to last year’s budget.¹ The better part of the budget was in favour of primary education, with a relatively meagre amount of $2.9 billion (Rs. 15,438 crore) for the benefit of higher education.²

A generous education budget would have plenty to offer to the country’s under-performing schools and universities .³

It would allow for the introduction of the mid-day meal scheme where government and several private schools provide an afternoon meal to children for minimal or no cost. The scheme incentivises parents of poor and below poverty-line backgrounds to send their children to school, encourages children to attend classes to be rewarded with the meal, and also provides children with the nutrition and energy required to concentrate in lessons.

An increased budget would also impart more government sponsored study loans to students for secondary, higher, and college education. It would assign larger amounts to government programmes like the National Skill Development Corporation (which seeks to provide vocational training to the youth, thereby increasing their employability) and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (which works towards universalisation of primary education by providing free and compulsory education to children between the ages of six and fourteen)⁴.  Furthermore, it would enhance access to secondary education and improve its quality, the Rashtriya Madhyam Shiksha Abhiyan.⁵ More money could build more schools with better infrastructure, increase the salaries of teachers, contribute to more books and stationery, and ensure other necessities such as running water and electricity.

However, there is a limit to the impact that fiscal favours from the government can have on quality education.

While for many, education is about learning, knowledge sharing, and a guide to building dreams, the majority of the Indian population cannot afford this luxury. For some, education, however little it may be, means employment. For the rest, education and employment are two distinct entities, where employment trumps education.  This is not a problem that a bigger education budget can solve. Unemployment is an issue that needs to be tackled independently.

Ironically, the issue here is not unemployment, but unemployability. In 2011, a daily national reported, “India has the largest, youngest population in the world. But it is also the most unemployable population as it lacks the work skills that can make it employable.”⁶ This is an issue that is not explained by polarised school fees.  Rather, it questions the very quality of the education system. Many students desire to, and need to learn skills that would provide them with the aptitude for a profession. The Indian education system in its endeavour to imprint facts and jargon upon young learners, under the impression that the gift of memory is akin to the gift of breathing, and out of rote learning rises the educated mind, has forgotten the significance of skills in the real world.  There are thousands who consider vocational practices more worthwhile than history, chemistry and geography. Once again, this issue cannot be fixed by higher funds. Development of skills includes imparting technical and vocational education, which includes structured apprenticeships, and other enterprise-based trainings.⁷ The government-funded National Skill Corporation has not yet implemented its mission in schools, where the educative system must be reformed to include and give equal, if not more importance, to skills development.

Despite having funds, the government has been unable to efficiently manage its existing resources. Many government schools, which are the answers to free and compulsory education, either function in the most dilapidated conditions, or do not function at all. The school buildings are often run-down and in the most hazardous of conditions.⁸  They are no separate toilets for girls, no drinking water, and no stationary. Human resources in the form of teachers are in-efficient and uninterested.⁹ In such conditions, children either do not want to attend school or do not have the resources to attend private schools. Moreover, it is common knowledge that due to miles of corruption, only a fraction of the government money reaches the schools, and even less is used by the school for the benefit of the students. More funds which would increase the number of schools in similar conditions is redundant if the government is not capable of maintaining and ensuring a better utilisation of these funds.

Funding for education would never be adequate if it does not target all groups of children. At the Universal Periodic Review earlier this year, the National Disability Network in their report documented India’s abysmal performance in catering to its mentally and physically handicapped persons.¹⁰ “Persons with disabilities remain the least educated in the country”, the report stated.¹¹ The provisions for disabled children – in terms of books, resources, additional infrastructure and trained teachers are minimal. Teachers and schools are yet to accept and include children with relatively minor learning disabilities like dyslexia and attention-deficit hyper-activity disorder.

These are not issues that a generous increase in the education budget can solve. These are factors that can only be solved if the government takes on the responsibility of providing quality education to all, instead of building schools for the few. Quality education is more than just a building with desks, tables and teachers. A quality education means ensuring that children are capable and learned, not just literate. A quality education means having quality teachers who not only utilise available tools creatively and are interested in teaching, but who also encourage the children to remain interested in being taught.  For the poorest of the poor, a quality education would mean learning a skill that would teach them enough to start something on their own or use that skill to find a job. A quality education for special children would mean learning enough to help them manage as much as possible without constant dependence. A quality education for children with learning disabilities would be something that would guide them patiently till they feel confident enough to be productive by themselves. A quality education for many others would be an unbreakable moulding to build their dreams on. And what underlies a quality education for all these children from different socio-economic and emotional backgrounds is the ability to sustain the interest in being taught, the curiosity to know more, the belief that education is helpful,  and the determination to come to school to learn every day.

Rithika Nair is a Human Rights researcher based in New Delhi. Her primary areas of interest are child rights, children involved in armed conflict, and the conflict zones in Africa.

By Jack Hamilton, 4th October, 2012

Great Mosque of Djenné – Djenné, Mali

Eradicating History

The Great Mosque of Djenné is the largest mud brick building on Earth.  Like Timbuktu, it has been a centre of Islamic learning in Africa since the 13^th century and a waypoint for trans-Saharan trade.  Now there is a different line of Islamic thought passing along the trade route as ancient shrines in Mali have been decimated by affiliates of al-Qaeda and there are fears that Djenné will be next.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar el-Dine and the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) oppose the notion of Sufi saints and any monument erected in their honour.   That is the logic behind the continued destruction of Mali’s heritage and the fall of Douetza shows how close the militants are coming to the UNESCO site at Djenné.

Migration from Mali to Burkina Faso

Mass Displacement

The Malian regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal cover eight hundred thousand square kilometres.  It is a territory now controlled by jihadist movements whose extremist rule has caused many to flee.  The groups have recruited as many as 1,000 child soldiers, carried out public executions and amputations as punishment in addition to the systematic destruction of sacred shrines.

274,363 Malians have fled the country so far in the wake of the crisis and 118,795 are internally displaced according to UN figures.  The total number of Malian refugees now stands at around 400,000.  In an area that has been afflicted with drought the situation is critical, as demonstrated by these statistics:

4.99 million people affected by the crisis

2.97 million affected by drought

1.63 million affected by conflict

94% of the health centres are non-operational

Diola festival – Near Diakene Diola, Casamance, Senegal

Reforming Traditions

Thousands of men from the Casamance region of Senegal re-emerged last week after enduring one month of physical tasks and survival techniques.  The ritual takes place every 20 to 50 years and represents the transition of boys into men.  Men between the ages of 2 and 40 take to a sacred area of the forest to engage in these activities.  Some never return.

The last time the rituals were held was in 1962 and they used to determine whether or not a man could marry, a stipulation since dropped due to impracticality.  It is one of many facets of the trials that is rapidly changing.  Djola tradition stipulates that the men should spend three months in the wilderness, since shortened to one, and doctors keep a watchful eye as a precaution.  However, dangers remain and this year one man passed away.  In keeping with one tradition, his family were not informed until the rest of the men emerged from the forest.

Participation is not obligatory but a deep respect is the reward.  Those who choose to take part are forbidden to discuss what happens in the forest.  When the month is complete the men are rejoin with their partners and are given several days to celebrate their passage to manhood.

Palace of the Emir – Kano, Nigeria

The Erosion of Traditional Authority

Eyewitnesses to the recent assassination attempt on the Emir of Fika, Alhaji Mohammed Idrisa scampered away from his attackers, collapsing over his ceremonial robes before recovering to dart down the side streets with his turban flailing behind him.  The slapstick retellings of the story seem even more jarring when compared to the revered positions the northern leaders of Nigeria have held until recent years.  Traditional authority in northern Nigeria is changing.

This year, for the first time in over 200 years, the annual festivals of homage to the Emirs, the Sallah Durbur, were cancelled across much of the north, including Kano.  The official excuse was that the Emir was ill but subsequent revelations showed that Boko Haram had planned to use the celebrations to cause havoc with the royalty.  The terrorist organisation oppose the leadership of the emirs they deem to kowtow to a non-Sharia government of Nigeria.  To put this decision in perspective, even the British occupation and colonisation of Kano in 1903 did not halt the Sallah Durbur.

In the aftermath of the bitterly divisive election of President Jonathan in 2011, angry mobs attacked the palaces of the emirs over suspicions of bribery by the ruling party and the perception of systematic electoral rigging.  In recent years the failure to remove one’s shoes in the presence of district heads, let alone an emir, could have been interpreted as an act of rebellion.  Now the stories of the cowardly royalty scampering away from danger are told as a form of amusement.

The Emirs have not lost their power.  They remain a dominant presence in the social and economic policy of the north.  That being said their authority is being challenged in ways never seen before.  The perception that the Emirs provide huge sums of money to a government that does not represent the people of their Emirate is corroding their legitimacy and there may come a time in the near future when mass reform is necessary.

In this essay, the author explores the fragile security situation and the rise of Islamist groups in post-revolution Libya. 

By Camille Maubert, 3rd October, 2012

Libya, through the persisting instability and violence ten months after the demise of Colonel Gadhafi, illustrates how fragile revolutionary gains can be. Indeed, the fall of the regime led to the disintegration of the status quo, the polarisation of the political scene and the assertion of new power relations. As the regime fell, so did the unity that the tyrant coercively insured over the great multiplicity of groups in the country, and this political break up resulted in the (re)-emergence of voices and groups with diverging agendas, interests and allegiances. The fight against the repressive regime united a multiplicity of actors from various tribal and socio-economic backgrounds into a strong, inclusive, but leaderless movement which disintegrated after the fall of the dictator. The uprising lost its unity at the moment when it lost its enemy. As a result, the constituents of this heterogeneous movement reorganised themselves in various groups with different – and sometimes competing – agendas. Among them are Islamists, which are the focus of this study because of their central role in the on-going violence. The security vacuum which stemmed from such a sudden change gave rise to instability, violence, and the empowerment of un-democratic actors – armed militias, terrorist groups, and so on – and increased insecurity in the wider Sahel region.

Accordingly, this paper aims to address the security consequences of the Libyan uprising by asking ‘How did the popular revolution impact on the regional security environment?’ In other words, it seeks to analyse the repercussion of the instability intrinsic to the post-revolutionary transitional period on Islamist activities in order to assess the shape and extent of the terror threat in the region. It argues that the security landscape is characterised by an increased Islamist presence which feeds on the instability, weak governance and widespread violence to expand its activities and audience.

Islamists’ Messaging During the Revolutions

The part taken by Islamist groups during the revolution seems to have been rather limited in extent. For instance, the black and white Islamist flags were noticeable by their absence while the Libyan one occupied the visual landscape. A major reason for that is that religious discourses and Islamic matters were not at the order of the day during the protests; Nationalism was the main driver and legitimiser of the revolution. As analyst Filiu argues “The key demand in all these protests is always the same: dignity, pride, honour. The revolutionary trend is essentially a struggle for self-determination, for liberation from a corrupt clique, for regaining control and power over a nation’s and the individual’s destiny”. Therefore, the Libyan insurgency is emphatically nationalist and in that respect amalgamates religious elements as part of the collective identity, not as a specific corpus, which means that the occasional incorporation of Islamic components into the larger revolutionary discourse must be understood more as a tool of mobilisation rather than in holistic terms.

If religion wasn’t a major part of the revolutionary discourse, then how can we explain the proliferation of Islamist activities in the post-revolutionary period? It is worth mentioning that Islamist activists didn’t appear after the fall of the Libyan regime. They were already present during Gadhafi’s rule but remained limited in scope as a result of decades of methodological sterilisation of the political landscape and ruthless repression of dissident forces. Despite the government’s crack downs, local salafi groups like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) persisted in their underground activities. However, they tended to focus specifically on local issues and, as shows the absence of Libya in AQIM’s messaging activities before the uprising, the links between the LIFG and global jihad were partial. Interestingly though, AQIM’s activities on jihadi forums at the beginning of the uprisings testify that Al Qaeda took a new interest in the Libyan situation, as, between February and October 2011, AQIM’s communiqués focused specifically on Libya.

AQIM’s Communiqués during the Arab Spring (Date: title):

13/01/2011: ”In Support of the Intifadah of our People in Tunisia” and “A Call to our Revenging People in Algeria”

28/01/2011: ”To our People in Tunisia: The Tyrant has Fled but the Indfidel and Tyrannical System Remains”

23/02/2011: ”Support and Backing for the [Libyan] Revolution of our Family the Free, Descendants of Umar al Mukhtar”

11/03/2011: ”Support for the Free, Descendants of Umar al Mukhtar”

02/10/2011: ”Congratulations on the Victory of the Descendant of Umar al Mukhtar”

27/10/2011: ”Open Letter to the Libyan People”

The first one, entitled “Support and backing for the Libyan revolution of our family the freemen descendants of Umar al Mukhtar”, called on the Muslim population to support the fight of their Libyan brothers against the apostate regime: “We declare our support and backing of the Libyan revolution in its legitimate demands (…)We call the Libyan people to be steadfast and patient, and we encourage them to continue their Jihad and revolution and to elevate it to remove the criminal tyrant (…)We call all the Muslim peoples to support their brothers in Libya with all of what they own”. The last message, entitled “Open letter to the Muslims in Libya” is more virulent. It first praises the Libyan people for toppling Gadhafi then denounces the NATO intervention as “driven by the hidden crusade hatred on Islam and Moslems” and meant to hijack the revolution to impose a secular state. This anti-Western stance is reinforced in the message by the reference to the Libyan people as the sons of Umar al Mukhtar, the leader of the anti-colonial resistance against the Italian domination of Libya. Lastly, the message urges for the creation of an Islamic state in Libya: “Gather your determinations and efforts and keep your trust in Allah in implementing the Sharia of Allah in Libya (…) and the Tawhid of the governance of the Sharia is above the national unity and the security of Libya”.

Although rather vague in terms of proposing a specific guideline and agenda for the Libyan people, these statements contain some valuable information about what the revolutionary change should lead to. They indeed urge the Libyan people not to lay down their weapons as the fight for the Muslim community, the Ummah, is not over yet. In fact, the last communiqué warns that “the stage is critical and everyone is observing, take care of mobilizing, directing and gathering the Ummah in the rank of the Islamic not secular solution, and frame it to preserve its achievements”. This new development in the relations between local Islamists and global jihadists raised some fears that AQIM might attempt to exploit the political instability to stir radical discourses and make Libya a breeding ground for extremism, as suggest a progressive influx of jihadis on the ground.

The Islamist Infiltration

As early as December 2010, just months before the beginning of the Libyan uprisings, unusual movements of AQIM katibas from the Sahel to the Maghreb were reported. Allegedly, these groups of fighters aimed to benefit from the weak security presence at the Southern borders to infiltrate into Libya. Similarly, when the revolutions kicked off, Tuaregs from Algeria and Mali penetrated in the Djebel Nefoussa Mountains in Southern Libya where they supposedly sold weapons to the tribes rising against Gadhafi’s regime. The same activities reportedly occurred in AQIM’s stronghold of Al Bayda, where Al Qaeda related groups set up an Islamic Emirate in February 2011. This influx in jihadi presence may allude to an attempt by Al Qaeda to co-opt the tribes into accepting an Islamist presence in the traditional strongholds of Northeast Libya in return for weapons and maybe funding. Yet, allegations of such an Islamist takeover in the Northern cities of Dernah, Al Bayda and Benghazi mainly rely on partisan sources, including Gadhafi’s regime attempt to scare the West into supporting it by waving the Islamic flag. Nevertheless, more reliable information suggests that two senior Al Qaeda leaders made their way from the drone-stricken Pakistan to Libya: A group of very experienced figures from North Africa left camps in Afghanistan (…) and travelled back across the Middle East. Shortly after, a European and Libyan national was captured on his way back from Pakistan to Libya. Such information insinuates that Al Qaeda leaders and experienced fighters from South Asia could have a crucial role in recruiting, training and radicalising local rebels. Therefore, the – so far limited but increasing – influx of Islamists suggests that Al Qaeda may attempt to implant itself into Libya and eventually use the country as a safe haven and possible launching pad for attacks on regional and European targets.

The hypothesis of an increasing Islamist presence is reinforced by a clear surge in terrorist attacks since January 2012.

These incidents, which mainly consist in bombings and armed assaults, occurred principally in the Northeastern provinces of Libya, which comprise the cities of Benghazi, Dernah and Al Bayda. The difficulty, however, with analyzing these terrorists attacks, is that they don’t follow any specific pattern. Indeed, although the frequency of incidents increased, the tempo remained very irregular (see graph below) thus suggesting that there is not one but several groups behind the incidents, and that these groups don’t necessarily intent or have the ability to sustain a regular activity. In addition, a great majority of the attacks are not claimed by any known terrorist group. This may imply that not all violent attacks have been carried out by recognised terrorist outfits but rather by various factions like ex-rebels, criminal groups or disgruntled individuals. Yet, when looking at the incidents’ targeting pattern, it is possible to discern a logic in this heterogeneous list of attacks.

A shown by the pie graph below, the main targets are Western interests. This focus on foreign diplomatic institutions (US consulate, ICRC offices, UK mission) is consistent with the objectives exposed in AQIM’s messages analysed above.

The emphasis on protecting the gains of the revolution from a Western hijacking also appears in the discourse of the only known Islamist group that claimed some of the attacks in Libya: the Omar Abdul Rahman Brigades (OARB). There thus seems to be a vague but credible collusion of interests between the local outfit (OARB) and global jihad, that is, the targeting of the Far Enemy and establishment of an Islamic State in Libya.

This recent rapprochement is emphasised by the proliferation of jihadi flags in Libya’s Northern cities. Indeed, between November 2011 and June 2012 the black and white jihadi flag was sighted several times in Benghazi. The most notable cases were the hoisting of the banner on top of the city’s courthouse by anti-Gadhafi rebels and, more recently, the waving of jihadi flags during a rally in Freedom Square where 300 armed men driving a dozen of trucks mounted with anti-aircraft weapons demanded the establishment of Sharia law. Although these reports seem to confirm an increasing and more open mobilisation of Islamist forces, jihadi appearances have been geographically limited to Benghazi and it is not clear what message they aim to convey. Indeed, it is debatable whether the Raya (Islamist flag) is being used as a sign of Faith in the fight against a corrupt regime and as a rallying banner, or as a symbol of Al Qaeda – similarly the call Allahu Akhbar can be used as a celebratory chant as well as a jihadi hymn. What is evident, however, is that Islamist and, more generally, violent activities are rendered possible by the proliferation of heavy weaponry and the inability of Libyan security forces to ensure government control over these areas.

Governance, Proliferation and the Islamist threat

The proliferation of weapons in Libya during and after the revolution is source of concern for regional authorities as it endangers the stability of Libya’s neighbouring countries. Indeed, following the demise of Gadhafi’s regime, the United Nations expressed concern that the stockpiles of weapons looted by rebels during the revolution could pose a threat to regional security, especially shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) which could be used to target passenger and military aircrafts. The concentration of weapons in the large hostile swathes of the Southern desert also presents a direct challenge to Libya’s new rulers by questioning their ability to impose their authority and enforce the rule of law. As early as November 2011, Niger’s military clashed with arms smugglers travelling from Libya. This is one of many instances when security forces from Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt have arrested smugglers and seized large quantities of weapons that were being trafficked trough a 1000km long traffic corridor in the Sahel, which also coincides with the area of activities of AQIM.

As a matter of fact Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM’ leader, claimed in an interview to a Mauritanian journal (ANI) that, although Al Qaeda didn’t directly participate in the fight against Gadhafi’s forces, it was the main beneficiary of the revolution. As Lebovich explains in his analysis of the interview, “the organization has taken a rather careful, nuanced and subtle approach to Libya, implying but never admitting a specific role of any kind in the rebellion. And with only a few exceptions, the group has chosen not to take credit for playing a role in the anti-Qaddafi uprising”. However, Belmokhtar asserted that the Mujahedeens benefited from the fall of the regime, in particular as the ensuing security vacuum allowed them to expand their smuggling activities. Reports indeed recount that Belmokhtar was present in Libya in March 2012, “shopping for weapons” in Gadhafi’s stockpiles.

This procurement of large amounts of weapons by AQIM and other violent groups highlights Libya’s intrinsic weaknesses. The country is in effect vulnerable to rogue groups and activities due to the inability of under-equipped border guards to tackle smugglers, who are often heavily armed and well entrenched in the local power networks. Indeed, traffickers mostly are villagers who partake in black market activities for lack of other sources of income in border regions where factories have been destroyed by the fighting and where most of the youth is unemployed. AQIM benefits from such a socio-economic environment as numerous armed groups have been competing for the control of smuggling routes, and militias have been raising checkpoint to tax the traffickers who thus request AQIM fighter’ protection services in exchange for a part of the benefits.

Limitations to an Islamist Presence

Libya’s poor governance is undeniably a facilitating factor of the expansion of Islamist activities. Nevertheless, this very instability could also be a restraint to the development of Islamic groups as a permanent feature of the post-revolutionary landscape. Indeed, the threat stemming from violent groups is not monolithic; as mentioned above, the revolutionary movement fragmented in a multiplicity of groups with diverging interests. Among them are Islamists, but also tribal armed groups which too benefited from the proliferation of weapons and weak governance. In the transitional period, they attempted to assert their authority and influence the local balance of powers. In the weeks preceding the general elections, these rivalries led to violent clashes between tribes. A most notable example is the heavy violence witnessed in Mizdah which confronted on one side fighters from the Gontrar tribe and Zintan – known for their support to rebels during the uprising – and, on the other, combatants from the Mashashia tribe who fought with pro-Gadhafi forces. Such conflicts occurred mainly in the West and South of the country which, interestingly, coincide with the main smuggling hubs (represented by a gun symbol on the map below).

The fight for control of the smuggling route further complicates the fragile relations between tribes, who profit from the security vacuum to settle their old rivalries – primarily discrimination grudges dating from the Gadhafi time when one tribe was given land expropriated from another. As a result, it is likely that, although AQIM benefits from some level of instability to expand its activities, a persisting war between tribes might present a real challenge to Islamists and make the Libyan environment somewhat hostile to their development.

As a result of this analysis, it seems that Islamists groups profited from Libya’s post-revolutionary political and security turmoil to increase their capacities and entrench their presence. In that sense, it is safe to assume that Islamist groups pose a credible threat to Libya’s security and Western targets. However, at the time of writing, Islamist groups remain restricted to a few safe havens and do not seem to pose a direct threat to regional and European interests. This being said, “the same cannot be definitively said for other Al Qaeda-linked figures, who are accustomed to operating clandestinely when setting up funding and operational networks and may be doing the same in Libya. Given Al Qaeda’s expressed interest in the country and the key role Libyan militants have historically played in the organization, this concern cannot be easily dismissed. For the moment, though, armed jihadists—especially those sharing Al Qaeda’s extreme ideology—do not appear to be in a position to contest the fragile Libyan state”.

Camille Maubert is an international security researcher based in London. Her work focuses on security, intelligence and counter-insurgency, with a specific interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. She is currently completing a Masters degree at King’s College War Studies Department.

This essay is a literature review of the conceptual framework of ‘energy security’ in the international and Indian contexts. 

By Siddharth Singh, 24th September, 2012

The globalisation of energy markets has increased interdependence across the regions of the world. The access to energy today depends on international networks of infrastructure and transport. This has heightened the risks of major supply disruptions which result from of political conflicts, wars, technical system failures, accidents, sabotage, extreme weather events and financial market turmoil. Additionally, the global energy market is characterised by the reliance by energy importing economies on an ever-smaller group of countries (Chester, 2010).

As energy is essential for the economic growth and development of a country, it has come to be recognised as a ‘strategic commodity’. This is because any uncertainty in its supply can threaten the effective functioning of an economy (Sahir and Qureshi, 2007). It therefore becomes an imperative for a country to ensure secure energy supplies at affordable rates. This crudely defines the idea of ‘energy security’.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) definitions of energy security have focused on the “adequate supply of energy at a reasonable cost”, and have referred to energy security to be just “another way of avoiding market distortions” (IEA, 1995). The underlying belief of these definitions is that “smoothly functioning international energy markets” will deliver “a secure – adequate, affordable and reliable – supply of energy” (IEA, 2002). IEA has claimed that energy security always consists of both a physical unavailability component and a price component, although their relative importance depends on the market structure (IEA, 2007).

Chester (2010) points out that these definitions have primarily been market-centric. The underpinning logic of such market-centric definitions is that due to the liberalisation and globalisation of energy markets, energy security is a market outcome, and can be defined in market terms – specifically, supply and price. The implication of such definitions is that the purpose of energy security strategies must be to make markets work.

Broader definitions of energy security embrace dimensions beyond market supply and price. The European Commission’s Green Paper (EC, 2000) states that energy security also entails respecting environmental concerns and working towards sustainable development. They clarify that the security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence. Definitions of energy security by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC, 2007) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2004) also stress on environmental impact and sustainability.

Chester (2010) lists five fundamental aspects that characterise ‘energy security’. Firstly, energy security is about the management of risk – the risk of uninterrupted, unavailable energy supplies; the risk of insufficient capacity to meet demand; the risk of unaffordable energy prices; the risk of reliance on unsustainable sources of energy. These risks may be caused due to energy market instabilities, technical failures or physical security threats. Secondly, the definition of energy security may be framed to reflect a country’s energy mix, the abundance of local resources and import dependence. Thirdly, the term energy security reflects a concept of strategic intent, implying that energy security is not a policy in itself, but that specific policies have to be adopted by governments to achieve the objectives of energy security. Fourthly, energy security has temporal dimensions – the risks and threats to physical supply differ across short, medium and long-term horizons. Short-term risks include terrorism attacks and technical failures. Long-term risks, on the other hand, concern the adequacy of supply to meet demand and adequacy of infrastructure to deliver supply to markets. Fifthly, the term energy security has to be applied keeping in mind the significant differences between the oil, gas, nuclear and other energy markets and infrastructure.

The polysemic nature of ‘energy security’ hence necessitates context specific definitions and strategies. Given these fundamental aspects of energy security, this paper will first look into what the primary factors that influence the concept of energy security in India are.

Energy Security in India’s Context

India’s discourse on energy security so far has been primarily framed by three issues: energy demand due to economic growth, energy poverty in India, and the implications of its energy paths on the environment (Noronha, 2009). The forces that have influenced India’s economic growth over the last two decades have also led to a paradigm shift in the energy policy of the country. In recent years, geopolitics has become a central concern in energy trade, and is characterised by resource nationalism, in part due to the threat to energy infrastructure and transit routes.

Sudarshan and Noronha (2009) lay out five important factors that have contributed to increasing energy demand in India. First, the real income of India has grown at a rate of 6-7% per annum over the past two decades, and the Planning Commission of India has a future targeted growth rate of 8-10% per annum for the next decade. TERI (2006) estimates that India will require 2023 mtoe of energy by the year 2031 to feed such economic growth rates. Second, a structural shift has been taking place in India, which has accelerated since the 1991 economic reforms. This shift is from agriculture towards the services sector, which is relatively energy intensive. Next, an annual population increase of about 1.9% p.a. has been observed over the past two decades. Importantly, the urban population in India was 25.5% in 1990 and is expected to rise to 40% by 2030. Given per capita energy demand in rural areas is low, this will further feed into India’s gross energy demand. Fourth, there is a growing transport sector. Fifth, an energy transformation is taking place, with a shift from biomass to electricity in rural India. Further, as of 2005, only 55% of rural Indian households had electricity access. Electricity demand is expected to rise, even as the government has significant plans to meet the demand (Planning Commission, 2008). Increasing import dependence of India on fossil fuel-rich countries has hence forced the government to rethink the way India engages with these countries.

Given the factors influencing the demand and consumption of energy in India, the Planning Commission of India defined energy security by modifying the definition of energy security given by The World Energy Assessment (UNDP 1999) to suit the Indian context better. This definition is accepted by the Indian government, and it is as follows:

“We are energy secure when we can supply lifeline energy to all our citizens irrespective of their ability to pay for it as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy to satisfy their various needs at competitive prices at all times and with a prescribed confidence level considering shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably expected” (Planning Commission, 2006)

This definition includes the key aspects of energy security, including those related to poverty and economic growth. The idea that the provision of energy ought to be “irrespective of their ability to pay” is a slight departure from the definitions of energy security accepted by several nations, which tend to be market oriented. By factoring in poverty and the inability of India’s citizens to pay for energy, it only stops short of according energy the status of a ‘right’. The income distribution angle is hence incorporated in the definition.

Additionally, this definition accounts for India’s import dependency of energy and the possibility of disruptions in the supply. There is also a veiled reference to what would be considered an appropriate level of risk, although this has not been quantified due to the uncertainties involved.

In the context of India’s energy security needs, Verma (2007) lays out a two principles to maintain energy security. He states that firstly, India must diversify the supply of energy, both by location and source. Secondly, he states that the resilience of energy systems must be maintained, which is a reference to “security margins” that act as buffers against shocks and provide facilities for recovery after disruptions. Resilience can come through spare capacity, strategic reserves, backup supplies of equipment, adequate storage capacity along supply change and the stocking of critical components of electricity generation.

Any policy measures taken by the government need to thus needs to incorporate these conceptual frameworks. Understanding these concepts is necessary in order to pursue rational policy making in the energy domain. Of course, policy implementation would ultimately revolve around day-to-day governance issues, and fiscal, administrative and political bottlenecks.

Sources:

1. APERC, 2007, A quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century: Resources and Constraints, Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, Tokyo, 2007
2. Chester, L., 2010, “Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic nature”, Energy Policy 38, 2010, pp887-895
3. European Commission (EC), 2000, Green paper: towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply, Commission of the European Communities, COM/2000/0769 Final, Brussels, 2000
4. International Energy Agency (IEA), 1995, The IEA Natural Gas Security Study, OECD/IEA, Paris, 1995
5. International Energy Agency (IEA), 2002, Energy Security, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2002
6. International Energy Agency (IEA), 2007, Energy Security and Climate Policy: Assessing Interactions, OECD/IEA, Paris(March), 2007
7. Noronha, L., 2009, “India’s energy security landscape” in L. Noronha and A. Sudarshan (Eds.) India’s Energy Security, Routledge, 2009
8. Planning Commission, 2006, Integrated Energy Policy Report of the Expert Committee, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 2006
9. Planning Commission, 2008, Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-2011 : agriculture, rural development, industry, services, and physical infrastructure, Volume III, Planning Commission, Government of India, Oxford University Press, 2008
10. Sahir, M. H., and Qureshi, A. H., 2007, “Specific concerns of Pakistan in the context of energy security issues and geopolitics of the region”, Energy Policy 35 , 2007, pp2031-2037
11. Sudarshan, A., and Noronha, L., 2009, “Contextualizing India’s energy security” in Noronha. L., and Sudarshan, A. (Eds.) India’s Energy Security, Routledge, 2009
12. TERI, 2006, National Energy Map for India: Technology Vision 2030, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, 2006
13. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2004, World Energy Assessment: Overview 2004 Update, UNDP, New York UNDP, 2004
14. Verma, S. K., 2007, “Energy geopolitics and Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline”, Energy Policy 35, 2007, pp3280-3301

Siddharth Singh is the editor of InPEC. He is an Indian macroeconomic and government policy analyst. He can be followed on Twitter @siddharth3

Tunisia has expressed its preference to work with the OSCE in its democratic transition rather than the EU. This organization started a program of support to the civil society in this country. But is it enough to foster democratization? Is the OSCE still capable to apply in Tunisia the same policies than in Eastern Europe after 1989?

By Alejandro Marx, 19th September, 2012

The Arab Spring has unleashed the hope that home-grown democracies will be created in the region. However, after the revolution comes the time for stabilization and democracy-building. The failure of democracy-building or the start of chaos would be used by authoritarian governments to maintain their power or advocated controlled “democratization” to their population. The legitimacy of the revolution in Tunisia is based on popular support, placing the leadership and the civil society in a new situation. In addition, the uprising has changed the relations that the Tunisian government shared with the ex-colonial power in the region, France. The Tunisian leaders want to follow the path they decide for their country, not the one dictated by other countries. The Arab countries can share their experience of the democratic transition, and exchange advices with countries with longer-established democracies or recent transitions to democracy. However, when a country asks for advice and support to another one, it risks to be in a position of dependency. How to keep the same level of exchange between countries without a country becoming dependent from the support of another?

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is an organization, created in November 1994 from the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe which aimed to encourage negotiation between Western States and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. During the 1990s, this organization helped the new governments of the ex-communist countries to develop their democracies. An experience, the OSCE and the Northern African leaders can use in the region. It has now 56 members which include the United States, Canada, Russia and the countries of Europe and Central Asia. Decisions are taken at the Permanent Council in Vienna by consensus between the representatives of the member States. Also, a Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) exists in Copenhagen, Denmark, where parliamentarians meet to express the views of their national parliaments. In continuation, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) based in Warsaw, Poland, focus on monitoring elections, the implementation of Human Rights commitments and the development of civil society in the OSCE region. The OSCE does not have the capacity to enforce policies on its member States.

Tunisia has relations with the OSCE. Despite not being a full member, it is part of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership for Co-operation with other countries of the region (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Israel and Jordan). Discussions in the past often covered issues such as illegal migration from and to the region, Islamic extremism, and the creation of confidence-building measures between the armies of the Mediterranean Partnership. The OSCE did not focus particularly on civil society in the region.

The interest of governments to cooperate with the OSCE lies on the role of the OSCE as an organization which provides advice and support to the sectors the government has chosen as needing reform. In opposition to organization like the European Union (EU) which can impose sanctions to States, the OSCE does not have such power. A decision of the Tunisian leadership to ask the EU to support democracy-building in the country could let the French government, a major member of the EU, to reassert its political influence in the country and its leadership. The government of Tunisia has already announced its preference to work with the OSCE for the establishment of democracy. In addition, the OSCE regroups countries which have different agendas for the Mediterranean region. This disagreement is particularly visible on the divergence of Russia with the USA, the United Kingdom and France on the intervention in Libya and Syria. The Russian government is hostile to the involvement of foreign countries in the internal affairs of sovereign States. The new authorities in Tunisia can use the disagreement between the countries members of the OSCE to gain the support and training they want for their democratic reforms, without placing themselves at the mercy of a particular country.

However, the OSCE is mostly funded by the USA, France and United Kingdom who count for a third of the contribution to the OSCE field operations for 2012. Russia counts only for 2.5 % of the total contributions by the 56 member countries¹. On the other hand, the need for consensus in the organization to take decisions means that a middle ground must be found between countries with different agendas for Tunisia. The Northern African State seems to have chosen an organization which is adapted to the situation.

The importance in supporting Democracy and Human Rights effectively

The proposal of the OSCE to support the democratic transition was formulated after the fleeing of former dictator Ben Ali from Tunisia, on the 14th of January 2011. In February 2011, the OSCE Chairman-in-office, Lithuanian Foreign minister Audronius Azubalis proposed the help of the organization to Tunisia and Egypt. In April of the same year, the Chairman-in-Office visited Tunisia to look in which areas the OSCE can help Tunisia. Azubalis meet the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, Mouldi Kefi, and stressed that the assistance from the International Community is instrumental in the democratic transition. Azubalis emphasized the experience of the OSCE in this sector, since the role of the organization in the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. He met representatives of the UN in the country and reminded the need to coordinate international support to Tunisia with other International organizations². The cooperation between international organizations should again ensure that the influence of a particular country in Tunisia would be minimal.

The democratic transition in Tunisia was again discussed at the OSCE Human Rights Conference in Warsaw, Poland, in September 2011. Khadija Chérif, the Secretary General of the International Federation for Human Rights and a prominent Human Rights activist from Tunisia, said that the uprisings in the Mediterranean region were the result of the repression of authoritarian governments. She added that a strong civil society, not authoritarian leaders, is the guarantor of security and stability in the region³.

The OSCE has reacted very fast to the political change in Tunisia. The organization has now shown to prefer a stronger emphasis on the Tunisian civil society. It has multiplied the events during this last year to foster and give to the civil society’s organizations, a prominent role in the transition. This shows that the OSCE understand that the involvement of the civil society in the political game is important to continue what was unleashed by the Tunisian uprising. In addition, it means that the members States have understood that authoritarianism is not the solution to stability in Tunisia.

In October 2011, the OSCE has monitored the elections for the Constituent National Assembly in Tunisia after the Tunisian provisional authorities agreed to have a transparent transition. The elections monitors were 75 parliamentarians from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly coming from 21 member states of the OSCE and Algeria. The observers said that the elections were marked with fair media covering and a plural choice of parties. However, they criticized the restrictive policies on public advertising, the exclusion of followers from the old regime from the elections and an imperfect voter registration system⁴. However, due to the soft power policy of the organization, criticism formulated by the OSCE cannot go further that verbal warning, making difficult to put pressures on the Tunisian leadership. On the other hand, the reputation of the OSCE as a neutral body allows it to be an arbiter between political parties in Tunisia, avoiding tensions between the different actors.

In addition, during the same period, the ODIHR has given training to elections observers from Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco at the Budva OSCE Mediterranean Conference, in Montenegro, on topics identified by the North-African participants themselves⁵.

The support of the ODIHR for representatives of the Mediterranean partners’ civil society continued after the Budva Conference. In December 2011, in Vilnius, Lithuania, a special conference saw the meeting of representatives of civil society’s groups from the Mediterranean region and the OSCE to discuss and share experience on the challenges facing the transition to democracy in the region. Achref Aouadi, the founder of the Tunisian NGO “I-Watch”, addressed the opening of the conference. The discussions focused on Electoral Good Practice, Political participation (including Gender participation), Justice and Legal Reform, and on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination during Democratic Transition.⁶ This action gives visibility to the organizations of the Tunisian civil society. However, their meetings with representatives of foreign States may make them vulnerable to accusations of being agents of abroad in Tunisia.
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However, the democratic transition in Tunisia is facing risks. In June 2012, Salafists rioted in protest to an art exhibition. Two sculptors, who exhibited their work at the exhibition, have been charged in August by Tunisian prosecutors. The appointment of new journalists in the State-media, without the approval of the National Union of Tunisian Journalists, is criticized as “government interference in media”⁷. The instability in Libya has caused the movements of many refugees to Tunisia. If the situation in Libya does not improve, the Tunisian authorities will have to accommodate these refugees and protect them from discriminations they may face. Also, insecurity in Libya could spread in Tunisia through the illegal arm trade. The drafting of the new Constitution is taking time and some citizens may become frustrated at the slow development of the Constitution. Also, the presidential elections will take place only after the definitive adoption of the Constitution. Tunisia has not shown exactly which relations it wants to have with the former colonial power, France. The Tunisian President, Moncef Marzouki met in July 2012, the French President François Hollande⁸. This seemed to show that relations between the two countries are good again, but Marzouki has sometimes been ignored by members of his government, in particular those from the Islamist party, Ennahda⁹. It is difficult to know to what extent this visit was supported by the whole Tunisian government.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly continues to support the transition in Tunisia. At the Monaco Summit of July 2012, the Parliamentary Assembly called its members States to continue their economic and political support to emerging Arab democracies¹⁰. The 30th and the 31rst of October will see the organization of the OSCE Mediterranean Conference in Rome, Italy. However, the agenda of the conference will mostly cover the economic aspect of the transition in the Mediterranean partners of the OSCE. Human Rights will probably only be discussed when covering the participation of women in political and public life in the last session of the conference¹¹. The emphasis of the OSCE in economic development, despite being praiseworthy, is taking the organization away from its original goals.

A bright future still has to be created

The Arab Spring has unleashed hope for the people of the region, but a lot of uncertainty too. For the consolidation of democracy, compromise will have to be made between the different political forces. The region is facing challenges that Central and Eastern Europe faced after the fall of Communism. The OSCE, with its experience in the democratic transition of the Post-communist States, can share its experience with other countries. Also, the OSCE is sometime treated as an organization which has finished its role in history. It is time to reassess this view and give to the OSCE the means and support it needs to fulfill in the Arab region the same role it carried out before in Europe. As well, the OSCE must be prepared to criticize actors who commit Human Rights abuses. A cooperating relation with the Arab League is possible, if the Arab States wish to collaborate in the responsibilities of the OSCE in the region. The Arab League can use the experience of the OSCE to develop its own institutions to foster security in the region. Democracy-building and the respect of Human Rights can only be attained if the leaders of the OSCE States and the Arab States decide to work together to ensure that all the classes, communities and generations feel that they are represented and are part of the political process. Tunisia can only go forward through the solidarity of its peoples and political parties.

Sources:

1. Decision No. 1027, “Scales of contributions for 2012”, 895th Plenary meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council http://www.osce.org/pc/86722

2. Press release, OSCE Chairperson emphasizes need to respect commitments, offers support to partner countries Egypt and Tunisia http://www.osce.org/cio/75754 Press release, OSCE Chairman meets Tunisian authorities, discusses priority needs for OSCE assistance http://www.osce.org/cio/77020

3. Press release, North Africa events highlight link between democracy and Security, say speakers at opening of OSCE human rights conference http://www.osce.org/odihr/82876

4. Press release, Parliamentary observers applaud Tunisian elections: vote shows country on its way to guaranteeing Freedom, Human Rights, Democracy http://www.osce.org/pa/84325

5. ODIHR trains election observers from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/83922

6. Press release, OSCE civil society conference on challenges facing Mediterranean Democracies in Transition http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/85727

7. Human Rights Watch document, “Tunisia: Drop charges against Artists”, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/03/tunisia-drop-charges-against-artists Tunisia Live article, Appointment of New National Television directors sparks backlash http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/09/03/appointment-of-new-national-television-directors-sparks-backlash/

8. Tunisia Live article, Tunisian President’s first official visit to France strengthens bilateral relationship http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/07/18/marzoukis-first-official-visit-to-france-strengthens-bilateral-relationship/

9. In June 2012, the Prime Minister of Tunisia, Hamadi Jebali, decided to extradite the former Prime Minister of Libya, Baghdadi Mahmoudi, to his country. This decision was taken without the approval of the Tunisian President, Moncef Marzouki. Tunisia Live article, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/06/09/tunisian-pm-confirms-extradiction-of-baghdadi-mahmoudi-to-libya/

10. “Monaco declaration and resolutions adopted at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the 21rst Annual Session”, 5 to 9 of July 2012, http://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions

11. Decision No. 1046, “Agenda and organisational modalities of the 2012 OSCE Mediterranean Conference”, 922nd Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council http://www.osce.org/pc/92556

Alejandro Marx is a graduate from University College of London-School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He worked at the Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat and will start a research fellowship at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Copenhagen, Denmark. He is also a contributor to the French publication “Regard sur l’Est”.

By Neha Bandi, 16th September 2012

The 2008 global financial crisis was an outcome of certain major aspects of macroeconomics. Low interest rates prevailed for almost a decade and spawned a huge surge in mortgage lending, led by a long record of growth with lower inflation in the pre-crisis period. These conditions led financial institutions to expand the realm of structured financing and securitisation to boost revenue sources, resulting in huge growth in the alternative instruments functioning outside the rigour of formal regulation. Extremely easy monetary policy led to the global macroeconomic imbalances with developed markets facing deficits and emerging markets accumulating huge forex resources. Deregulation of financial markets reduced the distance between commercial and investment banking, sizeably relaxing norms for leverage quality applicable to financial institutions and intermediaries. Relaxed leverage ratios expanded the risk exposure of institutions.

Undertaking New Consensus Macroeconomics as a macroeconomic model

Approximately five decades ago, during the period of ‘golden age growth’ the macroeconomic policy regime was mainly ‘Keynesian’ which suggested that the principle instrument of demand management policy and macroeconomic policy in general was considered to be fiscal policy, which eventually promoted full employment. Thus, if governments chose to slowdown the economy, to avoid inflation or balance-of-payments deficits, or to speed it up to offset recession, then governments would sort to adjust aggregate government expenditure and/or taxes (therefore, changing the level of budget deficit). Simultaneously, however, during the 1960s, monetarist economists led by Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer showed show that a central bank had the monetary policy tools to act against inflation. Monetarists first gathered evidence that although short-term inflation can be influenced by many factors, sustainable long-term inflation is always associated with excessive money growth. They also developed an evidence backed theory of money demand suggesting that control of money is necessary to control the trend rate of inflation; and that this control of money can be exercised by the central bank through its monopoly on currency and bank reserves, even if it was difficult to foresee the fluctuations in the demand for money (Goodfriend, M. 2007).

Further, the Volcker disinflation¹ (VD) taught several lessons that are among the founding principles of the new consensus on monetary policy. The VD supported the monetarist’s message that monetary policy alone, without wage, price, or credit controls, and without supportive fiscal policy, could control and reduce inflation permanently at a cost to output and employment. Second, an independent central bank will be able to acquire low inflation without a significant role played by the government. Third, a well-planned tightening of policy rates can control inflation expectations and anticipate a rise in inflation without creating a recession. The much talked about New Consensus Macroeconomics model, however, has been subject to various criticisms, mainly on the above-mentioned grounds.

The New Consensus Macroeconomics was the result of a collaborative effort made by the academia and policymakers. It had similar features of the typically large macroeconomic models of 1960s and 1970s, thus conforming to convergence of a shared theoretical framework of academia and policy makers drawn on past theoretical and empirical advances.

In short, the NCM model is based on three equations, namely the changes in output gap (equation 1), in the inflation rate (equation 2) and in the interest rates (equation 3). All these equations have been derived keeping in mind with the optimizing behaviour of individual agents in an economy vulnerable to market failures, imperfect competition, asymmetric information and incomplete markets.

In the above three equations,

• α₃<0 and α₀ is a constant indicating that, among others things, the effects of fiscal variables on the output gap (y-y‾).

• E_t is the expectations operator; it is the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank.

• π is the rate of inflation.

• π_T  is the target for the inflation rate.

• r* is the equilibrium real interest, namely the interest rate that prevails in the long-run when current output y is at potential level y.

• S₁,S₂  represent stochastic shocks.

In the first equation, it can be concluded that the NCM model considers micro-foundations by suggesting that the current output gap can be derived by the past and future expected output gaps and the real interest rate and it also relates the real interest rate to the current output gap and the potential output gap. In the second equation, the current output gap can be measured by past and expected future inflation rates, being consistent with the first equation. The third equation states that the nominal interest rate is explained by the current output gap, the deviation of current inflation from its target, and the equilibrium real interest rate.

In all the above mentioned equations, the NCM states the importance of central banks as playing a significant role in maintaining price stability and overall output stabilization in the long run but fails to incorporate the importance of fiscal policy and the role of government with regards to economic stabilization.

Supporters of the conventional NCM justify the additional attention to monetary policy, as a medium to control and target inflation. In practise, however, central banks can associate inflation targeting though the use of short-term interest rates as a policy instrument. According to Allsopp and Vines (2005), inflation targeting may not necessarily involve using a policy instrument to lower the output gap to its best potential supply in order to stabilize the economy. In short, such reaction functions can use any policy instrument that affects aggregate demand. Moreover, supporters of the NCM model have also mentioned the superiority of monetary policy over fiscal policy on the basis that the so-called ‘Ricardian equivalence’ theory does not hold². Allsopp and Vines (2005) consider an individual or a company is handed over a stock of domestic national debt (it is also important to note that a gilt-edged stock cannot be considered as net wealth³ as compared to capital stock that can be considered as net wealth). This said, it is not the best option to assume that a shift from tax financing and debt financing will have no impact of a private agent’s consumption or spending behaviour. In the short-run, a private agent is likely to consider a bond-financed deficit as an effective provision of credit, which would have an impact on his spending, thus collectively further impacting inflation. Thus, in such a framework, policy makers can focus on maintaining a certain optimum level of national debt as fluctuations in the level of national debt can affect the economy via wealth effects. For instance, a rise in the bond stock (depending on the interest rates) can lead to rising prices and inflation.  Finally, fiscal policy has also been side-lined on the basis that it is often exposed to political interference, limiting its actual usefulness. The cost of changing fiscal policy can be larger than the cost of changing interest-rates, and also an active use of fiscal policy might lead to persistent deficits and a build-up of national debt.

Another important criticism of the NCM was the limited role given to the government with regards to influencing aggregate demand. In contrast, the government can easily alter aggregate demand.

The above equation reflects the government’s ability to alter and operate fiscal variables G (government expenditure) and T (Taxes). Changes in these fiscal variables can influence changes in the constant a₀ in equation [1] of the NCM which can further create direct and indirect (via private consumption and investment) effects on the aggregate demand (AD) function. Further, changes in the AD function can change the level of current output ‘y’ in the output gap (y-y‾) and via equation [2], the current inflation rate. Thus, appropriate alterations by the government in expenditures and taxes would be able to maintain the current inflation rate to its desired target level.

Loose Macroeconomic Policy gives way to a financial downturn

To summarize, macroeconomics policy consisted of two devices, the monetary policy and the fiscal policy, to maintain a stable economy. Monetary policy was given more weightage, which would maintain a stable rate of inflation with the help of interest rates. As long as inflation was maintained at a suggested stable rate, the output gap would be minimal and monetary policy did what was required⁴.

Figure 1: Interest Rates in Selected Countries Change from August 2007-December 2008 (basis points)

Rates are country-specific; for instance, the Federal funds rate in the US, the Repo rate in the UK. As a measure of reviving the economy, a wide range of policy measures, including reduction in interest rates and launching of fiscal stimulus packages, were initiated.

Theoretically, these views were more often held strongly by individuals from academia; policymakers are assumed to be more realistic and pragmatic and are assumed to draft economies policies that would suit the current economic conditions. However, in reality, it was different; very few central banks concerned themselves with controlling or maintaining inflation. Most of the banks tried maintaining inflation within a particular range or a bracket, allowing for shifts in the headline inflation (for instance shifts caused by oil prices), as long as the expectations over inflation were not overturned. Banks started focusing more on asset prices such as housing prices, stock indexes, and exchange rates. To add to this, financial regulation was assumed to be outside the macroeconomic framework. 

During the years preceding the crisis, interest rates remained exceptionally low (IMF, Initial Lessons of the Crisis, 2009). To add to this, there is a belief that low real short-term rates reflected accommodating monetary policy. This financial setting allowed for a high degree of central bank credibility and financial liberty as central banks in developed economies concluded that it was possible to maintain low levels of inflation with low interest rates (in most countries core inflation remained well within its explicit or implicit targets). In developed countries, low real long-term rates bore a larger yield. There was high savings and surpluses in Asian economies and other emerging markets (including other oil exporting economies) that preferred investing in the safe U.S assets, which were considered both less risky and more liquid. Thus, there was a large capital flows from surplus countries to the United States.

Figure 2: Investment in Hedge Funds

This financial liberty also allowed for two trends in the banking industry which led to the sub-prime losses and a build-up of a systemic risk. First, banks started implementing the ‘originate and distribute’ model; wherein banks would repackage loans with impressive returns, instead of just holding loans on banks’ balance sheets, and pass it on to other financial investors, thereby reducing risk. Secondly, banks also started financing their asset holdings with shorter maturity instruments. This change left banks particularly exposed to a dry-up in funding liquidity.

The rise of such securitized or ‘packaged’ financial instruments ultimately led a flood of funds. In 1994, $35 billion in subprime mortgages were issued and by 2006, that number rose to more than $600 billion. Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008) offer empirical evidence that such an increased securitization led to a decline in credit quality. There was a rise of teaser rates (rates which are below the market rates) to entice borrowers; plus there was also a rise of mortgages which did not require any documentation/cross-checking. NINJA (“no income, no job or assets”) loans also observed an uphill with the belief that all these mortgages could be undertaken without any background checks necessary as the real estate market will always witness a rise, ensuring the borrowers that they will always be able to pay back their loans with the increased market value of their house.

Figure 3: Structured credit issuance by type

The combination of loose mortgage deals and low lending standards led to an increase in systemic risk (housing turmoil), leading to a crisis. By early 2007, many observers showed concerned about a possible “liquidity bubble” or “credit bubble” (for example, Berman, 2007). However, they were unwilling to bet against the bubble. As per a theoretical model presented in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) paper, it was perceived that it would be “more profitable to ride the wave than to lean against it”. Nevertheless, there was a widespread acceptance that there would be a bursting of the liquidity bubble one day. Citigroup’s former chief executive officer, Chuck Prince, summed up the situation on July 10, 2007 by referring to Keynes’s analogy between bubbles and musical chairs (Nakamoto and Wighton, 2007): “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” This game of musical chairs, combined with the vulnerability of banks to dry-ups in funding liquidity, ultimately led to the 2007 crisis (As cited in Brunnermeier 2007). In 2006, short-term interest rates rose while the value of homes dropped. Borrowers which were not credit worthy did not have the resources to pay back their debts, chose to sell their homes to pay off mortgages when they were unable to make monthly payments. Rising defaults on subprime mortgages caused rating agencies to downgrade mortgage backed securities. Investors in those securities suffered substantial losses with adverse impact on liquidity in the financial markets.

There is no denying that there was a large interference of sheer neglect with the financial approach. Many argue that the main culprit in leading to the crisis is lack of efficient regulation. During the pre-crisis period, macroeconomic forces were at work. Low interest rates kept encouraging financial investors around the world to look for higher yields with less risky products. On the other side, and partly in response to the demand, the financial system developed new structures and created new instruments that seemed to offer higher risk-adjusted yields, but were in fact more risky than they appeared. Absence of financial regulation contributed to the amplification effects that transformed the decrease in U.S. housing prices into a major world economic crisis. The absence of effective regulation gave incentives to banks to create off-balance-sheet entities, thus avoiding prudential rules and increasing leverage. Once the crisis hit, rules aimed at assuring the dependability of individual institutions worked against the stability of the system. In this setting, market discipline failed. Due diligence was then outsourced to credit rating agencies, to build optimism and a financial sector compensation system based on short-term profits reinforced the momentum for risk taking.

Figure 4: General Government Fiscal Balances (% of GDP)

Finally, in many countries, including the U.S., budget deficits were not reduced sufficiently during the boom years when there were high revenues, which further imposed limitations on the fiscal front to fight the crisis. 

Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy

There are lessons from the current and past crises for the conduct of macroeconomic policy. How assets are held and who is exposed to the eventual crash should be considered while policy responses are planned. Asset price led booms, primarily led by leveraged financing (thus involving financial intermediaries) should be dealt with, since they involve risks associated with the supply of credit in an economy.

One of the main problems, according to Willen Buiter, is the assumption of complete markets in most of the New Classical and New Keynesian macroeconomics which assumes away the problem of contract enforcement. This is truly a world with “selfish, rational, opportunistic agents, able and willing to lie and deceive and only a small set of voluntary transactions will ever be observed, relative to the universe of all potentially feasible transactions.”

Paul Krugman believes the economics profession to have gone astray because economists, as a group, may have misunderstood the impressive mathematical equations led macroeconomic models as the truth. There was a time when most economists took capitalism as a perfect system, however, Great Depression set in with mass unemployment and opinions changed. The memories of the great depression started fading away “economists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations.”

Similar on those lines, Tim Bensley views suggest that there was a lack of clear understanding of the nature of financial sector risk, in addition to the view that crisis would mainly occur in emerging-markets and developing economies. One of the reasons for this could be that the study of the financial sector currently falls under a separate branch of economics and not the mainstream economics. A separate branch of study can then lead to become an independent branch, loosing ties with its original approach. Many practitioners now learn the financial economics that they put into practice in business schools rather than economics departments (as cited by Willem Buiter).

This said, the romanticized version of mathematical equations, backed by unrealistic assumptions and fascinating results led to economists believing that nothing could go wrong, as long as their models incorporated different variables and predicted results. There was little importance given to the rational side of human spending and the emotional attachment to money/credit; there was also neglect over the mere functioning of financial markets, where institutions with imperfect information is a natural setting. This collectively can cause an economy’s functioning and health to undergo a sudden and costly downturn and can create results and consequences when authorities don’t believe in regulation.

Conclusion

According to Paul Krugman, it seems clear that economists will have to accept the irrational and unpredictable behaviour and imperfections of markets. Financial innovation and complex financial models help allot values to factors that help interpret the world, but their scope of predicting accurate end results is very limited, since the quotient of human rationality and his sentiment towards money/credit is not fully covered. It is better to be rational and avoid assuming that a theoretical simplification can be considered as a complete description of reality. Models must be taken realistically, however it must be noted that they capture at most a small portion of reality. It would rather be more rational to efficiently and effectively translate policy advice instead of holding markets as a self-enhancing and self-protective mechanism.

Crisis is an expensive ordeal, but it is also the result of financial innovation and risk-taking, two factors that help in financial progress. However, strengthening the financial system with good macroeconomic policies, efficient regulatory devices and better institutional arrangements, and a structural reform of financial sector to remove some of the key vulnerabilities will help minimize the consequences and the probability of a crisis.

Notes:

¹The change in inflation that occurred during 1980- 1984, when the Federal Reserve System was headed by Paul Volcker, is arguably the most widely discussed macroeconomic event of the last 50 years of U.S. macroeconomic history. Prior to this time, inflation had been dramatically rising, but under Volcker, the Federal Reserve System first contained and then reversed this process. 

²Ricardian Equivalency theory states that when government finances it’s spending through either issuing bonds or by raising taxes, the total level of demand in the economy will still remain unchanged This is because the consumer would prefer to save more now to be prepared for the rise in current taxes (with tax-financed government expenditure) or a rise in future taxes (due to bond-financed government expenditure), as the government will have to pay back its debts. The increased government spending is therefore exactly offset by decreased consumption on the part of private agents.

³Robert Barro in his journal Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? mentions that government bonds cannot be necessarily be considered as net wealth, as the government might increase taxes in the future in order to redeem the bonds value during its maturity period.

⁴Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, 2009

References:

Allsopp, C. and Vines, D. (2005), “The Macroeconomic Role of Fiscal Policy”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(4), 485-508.

Barrow, R. ‘Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?’Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov. – Dec., 1974), pp. 1095-111.

Besley, T (May 2011), ‘Rethinking Economics: Introduction and Overview.’ Global Policy Volume 2, Issue 2.

Bernanke, Ben (March 2008). “Fostering Sustainable Homeownership”. National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting presented at Washington, D.C, United States (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080314a.htm)

Blanchard, Olivier., Dell’Ariccia, G, and Mauro, P. (February 2010),  “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”. International Monetary Fund.

Brunnermeier K. M. (2009), “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 23, Number 1, Pages 77–100.

Buiter, Willem (March 3rd, 2009). “The unfortunate uselessness of most ’state of the art’ academic monetary economics.”

De Gregorio, José, (4 September 2009), Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, “Macroeconomics, economists and the crisis”, at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Chilean Economy (SECHI), Antofagasta.

Fontana, G. “The Unemployment Bias of the New Consensus View of Macroeconomics”

Fontana, G (May 2009). “Whither New Consensus Macroeconomics? The Role of Government and Fiscal Policy in Modern Macroeconomics” Working Paper no. 563. The Levy Institute of Bard College.

Goodfriend, M. (November 2007), ‘How did the World Achieve Consensus on Monetary Policy’, Working Paper 13580, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Goodfriend, M and King, R. (November 2004), “The Incredible Volcker Disinflation”

“Initial Lessons of the Crisis”, February 6, 2009. Approved by Olivier Blanchard, Jaime Caruana, and Reza Moghadam. Prepared by the Research, Monetary and Capital Markets, and Strategy, Policy, and Review Departments, International Monetary Fund.

Krugman, Paul., September 2nd, 2009. “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”. The New York Times.

“Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management” (February 4th, 2009), Prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Approved by Jaime Caruana, International Monetary Fund.

Stiglitz E., Joseph. “Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, and the Crisis”

Sources of graphs:

Figure 1, 2 and 4: Financial Markets Under Stress, An Update (January 2009), Financial Technologies Knowledge Management Company Limited

Figure 3: Blundell-Wignall,  Adrian, “Structured Products: Implications for Financial Markets”,  Financial Market Trends, Volume 2007/2, No. 93.

By Roberto Valussi, 4th September, 2012

The 31st August 2012 marked the day of the Angolan presidential elections; the second one after the 27 years of civil war of 1975-2002. The last time the Angolan population went to the poll was in 2008, when the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – which emerged victorious in the conflict – obtained an enviable 82%.

The transparency of the electoral process was a concern then and it has only grown on this occasion. Many  have denounced the irregularities, some of which has already hit the international news. The main opposition party, UNITA – which lost the war – organised a rally last Saturday calling a postponement  of the elections until a decent standard of transparency is met.

In spite of its immense oil revenues, Angola has ranked near the bottom of the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index for many years. In the 2010 Index, Angola ranked 146 out of 169 countries, between Haiti and Djibouti. The first cause of this contrast can be found in another statistic: Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption, ranks it 168 out of 183.

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising to hear a general call for boycott from the population. Certainly some people do, but It is not the case of Dionísio Casimiro. Dionísio, aged 29, born and raised in Rangel, one of the most populated municipalities of Luanda, speaks on behalf of an unnamed, undefined, uncounted and partially clandestine social movement. This movement represents the first sparkles of civil society in his country.

On the phone from Luanda, he tells me, “we want to vote to clearly express our dissent from MPLA and our willingness to change the situation.” Who they will vote for count less than voting against MPLA; “ours is a tactical voting”.

This movement started with an anonymous call on internet for a protest on 7 March 2011 against the regime. The demonstration ended up attracting only a few people, but the response of the government was so virulent that ended up for sparking more protests.

In the last year and half, the movement has been able to organise several demonstrations in Luanda, as well as in the provinces of Biè, Benguela, Lundas and Huila. “This movement is made up by whoever is interested in a country with more social justice and more democracy”, he adds.

The people who have an interest in this movement potentially outnumber the 1000 or 2000 who showed up in the rallies.This movement has the big potential for growing, and as is the case with non democratic regimes, the government is determined to crack down upon it. In a country where 47% of the population is under 15, “most of the movement is formed by youths between 15 and 35 years old”.

What seems to be happening is that part of the vacuum left by the politics is being filled up by a social movement led by musicians. The immediate term of comparison is the Nigeria of the 70′s and 80′s stormed by Fela Kuti’s afro-beat, whose unrealised dream was to become president.

The youth seems to be very responsive to the inflammatory political rap which fills up all sorts of venues in Angola. Names such as MC K, Ikonoklasta, and Dioniso himself, whose artistic name is Carbono Casimiro – are extremely popular.

As of now, Carbono and his affiliates do not cultivate this high ambition. “We are not thinking to form a party. The idea for now is to gather all the people who are against this status quo. There is no plan to formalise our movement. We want to be as inclusive as possible. We don’t even have a name.”

On the web, it is possible to follow some of their debate on the blog Central 7311, whose name derive from the first demonstration organised on March 7 last year and mentioned earlier in this article. In that occasion, 17 people – including Carbono and Ikonoklasta – were arrested.

In one post of Central 7311, they define themselves in these terms: “We’re called “troublemakers”, “rabble-rousers”, “drug addicts”, “criminals” and a host of other less than flattering names, but for social degenerates, as the regime would want you to believe, and even in our perpetual state of disorganization, we sometimes produce good, honest work.”

Recently, they launched the Movement for the Electoral True (MPVE) online. Conceived as a website, it is meant to host the denounces of irregularities about the elections.

Facebook and other social media are also part of the game, but the door-to-door campaign is more efficient in a country where only close to 6% of the population use Internet.

Their modus operandi rely heavily on the activism of different cells in Luanda, and other provinces.

Abroad, this informal group has not received yet all the credit it deserves. Who instead has dedicated it lots of attention is the Angolan government. As the movement grew, so did the police repression.

A Human Rights Watch report released in June states that “Police and plainclothes security agents have forcibly dispersed anti-government protests, beating and arresting peaceful demonstrators, organizers, and opposition politicians, and obstructing and intimidating journalists ”.

For Victor Nogueira, born in Angola and raised in Portugal where he works as President of the Board of Amnesty International Portugal, the intervention of the State can be interpreted as an unnecessarily heavy-handed reaction. But it can be also seen as a sign of a regime which is nervous to lose its grip on power.

At a first sight, for dos Santos, the situation could not be more under control: the economy is booming; its strongest economic partner are China and USA; he will win the elections. Scratch behind the surface and the first cracks in the system will begin to appear. The whole country is accumulating a huge mass of people who do not have much too lose and do not buy the myth of dos Santos as the ‘peace architect’.

Fearing a tangible decrease of legitimacy, he decided in 2010 to revise the Constitution. There is not any more the direct election of President. It is possible to vote only for the political party, whose front runner becomes President in case of victory. In this way, dos Santos avoids the risk of receiving less votes than its party.

Another main source of concern regards his age. After 33 years in power, he is now 70 and the moment for relinquish his authority seems near.

His designated successor most likely will be Manuel Vicente, which ran the oil-state company Sonangol (the real engine of Angola) for the last twelve years. In January 2012, he has been appointed Minister of State for Economic Co- ordination and, only two months ago, Vice-President in case of victory in the elections.

Over the next five years, the current setting is destined to change. It is hard to say if for better or for worse. When asked about it, Carbono comments with a concerned “We are in Africa […]. The transition will be a difficult moment for Angola.”

Roberto Valussi is an Italian freelance journalist and documentary maker based in London. After a long period of infatuation with the Balkan politics, he now covers the the socio-economic developments of the Portoguese speaking countries in Africa.

By Kanchi Gupta, 27th August, 2012

This essay demonstrates that while Zionist ideology is predicated on the expansion and territorial integrity of ‘Eretz Israel’, the nature of its administrative regime was steered by Israel’s internal socioeconomic dynamics. Israel’s sui generis ‘instrumentalization’ for the ingathering of global Jewish diaspora and resulting ethnic make-up, as well as social democratic, secular and religio-national ideological preferences are inclusive of Israeli political structure. However, as Israel’s economy opened to global capital, neoliberal capital interests spilled across borders and determined the construction of Israel’s policies in Occupied Palestinian Territories. Therefore, the essay determines that Israeli policy outlined below must not be viewed solely through the lens of ideologically driven military conflict. Rather, Israel’s military policy is an amalgamation of its economic and political strategies, which have further created transnational neoliberal economic imperatives.

These imperatives drive Israeli’s administration and thus, undermine the Right/Left dichotomy of Israel’s political composites, with the Labor ‘doves’ on one side and settlement driven Likud ‘hawks’ on the other. In order to demonstrate this, it is important to first outline the course of Israel’s administrative policies in Palestinian territories and their impact on economic, political and social organization of Palestinian inhabitants. The second of part of the essay will outline the effect of globalization of Israeli capital on its policies in order to derive that the ideological thrust of Zionist ‘geography of imagination’ has been undermined by neoliberal capital interests and the economic vision of the dominant capitalist class.

Structural Dimension of Israel’s Administration:

Zionist discourse constructed Palestine as an empty space, devoid of its native Arab population and launched a political, military, economic and cultural campaign in order to establish this ‘imagined geography’ as ‘facts on ground’. As soon as the 1949 war was over, Israel initiated a massive transfer of land ownership in a brutal effort to erase the Arab population and establish its sovereignty as well as patrimony. The physical forms of erasure of Arabs, including evictions, displacements, seizures and demolitions, were accompanied by a large-scale grid of Jewish settlements on confiscated land. (Massad, 2000, Gregory, 2004)

As described by Derek Gregory, the nature of colonization was such that it fused together ‘settlement, security and sovereignty’ in an ‘essential union that continued to function as something far deeper than a political or military objective, something much closer to an existential imperative’ (Gregory, 2004). Israel maintained the same ‘existential imperative’ in order to claim legitimacy for the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip By asserting that the 6-day war was a pre-emptive war that sought to defend Israel’s existence and deter Arab countries from invading it (Farsakh, 2006)

Initially, Israel assumed responsibility of administration of major civil institutions like education, health-care, financial and legal systems. However, in what Gordon describes as the ‘colonization principle’, simultaneous expropriation of Palestinian land and water facilitated settlement construction to establish a territorial claim over the indigenously populated area. While Israel incorporated Palestinian labour as cheap workforce, the system of economic integration was such that it made the WBGS economy dependent on Israeli demand and regulations. For example, heavy taxes on Palestinian population and one-sided customs union that allowed access of Israeli goods to Palestinian markets but restricted entry of Palestinian goods into Israeli markets. As a result, a rise in employment, per capita income and standard of living was accompanied by diminishing productive capacities and hence, ‘de-development’ of OPTs. Settlers, moreover, were central to the institutionalization of a legal system of segregation whereby the military placed the settlers and the Palestinians under different legal systems in the occupied territories, the former under Israeli law while the latter subject to military laws. While the settlements were administered like any other town in Israel, the Palestinians were not included into the Israeli polity as citizens (Gordon, 2008, Farsakh, 2006).

This division of space is embodied in the outcome of the Oslo Agreements which ‘subcontracted’ responsibilities of Israel as an occupier to the international community, while at the same time institutionalized Israeli security concerns as a governing principle for political, legal and economic activity. In what Gordon calls the ‘separation principle’, Israel sought to re-organize power by preserving control of Palestinian space while transferring responsibility of its citizens to Palestinians themselves as well as the international community. However, Israel continued to monitor and administer ‘moving’ inhabitants through imposition of closures, checkpoints and blockades, construction of the separation barrier and fortification of outposts and settlements. Labor flows were also regulated by the military according to security considerations through permit systems and eventually, practically ended the employment of Gaza workers in the Israeli economy (Gordon, 2008 Farsakh, 2006). This eventually facilitated greater integration between the West Bank and Israel and separation between Gaza and Israel. This institutionalization of security concerns through shifting modes of control from use of violence and rule of law, to use of bureaucratic modes of control, finally to policies of separation eventually destroyed the economy of OPTs including their education, welfare and health-care systems.

While the Intifada is used as a pretext, Falah contends that the articulation of Israeli occupation through spatial re-organization is aimed at ‘enclavization’ and spatial dismemberment of OPTs for the greater goal of territorial aggrandizement. The geopolitical vision of Eretz Israel underlines the tactic of ‘spatial buffering’ whereby Palestinian inhabitants are ‘cleansed’ from areas contiguous to borders of OPTs. The Separation Wall is the most visible symbol of control and expropriation of Palestinian space while abrogating direct control of its population. The Wall has facilitated the sundering of enclaved spaces from other areas and this territorial non-contiguity has not only weakened the population politically, economically and socially, but has also ruined any effective fabric of sovereignty. (Falah, 2005, Pallister-Wilkins, 2011)

Therefore, this part of the essay asserts that Israel’s administrative regime institutionalized its ideological vision through shifting modes of establishing and extending spatial control in order to ‘naturalize’ its own territorial component. The eventual ‘bantustinization’ of OPTs was constructed to create a structure conducive to their economic and spatial domination while dismembering any plausible threat to Israeli ‘geography of imagination’. (Falah, 2005, Pallister-Wilkins, 2011)

Socioeconomic Trends:

The opening up of the Israeli capital to global orientation defined by privatization of state and quasi-state enterprises, relaxation of government control of capital markets and increased foreign investment was looked upon as the undermining of the social democratic thrust of Labor Zionism. However, Hanieh argues that the Israeli leadership was never antagonistic to private capital. Instead this capital was directed to Ashkenazim business groups that eventually coalesced into five large state and quasi-state conglomerates due to the absence of a strong indigenous capitalist class. However, the economic crisis of 1970s and 1980s compelled the National Unity Government comprising of both Labor and Likud factions to introduce economic reforms that transferred control of key economic sectors to the emergent capitalist class. As a result, Israeli economy progressed from low-tech to high-tech export-oriented economy and provided a cost-efficient environment to multinational corporations like Microsoft, IBM, Motorola etc. for establishing local branches for production and research. This internationalization of Israeli capital marked to a large extent an ideological shift in Israeli politics and necessitated the ‘cantonization’ rather than transfer of OPTs. (Hanieh, 2003)

The demagogic nature of Israel’s approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflictis most significantly exemplary of the influence of transnational forces and the internal dynamics they created . In the 1970s and 1980s Israel was boosted by aid from the United States and in a position to reject any resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict owing to its military strength demonstrated in the 1967 and 1973 wars. As a result, U.S. aid, which had previously been in the form of unilateral capital transfers from American Jewry, was replaced by sequentially increasing economic and military assistance from the government. So much so that by the 1980s, economic support loans to Israel were were replaced by economic and military grants and no restrictions were placed on the expenditure of these funds. This strategy was predicated on building Israel’s military capacity in order to integrate Israel as a U.S. strategic asset and combating Soviet influence in the Middle East. Moreover, the persistence of the conflict allowed the U.S. to maintain its presence in the Middle East while mediating between Israel and Arab states but more often than not, supporting Israel’s positions. (Beinin, 1998)

However, in case of the Oslo Accords or the 1993 Declaration of Principles, Yitzhak Rabin reversed his long-standing refusal to negotiate with the PLO because of the ‘peace and privatization’ vision espoused by his government’s Ashkenazim supporters who were opposed to the costs connected with the occupation. Instead of Zionism’s ideological and institutional impediments, they favored neoliberal economic policies, export and profit oriented economy, privatization of public sector enterprises and integration with European markets and hence, wanted the conflict to be resolved. Thus, the peace process was not motivated by the goals of equality and social justice, but rather by the interests of the Ashkenazi Israeli business elite. No matter what the outcome of negotiations, the Declaration of Principles aimed to create an open economy with free movement of goods between Israel and OPTs which would consolidate Israel’s position as the dominant economy of the Middle East. For example, the expansion of the electronics and metals sectors would augment the Israel’s military supremacy in the region. (Hanieh, Beinin)

However, Beinin argues Religio-Nationalist factions, shifting allegiance from Labor to Likud, espoused a biblical right to sustain military force over Palestinian Arabs in order to secure the legitimacy of Jewish claim to Eretz Israel and would therefore, in no way be deterred by the costs of occupation. But this too was underlined by the support base of the Likud, the Mizrahim, who formed the working class and inhabited bulk of settlements in OPTs. While Labor Zionism always advocated exclusion of Palestinians, the 1967 war transformed them into a reserve of cheap labor, elevating the Mizrahim from the lowest strata of the labor markets, who were then opposed to evacuation of OPTs. (Beinin, 1998)

The solution envisaged was ending direct military rule and ‘cantonizing’ OPTs under self-rule governed by a system of control based on permits and closures, and creating isolated enclaves surrounded by settlements and separation barriers. (Hanieh, 2003). It is contended that this ‘cantonization’ was advocated by the politically weakened Labor Party that demagogically raised the issue of ‘separation’ in light of costs of indefinite occupation, without addressing the Palestinian’s right to self-determination. This move was intended to appeal to the Jews who were opposed to repression of the Intifada but were also against withdrawal from WBGS on nationalistic grounds.
However, Pallister-Wilkins cites that construction of the Wall as a tool of separation is in fact illustrative of a trend towards neoliberal forms of domination, both within Israel and transnationally. She contends that the neither the ‘need for a barrier’ nor the route of the Wall are results of top-down government planning, but rather a product of influence of interests of multiplicity of organizations like real-estate developers, settler lobbies, environmental activists, Jewish religious organizations, political and human rights groups etc. that ‘operate independently, in spite of or in accordance with state policies’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011). Algazi cites the example of ‘Green Park’, a settler housing development that is being built on the land confiscated in the village of Bil’in due to the construction of the Wall, by Leviev and Boymelgreen’s Danya Cebus company which is a subsidiary of Africa Israel. Such settlements, like in the case of the Modi’in Illit bloc, are intended for those ‘struggling to subsist’ by providing them housing and social services not affordable in Israel. (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011, Algazi, 2006).

Algazi contends that Modi’in Illit is a site of high-tech capitalist modernization of Israel where subsidized land, wages and public resources attract corporations that are functions of privatization and represent transnational interests. A prime example of this is Israel’s largest software company, Matrix, that describes itself as the ‘first Zionist local offshore outsourcing’, an alternative to relocate offshore in order to compete with low-paid computer programmers in India. The company’s operation is sustained by the state by the provision of confiscated land in the Modi’in Illit settlement bloc, and it employs ultra-orthodox women’s labor under exploitative working conditions and low remuneration. Algazi contends that these women are victims of colonial capitalism that are incorporated into the settlement process and subsequent employment by exploiting their poverty. Thus, capitalist interests have also coalesced as a result of the Wall, to produce certain social, political, economic and spatial realities in the occupied territories. (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011, Algazi, 2006).

However, if unilateral disengagement from Gaza is considered, it can be argued that only an ideological shift within Revisionism, the ideology of Likud and secular Israeli right, could have caused the abandonment of ideological commitment to Jewish control of Erezt Israel. Following the Intifada that severely tarnished Israel’s international image and claim to legitimacy, moderate Revisionists were of the opinion that territorial maximization including control of historically Jewish territories captured in 1967, was undermining Israel’s desired Jewish and democratic character. (Rynhold and Waxman, 2008) Instead Falah contends that Israel’s disengagement from Gaza must not be understood as partitioning. Instead, by retaining control over its sea and air space and its borders, Israel retains total control of both sides of the Green Line while discarding Gaza, a negligible piece of real estate devouring Israel’s military and financial resources in favor of creating conditions for annexation of more than half of West Bank. (Falah, 2005)

Rynhold and Waxman maintain that given the marginal Jewish settlers in Gaza, the amelioration of demographic threat to Jewish nationalism was an important factor in the decision to withdrawal from Gaza and parts of West Bank. Moreover, when the Road Map for peace was sponsored by the ‘Quartet’, the U.S., the EU, Russian and the UN, appeared to reach a ‘diplomatic deadlock’. Sharon adopted a policy of Israeli initiative by disengaging from Gaza in order to maintain U.S. support for its hardline policies against the Palestinians and avoid erosion of support amongst its patrons and diaspora Jewry, and evade domestic pressures, particularly following the international outcry to the West Bank Separation Wall. Thus, ideological change was a prerequisite because it radically altered the way the Likud conceptualized Israel’s national interest. (Rynhold and Waxman, 2008). Therefore, the disengagement from Gaza is illustrative of a myriad of socio-economic factors ranging from international pressures, economic considerations and demographic challenges that alter Israeli administrative tendencies and determine the course of Palestinian realities.

Conclusion:

This essay demonstrates that transnational socio-economic factors characterized by a network of influences from that of international pressure to necessities of global capital have undermined Zionist ideological considerations driven by their ‘imagined geography’ of control over all of historically Jewish land including those occupied in 1967, and the overlapping policies of the ‘dovish’ left and ‘hawkish’ right over the course of Israel’s economic revolution are symbolic of this. While Israel’s administrative regime in OPTs is defined by their ‘cantonization’ aimed at spatial expansion and control, this ‘cantonization’ is not so much a function of the territorial integrity of Eretz Israel as it of neoliberal capital interests that have coalesced around these territories and constructed new structures of domination, nationally and transnationally. Therefore, while ideological tendencies have always been a necessary condition for the course of Israel’s policies, they fall short of being sufficient conditions because Israel’s administration is steered, to a large extent, by its opening to global capital and the economic imperatives this necessitates.

Bibliography:

• Algazi, Gadi, “Offshore Zionism”, New Left Review 40 (2006)
• Beinin, Joel, “Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict: 50 Years of Jewish Statehood” in Jewish Social Studies 4:3 (Spring – Summer, 1998), pp. 96-141.
• Falah, Ghazi-Walid, “The Geopolitics of ‘Enclavization’ and the Demise of a Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict”, Third World Quarterly 26:8 (2005)
• Farsakh, Leila, “The Political Economy of Israeli Occupation: What is Colonial about it?”
• Gordon, Neve, “From Colonization to Separation: Exploring the Structure of Israel’s Occupation”, Third World Quarterly 29:1 (2008)
• Gregory, Derek, “The Colonial Present” (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004)
• Hanieh, Adam, “From State-Led Growth to Globalization: The Evolution of Israeli Capitalism” in Journal of Palestine Studies 32:4 (Summer, 2003), pp. 5-21.
• Massad, Joseph, “The Post-Colonial Colony: Time, Space and Bodies in Palestine/Israel” in The Pre-Occupation of Postcolonial Studies edited by Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadiri-Crooks, Durham and LOndon: Duke University Press, 2000
• Pallister-Wilkins, Polly, “The Separation Wall: A Symbol of Power and a Site of Resistance?”, Antipode 43:5 (2011)
• Rynhold, Jonathan and Waxman, Dov, ” Ideological Change and Israel’s Disengagement from Gaza”, Political Science Quarterly 123:1 (2008)

Kanchi Gupta is an economics and politics graduate from University of Bath, UK. She is currently pursuing postgraduate studies in International Studies and Diplomacy from SOAS, London. Her interests include political research, freelance travel writing and amateur poetry.

The two days of talks in Moscow between the representative of P5+1 (US, UK, China, France, Russia and Germany) led by Catherine Ashton, the European Union High Representative and Dr. Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, ended with no major breakthrough and the possibility of further negotiations in Istanbul in July. “It remains clear that there are significant gaps between the substance of the two positions,” commented Ashton.

Concerned about uranium enrichment in Iran and the possibility of weaponization of its nuclear programme, the United Nations Security Council has imposed four sets of sanctions, resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 on Iran asking the country to “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” Moreover, The US House of Representative passed a resolution on May 11, 2012  asking for “the full and sustained suspension of all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” Jalili, on the other hand, has repeatedly stated  that “enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes in all levels is an inalienable right.”

In Baghdad, in return for the smallest incentives such as the sale of spare parts for civilian planes, the P5+1 wanted Iran to give up 20% enrichment and export all stockpiles in addition to fully cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency. That in the words of Dr. Seyyed Hossein Mousavian , the former spokesperson for the Iranian nuclear negotiation team from 2003 to 2005 and current visiting scholar at Princeton University was like asking Iran “to give diamond in return for peanuts.” Iran rejected the deal, but both sides agreed to meet in Moscow.

In Moscow the P5+1 asked Iran to suspend enrichment of uranium to 20%, close down an underground enrichment facility, Fordow, near the city of Qom and export its stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium. However, as illustrated before, repeated United Nations Security Council Resolutions ordered Iran to stop all uranium enrichment activities. The P5+1 and Iran agreed that the nuclear experts from both sides would meet in Istanbul on July 3 to make sure they understand the nature of each other’s proposals. Iran considers the UN resolutions and the EU and US embargo’s illegal and asks for the removal of sanctions.

The way the western powers treat Iran and its nuclear dossier reminds me of some of Samuel Huntington’s arguments in The Clash of Civilization. He observed that “the West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance” and that “the primary purpose of arms control in the post-Cold War world is to preclude the development by non-Western societies of military power that could threaten Western interests. The West tries to do this through economic pressure, international agreements and control regimes.” Huntington was arguing that in effect we live in a world of double standards and he was absolutely right.

Diplomacy, according to Sir Harold Nicolson is the management of international relations by negotiation. Alexander George, who coined the term ‘coercive diplomacy’, argued that the use of force and threats of force are at times necessary instruments of diplomacy. The aim of coercive diplomacy is to change the policies of another state. It does not aim at a regime change.

There is a discrepancy between the previous demand raised by the UN Resolutions to suspend all enrichment and the P5+1 demand in Moscow to suspend enrichment up to 20%. It must be noted, that as Iran has always argued, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not ban uranium enrichment. It is true that there are different interpretations of the NPT, but the treaty does not ban enrichment. On the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Arms Association Control on a panel on preventing nuclear-armed Iran  , Thomas Pickering, former US Ambassador to the UN, Dr. Moussavian, former Iran nuclear envoy and Dr. Tarja Cronberg, Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Iran, unanimously agreed that Iran has a right to enrich uranium, but they disagreed on the acceptable level of enrichment.

Instead of dealing with the cause of the problem that is the reason for which Iran might want to weaponize its nuclear programme and addressing those grievances to resolve the nuclear standoff, the western powers are imposing punitive sanctions and threatening Iran with the use of force. One wonders whether the eventual aim is to change Iran’s policy or a regime change. As long as the western powers do not have a clear answer to that question, the Iranian regime, concerned with its own survival, is not going to concede to their demands. Coercive diplomacy never works when the coerced are fighting for their existence.

The leadership in Iran is well aware that they have minimal legitimacy amongst Iranians. The case was evident when the government used brutal force to suppress the pro-democracy Green Movement after the 2009 fraudulent presidential election (to see just how oppressive the government of Iran is look at Amnesty International , Human Rights Watch’s annual reports).

However, I am not convinced that Iran wants to be a nuclear state. I believe Iran wants to be a ‘threshold power.’ The leadership, concerned about the regime’s survival, wants to get to a point that makes it possible for them to weaponize its nuclear programme if they decide to do so. Iranian American writer and journalist Hooman Majd argues that as a theocracy, the Islamic Republic has always purported to be committed to justice, fighting against inequality, and independence. The miserable human rights record and the ever-growing gap between the rich and the poor in the country has eroded that image. The Islamic Republic has remained with nothing but its independence. If the leadership gives in to western pressure on nuclear energy, they will lose the last remaining element of their legitimacy. They cannot afford to do that.

Moreover, the Iranian leadership has also learned a good deal from history. The former Libyan dictator Mummar Gaddadi gave up its unconventional weapons, and denounced terrorism to escape its isolation and join the international community. The west welcomed this but after a few years, at the first opportunity, they helped to topple him. Iran will not make the same mistake.

Furthermore, they are rightly critical of western hypocrisy. David Cohen , the U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, recently commented in Israel that “we have today and over the past years had very close cooperation with the Israeli government across a range of our sanctions programs. They are a very good partner. They are creative. They are supportive and we will continue to consult with the Israelis.”

Correct me if I am mistaken, but are we talking about a nuclear weapon-state outside the NPT, Israel, helping the United States to force Iran to give up its enrichment programme that is not proven to be geared towards weaponization? Let’s remember that on 18 September 2009, the IAEA called on Israel to join the NPT and open its nuclear sites to inspection, but Israel still refuses to join the NPT or authorize inspections. According to the BBC, it is estimated that Israel has up to 400 warheads, but it refuses to deny or confirm this. Why should the Iranians or anyone else accept this double standard?

Enriching uranium is Iran’s right and no future Iranian regime is going to relinquish that right, whether the current dictators or a western-friendly liberal government. Many Iranians compare Iran’s nuclear standoff with the west with nationalization of the oil industry in the 1950s. Every Iranian knows that in 1953, the CIA and the MI6 staged a coup d’état and removed the democratically elected Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq from power. What was Mossadeq’s crime? He nationalized Iran’s oil industry. For a lot of Iranians, the nuclear issue is on par with the oil nationalization with one reservation: the so-called Islamic Republic of Iran is not a democracy and it would be an insult to history to compare Mossadeq with dictators such as the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmood Ahmadinejad. That said, Iran should not give up its right to enrich uranium in Iran.

Advocates of a military strike against Iran always invoke the ‘irrationality’ of the Iranian leadership, Iran’s ‘threat to the world peace’, and the government’s miserable human rights record to support the use of force. They never quite spell out whether they want a policy change on the part of Iranian regime when it comes to its nuclear programme or regime change in Tehran. Meanwhile, the hawkish rhetoric of the supporters of military intervention in Iran has given the government more reasons to crack down on its civil society and wage a war against its citizens.

What is the best way to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue? The Iranian people are fed up, amongst other things, with the government’s mismanagement of the economy and suppression of human rights, so the government lacks domestic legitimacy. Besides, Iran has only a few friends in the world – countries such as Syria, and Venezuela. Its nuclear programme is arguably its last lever to guarantee its survival. Iran is ready for a compromise if it is given security assurances from the west. The removal of sanctions is a must in this process from the Iranian regime’s perspective.

Nevertheless, western powers will betray their own rhetoric about their values such as spreading democracy and promoting respect for human rights if they make a deal with the government of Iran without dealing with its widespread violation of human rights. Western powers need to reconsider how to use coercive diplomacy to achieve a permanent and acceptable outcome.

Iran will give up 20% uranium enrichment, NOT all uranium enrichment activities, if the P5+1 gives Iran security assurances and drops the regime change campaign. To remove sanctions and give security assurance, however, the P5+1 must get the Iranian regime to observe its obligations under different international human rights conventions. That will lead to a durable solution to Iran’s nuclear problems.

Alireza Ahmadian is an Iranian Canadian writer living in London. Ahmadian holds a history BA from the University of British Columbia and is currently completing his postgraduate studies at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

By Alireza Ahmadian, 30th July 2012

Azza Karam, the Senior Advisor on Culture at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), made the assertion at the roundtable discussion on Shared Sovereignty: Rights, Religion and the Problem of Authority (SSRRPA) at the School of Oriental and African Studies that religious actors have always played an important role in community-based projects all over the world: they invariably stay in areas of conflict even after secular organizations, such as the UN, withdraw their staff; and they provide between 40 to 70 percent of healthcare and education for the people. Karam also argued that with the financial crisis hitting all major donors to the UN, the religious actors that had not heavily relied on financial help from states and secular organizations would take over many projects that were traditionally implemented by secular UN agencies and other organizations. She was concerned that religious actors’ conservative stance on gender-related issues might jeopardize the attempts to promote gender equality in the world (2011).

The preceding examples illustrate the power of religious actors and how influential they are. This paper argues that the presumption that we live in a secularized world is false; therefore, the overwhelming majority of religious actors do not have to conform to secular norms. Moreover, since religion has remained an important factor in many people’s life, we have to facilitate religious actors and their religiosity in diplomacy. We start with a review of why religion has traditionally been marginalized in International Relations (IR) and diplomacy. After reviewing the concept of secularism, this paper addresses the prevalence of religion and religiosity. Thereafter, we investigate the assertion that religious actors must conform to secular norms. Finally, after problematizing the religion-secular binary, this paper illustrates how religion and religious actors can play pivotal roles in diplomacy.

A Secular World?

The idea of conformity to secular norms is not new in IR and diplomacy. From its inception, the discipline of IR has been defined by the Peace of Westphalia’s subordination of religion to the state—cuius regio eius religio (the ruler determines the religion of his realm). Therefore, in Daniel Philpott’s words, most scholars in the field have basically presumed the absence of religion in their analysis (In Farr 2008). IR theories, such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism have not traditionally dealt with the question of religion and its influence in IR (Snyder 2011, 1-2). This trend has changed by publication of a couple of new books (Snyder, 2011; Calhoun et al. 2011) that try to address the importance of religion in IR. Two factors have led to the IR theorists’ unwillingness to acknowledge the importance of religion. The first factor is fear. They consider religion to be historically a fundamental source of war, violence and conflict (Barnet 2011: 93-4). Because religious governments and groups operate on the basis of transcendental values and absolute claims, their politics is believed to be driven by different variables, which are incompatible with a culture of coexistence and compromise that presumes the imperfection of worldly arrangements and tries to accommodate them (Guilhot 2007).

The second factor is the significance of religion in IR. Even though religion is treated as a source of chaos, it is ironically considered at times of little causal importance; therefore, it is ignored (Barnet 2011: 93-4). Whereas religion is viewed to be irrational and emotive, secularism is conceived to be its antidote. Therefore, IR theorists have taken secularism to their heart. The fear of religion and questions about its causal significance have traditionally encouraged the IR theorists to believe in a secular international order and to ignore the significance of religion and religiosity.

Advocates of secularism have traditionally believed that religion was ephemeral and losing its relevance in a modern world. The rationalist theory of secularism argues that the Enlightenment initiated a rationalist worldview based of scientific and technological knowledge of phenomena. Rationalism would make fundamental claims of the religious institutions implausible in modern societies. Therefore, religion would lose its relevance. Moreover, the functionalist theory of secularism observes that in addition to a system of ideas and beliefs, religion is a system of actions involving symbolic ceremonies and formal rituals such as birth, marriage and death. Most societies are now characterized by functional differentiation, where specialized organizations and professionals carry out the tasks once conducted by religious institutions such as education, healthcare, and social control. Stripped of their main social purposes, religious institutions would gradually fade away (Norris and Inglehard 2004: 7-9). Sciences, technologies, and specialized institutions were expected to marginalize the role of religion, religious actors, and institutions.

IR theorists expected the world to move toward secularization. However, this has never been happened. With some exceptions, the world is “as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever” (Berger 1999: 2). Religion transcends the unit boundaries of states. It is a compelling source of motivation, a driving force incomparable with many other sources in politics. Religion is older than the state and encompasses all of life, not only politics. It involves social norms; norms that are supercharged by divine authority, and are absolute, and irrefutable (Snyder, SSRRPA, 2011). This historical superiority, legitimizing capability, and transnational nature of religion, in Shah and Philpott’s words, “give[s] it the potential to make significant impacts on world politics” (In Cochran and Snyder 2011: 203). Religion has not lost its relevance at all. Shattuck contends that religious beliefs are thriving all over the world with a few exceptions (The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2007) and Farr states that the world is “overflowing” with religious movements and communities, and there is little reason to believe this will change (2008). Religion drives the behavior of governments and people in significant ways. It can act as multiplier of both constructive and destructive behavior, with stronger results (Farr 2008). The premise that we live in a secular world is untrue. The preceding examples illustrate that religion, religiosity, and religious actors have remained as powerful as ever in most of the world.

Religious Actors and Conformity to Secular Norms:

Some religious actors prefer to hide their religiosity and use a secular discourse and identity. They purport to be secular for strategic reasons to be “consistent with the requirements of international order” (Barnet 2011: 109). Lynch argues that the Global War on Terror (GWT) and Liberal Market Practices encourage some religious NGOs to use a secular language to secure funds and reach out to more people who are in need of aid. The GWT has influenced the ways Muslim NGOs and Muslim aid workers identify themselves. In her interviews, the Iraqi, Somali and Palestinian NGO activists, predominantly identified themselves as secular and then Muslim. Lynch maintains that they may have refused to acknowledge Islamic principles as the driving force behind their humanitarian work because of anxieties about Islam in the global war on terror. Their secular identity can also help their appeal to their Western donors.

However, Christian NGO activists did not hide their religiosity. In particular, a Muslim representative on an interfaith Palestinian NGO that promoted nonviolence did not relate their activism to Islam, whereas a Christian leader of the group linked his work to Christianity and its interpretations of nonviolence and resistance to repression.

However, it is worthwhile to remember that most religious actors, as noted by Karam, do not rely on funds from secular organizations and operate based on their constituents’ financial donations or their business activities. Yet, those who do apply for funding from secular sources must learn a specific language that addresses issues such as “partnership,” “capacity-building,” and “training.” Results-oriented market discourse prioritizes efficiency, liberal progress, verifiable achievements, sustainability, accountability and success. Therefore, some religious actors have to adapt themselves to the required discourse if they want ongoing funding (2011: 210-7). These examples illustrate how some religious actors use a secular discourse as a strategy to facilitate the sustainability of their operations.

Most non-state actors do not have to hide their religiosity to be influential in the international arena or diplomacy. The International Islamic Relief Organizations (IIRO), a Saudi-run Wahhabi group, vividly linked the distribution of aid to proselytisation in the Iraqi province of Kudistan in the early 1990s. Women had to wear the veil and widows and orphans had to attend at the mosque. The group built hundred of mosques and their mullahs were financed by their new converts to Wahhabism. The group gave financial incentives to individuals who gave up membership of a secular political party. Burke argues the same people who were ideologically trained by IIRO were behind some of the extremist attacks against secular parties in Kurdistan that jeopardized the security of the region (Burke 2003: 201-2). Moreover, instead of using labor unions and other interests groups, Mozambique civil society expressed itself through religious communities and churches during the peace process to end its civil war. Churches played a “crucial” role in terminating the conflict (Bartoli 1999: 261-70). The preceding examples show that the majority of religious actors do not have to conform to secular norm and can still play a constructive or destructive role in international scene and therefore, influence, diplomacy.

Problematizing Secular- Religion Binary

We have to move beyond the binary between religious and secular. The secular versus religious approach distorts our understanding of how they might be related to one another. The religious and the secular is not a binary. One of the significant new revisions of the secular theory is the presumption that the religious and the secular are rivals for supremacy. They can actually be discursively related, co-institutive, and either one can create the other. Elizabeth Hurd’s distinction between the two trajectories of secularism, seperationist laicisim and accomodationist Judeo-Christian tradition, suggests that “the modern secular order rests on a religious foundation” (Barnet 2011: 102). Since the mixing of politics and religion is perilous and not rational, Laicists are committed to expelling religion from the public sphere.

Judeo-Christian secularists, on the other hand, do not try to expel religion from public sphere. Judeo-Christian characteristic disposition and cultural instincts are considered to have played a part in the unique Western achievement of separation of state and church. The separation of church and state softens sectarian divisions between Christian sects while retains the civilizational supremacy of Christianity (Hurd 2011: 5-6). Barnet maintains, that in this view, religion becomes either an ingredient of Western secularism or makes Western secularism feasible. According to this interpretation “the religious is part of the secular.” He goes on to maintain that many ‘secular’ global institutions have religious genesis and continue to retain religious significance for many different groups (2011: 103-9). The aforementioned examples show that it is not sound judgment to separate the religious from the secular to analyze how different actors influence IR and diplomacy because religion and secular is not a binary.

Rarely can you label something as purely secular or religious. Events, institutions and actions can have both religious and secular significance. For example, environmentalism can be seen as “stewardship of God’s creation” or in an entirely immanent frame (Calhoun et al. 2011: 20). However, IR theorists write about a liberal world order and equate liberalism with secularism. Charles Taylor argues that an immanent order was the great invention of Western culture. The immanent whose works could be systematically explicated and understood on its own terms, leaves open the question whether this order had a deeper importance. However, the immanent could never get rid of all the vestiges of the transcendental because people have a continuous need to relate to something bigger than themselves. It permits them to consider themselves connected to the world (In Barnet 2011: 103-4). The immanent and the transcendental could be together; therefore, it is difficult to label an actor solely a religious or secular actor. They coexist with each other.

Religion and Diplomacy:

Religion has direct effect on national and security interests of nation-states and can be used as a policy matter. Shattuck believes that religion is becoming a motivating factor in international relations, cultural, economic and political affairs. Therefore, it is “profoundly in our national interest, and our security interest, to come to grips with religion as a motivational force” (The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2007). Echoing the same sentiment, Farr maintains that lack of knowledge about the sociology of religion creates a policy problem, the “national interest problem” (The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2007). He believes that religion can be considered as a policy matter (Farr 2008). The importance of religion as a policy tool and a matter of security or national interest testify to the power of religion. Religious actors in turn are also very important because their activism is inspired by religion. States should acknowledge religious actors’ religiosity and engage them since they are inspired by religious ideas that are matters of national and security interests.

Religious actors and religion can and do play a major role in emergency relief, peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, and reconciliation processes. The interpretation of religious doctrines and sacred scriptures by militant leaders calling for war against the unfaithful is just one interpretation among others. All religions have a wealth of sources teaching the incompatibility of violence and faith, and asking for sacrifices for peace and respect for believers of other religions. In fact, Appleby argues that this civilizing dimension of the sacred should be facilitated in peace-building missions. He states “within each of [the] great traditions, notwithstanding their profound substantive differences, one can trace a moral trajectory challenging adherents to greater acts of compassion, forgiveness, and reconciliation” (In Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000: 666-7). During the peace process for Mozambique to end its civil war, the international community learned that NGOs can contribute positively to the solution of conflicts, and under specific circumstances, they might be able to play the leading role in conflict resolution initiatives. NGOs can offer new possibilities for adversaries who are willing to compromise and genuinely sue for peace. The Community of Sant’Egidio, an international Roman Catholic association that, played an important role in bringing about peace in Mozambique. Moreover, before the beginning of the peace talk between the government and the opposition in Mozambique the religious leaders started to promote peace talks (Bartoli 1999: 255-7).

Moreover, humanitarianism and its hope to help people to progress have also been religious projects for many people. The desire to emulate Christ and push forward for progress remains significant in humanitarian actions today. Emergency relief and peacekeeping projects are still significant projects for religious people and organizations (as well as others), but they are sometimes structured “in terms of ministering to the needs of people in the secular world” (Calhoun et al. 2011: 14). Furthermore, VanAntwerpen stated that archbishop Desmund Tutu’s take on the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) in South Africa and its success was influenced by his religious beliefs. Tutu saw reconciliation from a theological perspective with its intimation of confession and forgiveness and its association with amnesty and impunity. Both Vinjamuri and VanAntwerpen emphasized that Tutu’s take is heterodox and international human rights lawyers are more concerned with the duty to prosecute, but the fact that South Africa succeeded in dealing with its history under Tutu’s leadership of TRC and Tutu’s continual presence in reconciliation conferences shows that religion plays an important role in IR and influences diplomacy. (SSRRPA: 2011).

In conclusion, it is inaccurate to assume that we live in a secular world and we can treat religious actors as secular. This dismissive attitude towards religion has prevented diplomats and politicians from facilitating the policy advantages, and the peace-keeping, peace-making and reconciliation-promoting potentials of religion. Once politicians and diplomats come to appreciate the presence of religion along with the secular, and do away with the notion of absolute secularism in international relations and diplomacy, they can come up with alternative policies that can be more successful as they become more comprehensive. The strength of our diplomacy depends on its correspondence to what is happening in the world. Religion and religious actors have remained important players; therefore, their presence must be welcomed and used to enact better policies and promote peace.

Bibliography:

• Barnet, M. (2011) ‘Another Awakening?: International Relations Theory and Religion’, in Snyder, J. (ed.) Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 91-114.
• Bartoli, A. (1999) ‘Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant’Egidio’, in Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F. O., and Aall, P. (ed.), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 245-274.
• Berger, P. (1999) ‘The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview’, in Berger, P. (ed.) The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Published Policy Centre, pp. 1-18.
• Burke, J. (2003) Al-Qaeda, London: I.B Tauris.
• Calhoun, C., Juergensmeyer, M., and VanAntwerpen, J. (eds.) (2011) Rethinking Secularism, New York: Oxford University Press.
• Calhoun, C., Juergensmeyer, M., and VanAntwerpen, J. (2011) ‘Introduction’, in Calhoun, C., Juergensmeyer, M., and VanAntwerpen, J. (eds.) Rethinking Secularism, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-30.
• Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy Roundtable on Shared Sovereignty: Rights, Religion and the Problem of Authority, 20 October 2011.
• Cochran, E., and Snyder, J. (2011) ‘Conclusion: Religion’s Contribution to International Relations Theory’, in Snyder, J. (ed.) Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 200-209.
• Farr, T. F. (2008) ‘Diplomacy in an Age of Faith’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 2. Mar/April 2008, pp. na.
• Guilhot, N. (2007) ‘Secularism, Realism, and International Relations’ The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion and Public Sphere. Weblog [Online] 31/10/2007. Available from: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2007/10/31/secularism-realism-and-international-relations/ (Accessed 22 November 2011).
• Hasenclever, A. and Rittberger, V. (2000) ‘Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 641-674.
• Lynch, C. (2011) ‘Religious Humanitarianism and the Global Politics of secularism’, in Calhoun, C., Juergensmeyer, M., and VanAntwerpen, J. (eds.) Rethinking Secularism, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 204-224.
• Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2004) Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Pew Research Centre. (2007) International Religious Freedom: Religion and International Diplomacy. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Website [Online] 08/05. Available from: http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/International-Religious-Freedom-Religion-and-International-Diplomacy.aspx (accessed 20 October 2011).
• Shakman Hurd, E. (2008) The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Snyder, J. (2011) ‘Introduction’, in Snyder, J. (ed) Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-23.
• Snyder, J. (ed.) (2011) Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press.

Alireza Ahmadian is an Iranian Canadian writer living in London. Ahmadian holds a history BA from the University of British Columbia and is currently completing his postgraduate studies at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

Bastiaan is currently conducting an impact assessment of Projet Riz, a development project by Heineken International NV and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (Eucord) in the DRC. The project, focusing on smallholder rice farmers, has led Bastiaan to some of the most remote areas of country.

For more from this series see:

Reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo – Part I

Reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo – Part II

Reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo – Part III

In 2009 Bralima SARL – a subsidiary of Heineken International NV– and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (Eucord) launched Projet Riz, a development project targeting rural poverty, food insecurity and access to primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Specifically, the project aims to improve smallholder farmers’ productive capacity and catalyse the commercialisation of rice production by facilitating workshops detailing modern farming techniques, improving access to agricultural inputs such and crucially, by integrating smallholder rice farmers into the Bralima brewery’s supply chain.

By Bastiaan Huesken, 25th July, 2012.

1. Fixing Transport

Bralima, Eucord and their partners seek to assuage the difficulties imposed by the deplorable state of the roads in a series of manners. Around Bumba, SOCAM NT, Bralima’s commercial partner undertakes the transportation of paddy from the production sites to Bumba where the company owns a rice mill. SOCAM NT buys paddy at 12 collection points which the company has set up along the two main production axes in the Bumba region, the Yandongi and the Bokata axes. In so doing, the company relieves farmers of transportation costs and challenges and facilitates market access.

2. Collection Points for Rice

A collection point at Deki. The collection points have had a positive impact upon smallholder rice farmers’ market access.

3. Using Barges to Improve Water Transport

Bralima has employed several barges like the ‘Primus II’ pitured above to transport rice down the Congo from Bumba to Mbandaka and Kinshasa.

4. Commerce Returns to Bumba

The project has borne fruit. Commerce has returned to Bumba. Political instability and physical insecurity debilitated the local economy in Bumba, historically dependent primarily on agriculture. Now, financed by revenue derived from rice production commercial activity is picking up.

5. The Success of Small Businesses

Many small businesses have been started throughout rice producing areas as a product of revenue generated by rice production. Pictured above is Franklin with his boutique ‘Franklin du Ciel’.

6. Rice Production Takes Off

Rice production has taken off in the Kisangani area, stimulating a surge in commercial activity.

Bastiaan is currently conducting an impact assessment of Projet Riz, a development project by Heineken International NV and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (Eucord) in the DRC. The project, focusing on smallholder rice farmers, has led Bastiaan to some of the most remote areas of country.

For more from this series see:

Reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo – Part I

Reporting from the Democratic Republic of Congo – Part II

In 2009 Bralima SARL – a subsidiary of Heineken International NV– and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (Eucord) launched Projet Riz, a development project targeting rural poverty, food insecurity and access to primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Specifically, the project aims to improve smallholder farmers’ productive capacity and catalyse the commercialisation of rice production by facilitating workshops detailing modern farming techniques, improving access to agricultural inputs such and crucially, by integrating smallholder rice farmers into the Bralima brewery’s supply chain.

By Bastiaan Huesken, 17th July, 2012.

1. Bridging the Gap

Infrastructure, or lack thereof, constitutes one of the greatest barriers to the commercialisation of agricultural production.  Chronic economic mismanagement and internal conflict has led to serious under-funding for many years.  Water transport remains the dominant form of transport for two thirds of the country.

2. When a Tree Falls in the Woods (and the bridge has collapsed)

Here four pirogues tied together serve as a ferry where a bridge collapsed.  Pirogues are hollowed out trees used across the DRC as a form of transport.

3. The Motorbike Track

Most roads are only barely accessible by motorbike or bicycle.

4. Mud and Gutters

Larger vehicles, have tremendous difficulty.

5. The Bike Diaries

Due to the inaccessibility of roads, bicycles constitute the preferred mode of transportation. Rice and many other products such as palm oil, maize, manioc and ground nuts are transported to markets either by the farmers themselves, members of their family or by hired “Tolekistes”. The deplorable state of the (rural) infrastructure and the fact that loads transported exceed 100 kg make this extremely difficult and time consuming work.

6. Going to Market

Needless to say, market access is difficult.

In this post, Shirin Shafaie offers a policy recommendation paper for Iran ahead of the Moscow talks between the P5+1 and Iran.

By Shirin Shafaie

Iran should not allow the Moscow talks (18 June, 2012) to be announced, declared or referred to as “successful”, “positive”, “constructive” or even “promising” by the other party or the Western media in the absence of absolutely concrete and tangible concessions from the West in terms of sanctions relief and normalisation of Iran’s nuclear file in the IAEA. I explain why.

There are three general plausible scenarios that could happen in the aftermath of the Moscow talks. One of them amounts to political suicide for Iran, the second one means almost nothing to Iran, and the third one could be an optimal solution for all sides, meaning a win-win resolution or political suicide for the West with minimal harm to Iran.

First Scenario: Worst Case Scenario for Iran, Best Case Scenario for P5+1

When Iran and the P5+1 meet in Moscow on Monday, the other party will press Iran to take the first step based on the so-called principle of reciprocity and push Iran to at least declare its intention to take this or that step (meaning suspension of 20% enrichment, allowing inspection of Parchin, and implementing the Additional Protocol, to name some of the most important items on the P5+1 wish list) in return for a “declaration” of reciprocal steps by the West (meaning freezing of the EU oil embargo and Western unilateral sanctions against Iran’s Central Bank, revision and gradual lifting of the UNSC resolutions, normalisation of Iran’s nuclear file in the IAEA, to name some of the most important items on Iran’s wish list).

If this happens on Monday, the P5+1 and the world media will quickly announce the talks as “positive”, “promising”, “constructive” and overall a “success”. This would be detrimental for Iran.

Because this would keep oil prices “down” and “stable” at least for the next few months, something which can 1) amount to success for President Obama in the run up to the American presidential elections in November; 2) also benefit Russia who has already benefited from one round of high oil prices in December 2011 and January 2012. Russia managed to further subsidies its domestic energy consumption thanks to the extra taxes the Medvedev Government received from the surplus oil revenues. This helped Vladimir Putin’s victory in the country’s presidential elections last March. Now Russia wants to keep oil prices stable to help the American incumbent president win re-election in November so that he can move on to things “that can be solved, in particular missile defence” in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Russian blend of oil (for export) is most similar to the Iranian blend, which makes Russian oil a perfect alternative for European oil refineries (when the Iran oil embargo comes into effect). Russia only needs to be vocal in its defence of Iran’s nuclear rights so not to appear in public as betraying the Iranians; 3) low and stable oil prices will also amount to significant relief for Europe and a bargaining chip for China and other customers of Iranian oil in the aftermath of the looming Western oil embargo against Iran.

Accordingly, this would only weaken Iran’s negotiating position in the global energy market post-Moscow talks. There will not be any “real” sanctions relief in this scenario. Iran will be the biggest loser if the talks are announced as a success without any immediate tangible concessions to the Iranians.

Second Scenario: Second Worst Case Scenario for Iran; Second Best Case Scenario for P5+1

Under this scenario, there would still be no immediate tangible concessions to Iran (in the form of sanctions relief or normalisation of Iran’s nuclear file) nor any grand “declaration of intention” by either side for reciprocal steps but talks would still continue on a lower level. They might still be described by the world media as “promising” and Iran as “willing” to engage more in the future. The outcome of this scenario would still be like that of scenario number one, only on a lower level.

Third Scenario: Optimal Solution for Both Sides or Second Best Scenario for Iran and the Worst Case Scenario for the P5+1

Under this scenario, Iran would demand nonnegotiable immediate tangible concessions (i.e. the freezing of the EU oil embargo, the lifting of unilateral, Western sanctions against Iran’s Central Bank), and a negotiable “declaration” of further reciprocal steps (e.g. revision of the UNSC resolutions and normalisation of Iran’s nuclear file in the IAEA) in return for immediate tangible concessions from Iran (i.e. signing and ratifying the most recent agreement with the IAEA which, I think, includes permission for the IAEA to inspect the non-nuclear military site in Parchin; and perhaps the “provisional” freezing of 20% uranium enrichment possibly in return for extra concessions say air-plane parts which the West is very enthusiastic about selling to Iran) and a “declaration” of willingness for further reciprocal steps (such as implementation of the Additional Protocol and continuance of uranium enrichment only to 3.5% and 5%; note that we are talking about “declaration of intentions” here not actual and immediate implementation of these steps).

Anything short of this, and I mean absolutely anything short of this, should be considered as an absolute failure of the talks. Iran should be very vocal in announcing the talks as a failure to world media and take concrete actions to back its words if the above scenario is not completely realized because:

1. Doing so will at least keep oil prices high and unstable, something that Iran can benefit from in its negotiations with its oil customers in the event the upcoming Western oil embargo moves forward (Yes, it would also make the foreign currency market in Iran unstable but that is a risk Iran will have to take if it wants to exert some meaningful influence in the upcoming talks).

2. This will surprise the P5+1 by flipping their agenda upside down and prevent them from fooling Iran into accepting an “empty box of chocolate”.

3. This will deeply worry President Obama and President Putin, as well as China and Europe, making them more willing to take more meaningful, immediate and tangible steps to keep Iran at the negotiating table and, thereby, maintain low and stable oil prices.

Even though this scenario could be a win-win solution for all sides involved in Moscow Talks as well as for the rest of the world (save the Israeli regime and the Western military-industrial complex), one should still expect the other party to try and squeeze maximum concessions out of Iran in return for as little as possible. It is up to Iran to keep the stakes high for the other party. Iran has no reason to worry about a military attack against its nuclear installations in the event of the talks’ failure, as this would be absolutely counter-productive for the attacking country. Currently, the main goal for the other parties (at least until the American presidential elections in November) is to keep oil prices down and stable.

In fact, how the talks are labeled on Monday might be the most important aspect of this round of negotiations. The Iranian negotiating team should be aware of this fact and use its words extremely carefully when describing the talks to the Western media (they may use different words for describing the talks to the Iranian domestic media!). They should see this aspect as one of their strongest bargaining positions. They should not let the other party get away with conveniently describing the talks as “successful”, “constructive” or even “promising” when this is far from the case for the Iranians.

This post was originally published in Iran Review on 15 June 2012

About the author: Shirin Shafaie is Researcher at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London and the President of the SOAS Research Students’ Society.

En la siguiente entrevista, Alba Franco y Arcadi Oliveres debaten acerca de algunos de los retos del siglo XXI, desde la guerra al hambre, pasando por el cambio climático, el desarme, la paz mundial, y la violencia estructural del sistema.

Por Alba Franco, 11 de julio de 2012

Arcadi Oliveres es Doctor en Ciencias Económicas y profesor de Economía Aplicada en la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. En 1981 empieza a militar en la organización Justicia i Pau y en 2001 es nombrado Presidente. Es una de las voces más reconocidas del movimiento en contra del modelo neoliberal de globalización. Su compromiso permanente en causas reivindicativas de todo tipo hace de él un referente para quienes creen firmemente que “otro mundo es posible”.

Entrevista concedida el 26 de junio de 2012 en la sede de la organización Justícia i Pau.

P. A lo largo de su carrera ha escrito y hablado mucho sobre la paz. ¿Cuáles son en su opinión los principales retos a los que se enfrenta la paz mundial?

R. Antes de empezar, deberíamos aclarar qué es lo que se entiende por paz y más concretamente qué entiendo yo por el concepto de “PAZ”. Yo, quien me considero discípulo de Frederic Roda, gran activista catalán por la paz, creo que habría que recordar su concepto de paz. Y es que “la paz es un bien de segundo nivel”. Es decir que la paz no se puede conseguir si previamente no se dan unos requisitos. ¿Y cuáles son éstos? El respeto por los derechos humanos, la justicia social, el desarme, el respeto por el medio ambiente, el desarrollo de los pueblos del tercer mundo… Sin estos requisitos, ponemos en peligro la paz mundial.

Estos son realmente los retos a los que se enfrenta la paz. Aquí no interesa tanto decir si Estados Unidos ataca a Irak; sino que el concepto de paz es mucho más complejo que la simple asimilación con la ausencia de guerra. Cualquier vulneración de estos requisitos afecta a la paz mundial, ya sea directamente desde el punto de vista bélico como indirectamente a través de lo que muchos llaman –con razón- la violencia estructural del sistema.

P. Sabemos que la paz es más que la simple ausencia de guerra. Ahora bien, ¿qué es la “violencia estructural” de la que habla?

R. La violencia estructural viene del propio sistema. No hablamos de guerra, de explotación de armas, de conflictos bélicos… Sino que hablamos de aquella violencia que no respeta los derechos humanos, que causa hambruna, que obliga a millones de personas a seguir en campos de refugiados inaceptables, que echa a familias enteras de sus casas debido a unas deudas ilegítimas.

La violencia estructural es una violencia invisible en el sentido de que no es directa, no hay un conflicto armado, pero sí una terrible vulneración de los requisitos imprescindibles para la paz. No es fácil conseguir este objetivo porque cada cosa necesita su camino. Incluso aquí, en un país teóricamente democrático, es complicado hablar de paz cuando no hay desarrollo de los pueblos, cuando más de la mitad de la juventud está en paro, cuando los trabajadores están descontentos y cuando las pensiones se ven recortadas.

P. Entonces, ¿la paz es algo utópico, irreal?

R. Se podría decir que sí. Es un camino que hay que ir trabajando. De todos modos hoy en día con los recursos de los que disponemos sería, en teoría, mucho más fácil de conseguir. Supongo que siglos atrás era todo más complicado. Si hace 200 años había una mala cosecha de maíz, sólo tenías dos opciones: o morirte de hambre, o robarle al vecino y que se muriera de hambre él. Hoy en día esto no pasa.  Hay conocimientos agrarios, hay alertas, hay transporte, hay redes de comunicación…y todos estos avances permitirían que más o menos todos viviesen bien. Entre otras cosas porque alimentos en el mundo no es que falten, sino que sobran.

Por lo tanto, aquello que era más difícil de tener para construir la paz como los medios técnicos, los recursos, el transporte, las comunicaciones, los conocimientos médicos…ya lo tenemos. En cambio, aquello que teóricamente es más sencillo de tener para construir la paz como la convivencia social, el reparto equitativo de la renta, solidaridad entre los pueblos…es en la práctica lo más difícil de conseguir para establecer la paz en su concepto más amplio.

P. Teniendo en cuenta que la historia de la humanidad ha sido esencialmente violenta, ¿qué futuro contempla?

R. No ha sido esencialmente violenta, sino que la historia de la humanidad ha tenido siempre etapas de violencia puntuales. Pero yo diría que si ahora miramos los 7 mil millones de personas que viven en este planeta, veremos que hay entre 15 y 20 millones de individuos que sí que se encuentran en situación bélica directa. El resto de los habitantes de la tierra, no. Sin embargo, entendiendo la paz como concepto amplio, no existe la paz en nuestro país porque siempre te encontrarás con un pensionista que no cobra su pensión, con un inmigrante que es discriminado o con una mujer maltratada. Es evidente que en este sentido amplio, la paz no existe en los países supuestamente democráticos.

P. ¿Existe algún garante de la paz? ¿Cuál debe ser el papel del Estado español?

R. El Estado español tiene en estos momentos aproximadamente 5 millones de parados a los que no da las ayudas correspondientes. No obstante, España que no tiene ninguna amenaza directa gasta cada día 52 millones de euros preparando la guerra. ¿Crees realmente que España es un país que quiere garantizar la paz? En absoluto.

Pero esto no es todo. Además de gastar en armamento también interviene en una guerra en Afganistán, en una en Libia… Y aún peor, esta semana se está celebrando una feria de armamento en París y España tiene una presencia importante. Lo ideal sería que el Estado garantizase unos mínimos, pero no hay voluntad alguna de garantizar la paz por parte del gobierno español.

P. Entonces, ¿de quién es la responsabilidad?

R. Son las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) y la sociedad civil quienes deben presionar a los gobiernos para exigir unos mínimos. Deben explicarles que se puede hacer otra gestión del presupuesto total, administrar de otra forma los recursos e invertir en otros sectores que no sea sólo defensa. Las ONG tienen mucho trabajo.

De hecho, la semana que viene está prevista una conferencia mundial en Nueva York organizada por la ONU, pero impulsada por las ONG con el fin de que se establezca un tratado mundial que restrinja la venta de armas. Pero por mucho que se firme, no pasará nada porque hecha la ley, hecha la trampa.

Tengo un ejemplo, Europa aprobó también una normativa sobre la venta de armas en 1991, así que ya tenemos 20 años de experiencia. La Unión Europea recomendaba no vender armamento a los países que están en guerra o que estuvieran bajo dictaduras. Dos años más tarde, una agencia sueca hizo un estudio que demostraba que 72% de las exportaciones europeas de armas violaban  las órdenes de la Unión Europea.

P. La situación que presenta es poco optimista… ¿no hay ningún organismo que realmente vele por la paz y que obligue a cumplir las recomendaciones sobre la venta de armas?

R. ¿La ONU? La ONU no tiene ningún poder. El poder se lo otorgan los propios Estados, ahí está el problema. Además hay países que tienen el derecho a veto por lo que si hay un tema que no les interesa, lo vetan y ya no se habla. Hay algo que puede que sorprenda, pero el presupuesto total de las Naciones Unidas es seis veces menor que el presupuesto que tiene el ministerio de Defensa español. Reitero, seis veces menos. De ahí la imposibilidad de ser el garante de la paz.

P. Dejando de lado la visión amplia del concepto de paz y centrándonos en un tema más concreto, como puede ser el desarme, ¿cómo avanzamos hacia el desarme?

R. El avance hacia el desarme tendría varias etapas que se podrían llevar a cabo. De hecho, existen muchos estudios que hablan de esta posibilidad. El problema es que falta voluntad política para conseguirlo.

Lo primero que habría hacer es cerrar el grifo al gasto militar. Si los gobiernos no tuviesen presupuesto militar, difícilmente podrían preparar la guerra porque sin dinero no puedes pagar soldados ni comprar armas. En 1982, la ONU aprobó una resolución y pidió que, para avanzar en el camino hacia la paz, todos los países del mundo desde 1982 en adelante redujesen cada año un 5% su gasto militar. Han pasado 30 años y ni un solo país ha cumplido con la resolución de la ONU. Pero lo que más asusta es que lo que se gasta cada año en defensa militar permitiría, según cálculos de la ONU, erradicar no una, sino treinta veces el hambre en el mundo. Es decir que lo que gastamos cada año preparando la guerra permitiría acabar con la hambruna en el mundo.

Con esto está todo dicho, no hay ninguna voluntad política de avanzar hacia la paz. El segundo paso sería reducir los ejércitos. Contamos hoy en día con 26 millones de soldados de los cuales medio millón hace “peace-keeping”, “peace-builing” o “peace-making”. ¿Y qué hace el resto? War. Tercero y muy importante, reducir la cantidad de gente que se dedica a la investigación de armas nuevas. Según datos de la ONU, hay medio millón de científicos que no hacen nada más en su jornada laboral que mirar de crear las mejores armas.

P. ¿Qué piensa de la teoría de la doble amenaza?

R. Que no es aconsejable. Hubo un momento que Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética habían innovado tanto en armas nucleares que podían destruirse mútuamente unas 50 veces. No tiene sentido que los países inviertan en más armas nucleares porque ya tienen la capacidad de destruir toda la tierra. Es absurdo.

P. ¿Qué piensa usted de la afirmación que dice que las guerras han contribuido a un avance significativo de la tecnología, de las industrias… en definitiva, que las guerras han traído progreso?

R. Precisamente sobre este tema iba mi tesis doctoral. Y mi conclusión es que la investigación militar retrasa el progreso científico. Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Japón y Alemania fueron castigados por haber luchado contra los aliados. Se les prohibió tener gastos militares y de esta manera invirtieron en investigación civil en vez de en investigación militar. Resultado: son los dos países de la segunda mitad del siglo veinte que más competitividad tecnológica han tenido. Rusia, sin embargo, se dedicó a la investigación militar (cohetes, misiles…) y su economía acabó hecha un desastre. La organización SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) asegura que de la mitad de la investigación militar no se sabe nada porque se considera secreta. La otra mitad sí que se da a conocer a través del registro de patentes (innovaciones militares), pero sólo el 20% recibe interés por parte de la sociedad civil. Es decir que del total de la investigación militar, sólo un 10 % se hace público.

P. ¿Qué papel debe jugar la historia en la construcción de paz y qué piensa de la frase “perdonar es olvidar”?

R. Con las ciencias sociales, el contraste sólo lo da la historia. La historia te dice que si has hecho determinadas cosas pueden ocurrir otras muchas. La historia ha demostrado que Rusia armándose hasta el cuello no ha conseguido desarrollo productivo y las tiendas se han quedado vacías de productos necesarios para la población, teniendo que importar así productos del exterior.

La historia es fundamental en la construcción de la paz. Es, en cierto modo, la maestra del futuro porque nos muestra lo ocurrido en el pasado. El reconocimiento de la historia y su memoria es imprescindible para un verdadero progreso en la justicia. La frase “perdonar es olvidar” es una mala consigna porque necesitamos la memoria colectiva para cambiar todo lo que se ha hecho mal. El olvido no funciona en política, hace falta un reconocimiento público de la historia para contrastar el pasado con el presente y el posible futuro. El reconocimiento permite conocer y transformar.

P. ¿Qué piensa del “crecimiento por el crecimiento”? En otras palabras, ¿es compatible el crecimiento sin límite con el concepto de paz?

R. No hay ninguna razón lógica para seguir con el crecimiento. Habría que pedir explicaciones a los políticos que buscan aumentar el PIB en un 3%. ¿Por qué no podemos mantener las mismas ventas que el año pasado? Tendría su lógica querer aumentar las ventas o el PIB si  aumenta la población, pero sino no tiene sentido. Querer vender más o ganar más es absurdo si se hace únicamente por principio. Y aún más absurdo es si tenemos en cuenta que los recursos de los que disponemos se están agotando.

Hay un dato muy relevante: hasta 1986, todo aquello que los humanos destruíamos del planeta en un año, la tierra lo recuperaba el año siguiente. Se talaban árboles que al año siguiente ya habían crecido; se contaminaba el agua y las lluvias la purificaban después. Ahora bien, al año siguiente, lo que había recuperado el planeta, no era todo lo que los hombres habían gastado en un año. Todos los recursos que la tierra había recuperado en 2009, no era lo que los humanos habían gastado en 2008, sino lo que habían malgastado del 1 de enero al 23 de septiembre del 2008.

P. ¿Y cómo vivimos a partir del 24 de septiembre del 2008?

R. De gorra. Y a costa de futuras generaciones. Desde 1986 producimos y gastamos mucho más de lo necesario. Hay 7 mil millones de habitantes en el planeta, de los cuales 1000 millones consumimos a todo gas mientras que los 6000 restantes viven en la pobreza. Si todas las personas que pueblan la tierra quisiesen consumir la misma energía, el mismo petróleo, la misma madera, los mismos minerales, el mismo agua…que los mil millones de privilegiados que viven en el mundo rico, necesitaríamos cuatro planetas para abastecer a todos.

P. ¿La solución frente al expolio de los recursos del planeta?

R. La única solución: el decrecimiento material.

Alba Franco es Licenciada en Periodismo por la Facultad de Comunicación Blanquerna, de la Universidad Ramón Llull, Barcelona. En la actualidad está completando un Máster en Comunicación de Conflictos Sociales y Armados en la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

In this article, the author presents a critical review of the briefing, “Iran´s Nuclear Impasse: Breaking the Deadlock”, published by the Oxford Research Group on 1 May 2012. As negotiations over Iran´s nuclear programme stall, the author criticises the lack of neutrality of the briefing by the Oxford-based think tank, and calls for a review of the same in order to avoid some of the mistakes of the past, when pro-war think tanks played a key role in manufacturing consent for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

By Mehrnaz Shahabi, 10 July 2012

The Oxford Research Group’s briefing, Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Breaking the Deadlock (1 May 2012) [1], published before the second round of negotiations between Iran and P5+1 (permanent Security Council and Germany) in Baghdad on 23 May, whilst proposing some positive principles for a successful outcome of the negotiations – such as Iran’s right to enrichment,  “reciprocity”, “defining endgame”, and “taking regime change off the table” – suffers serious drawbacks, which have become even more glaringly  clear with the result of the recent Moscow negotiations.

At the conclusion of the third round of talks between Iran and P5+1, the initial optimism about the resolution of the stand-off between Iran and the US over Iran’s nuclear programme has been replaced for many keen observers by a sober appreciation of the nature of the conflict and the obstacles to reaching anything approaching a workable deal.  The events preceding and concurrent with the negotiations will have further disabused the international community of the illusion of “good will” on the part of the Obama administration.  Following the first round of negotiations in Baghdad in April 2012, the US Congress passed a near unanimous bill moving the US’s “red line”, from weaponisation by Iran to that of Israel’s redline of “Nuclear capability”.  The bill also made the termination of US sanctions conditional upon such demands on Iranian domestic politics which, in the context of the raging covert war by the US and Israel inside Iran, is tantamount to a demand for  regime change [2].  So even a surrender of Iran’s right to enrichment would fail to guarantee the removal of the draconian unilateral economic sanctions by the US, designed admittedly to hurt the population!  The bill therefore increased substantially the risk of war – as and when it becomes ‘feasible’ – and scuppered the chances of a successful deal.

Ahead of the second round of the negotiations in Baghdad, Iran made a provisional agreement with the IAEA Chief Inspector, Amano, to provide access to the Parchin military site, where it is claimed nuclear weaponisation related tests might have taken place.  According to Iran’s agreed guidelines with the IAEA, Iran is not obliged to open any non-nuclear site to inspection.  This important move by Iran, at great risk to its security, was played down by the US’s negotiating team as “irrelevant” to the negotiations.

As detailed in New York Times on 1 June [3], there have also been revelations about the Flame virus attack on the Iranian government computer network and oil and nuclear installations, and the Obama administration’s illegal, dangerous, and accelarating cyber war, in collaboration with Israel, against Iran’s nuclear and other infrastructural facilities as soon as Obama took office and as he was stretching out his much publicised “open hand” towards Iran.

In Istanbul, as announced by the EU Foreign Policy head and the representative of the P5+1, Catherine Ashton, the NPT and step-by-step reciprocity had been established as the key basis for the negotiations.  The US’s failure to honour this agreement by demanding Iran surrender its right to enrichment enshrined in the NPT and by refusing a reciprocal reduction of sanctions in return for Iranian concession to limit the level of enrichment to below 5 percent and to transfer its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium out of Iran, highlights the US’s absence of good will in resolving the stand-off with Iran.  This renders the ORG’s analysis redundant and in need of revision.   The analysis is framed in error and is factually uninformed.

Contrary to the ORG’s stated principle of neutrality, the analysis is framed within the dominant western discourse.  It takes at face value the US/Israeli led accusations about Iran’s nuclear programme – despite the intelligence verdict from both countries of an absence of a nuclear weaponisation programme in Iran  – and legitimises the singling out and demands on Iran to forfeit its rights under the NPT.  “Due to domestic political constraints as well as Iran’s inadequate levels of cooperation in the past, the pendulum may have swung too far in favour of punitive measures, with a resultant dearth of proposals and lack of appetite for constructive engagement”.  It thus attributes the current punitive measures against Iran and the ‘deadlock’ to Iran’s “inadequate cooperation” rather than a continued US/Israeli policy of coercion in a scenario of manufactured ‘crisis’.  All the references in the IAEA reports to Iran’s inadequate level of co-operation relate to the access provisions under the Additional Protocol, which Iran, based on its Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA, is not obliged to provide.   However,  as a confidence building measure during the negotiations with EU3 between 2003 and 2005, Iran voluntarily accepted the Additional Protocol and halted enrichment of uranium.  Iran has maintained its readiness since to implement the Additional Protocol on the condition that its right to enrich uranium as a member of the NPT is recognised and respected.

Notably the ORG does not shy away from blaming Iran even for the US’s backtracking from the uranium swap deal of 2010: “Nine months later because of extensive investment in the sanctions route and suspicions that Tehran was simply buying time, the US did not entertain the May 2010 Tehran Declaration”.   On 20 April 2010 following meeting with the Brazilian President Lula and the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, in the Nuclear Security Summit in New York, President Obama wrote [4] to President Lula that “Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions … This element is of fundamental importance for the United States. … Iran would begin to demonstrate peaceful nuclear intent”.  Less than a month later on 18th May 2010, Iran signed the Tehran Declaration of the uranium swap deal. This was promptly discarded and reciprocated with yet another sanctions resolution from the Obama Adminsitration.

The analysis proposes a re-adjustment of the Dual Track approach, but legitimises the strengthening of  economic war on a nation of 76 million by stipulating, “when and if Iran offers meaningful concessions to allay IAEA concerns over proliferation and weaponisation”, describing the Dual Track as “not without its merits”. In fact all the proposed concessions from Iran – implementing the Additional Protocol, limiting the level of enrichment and transferring the uranium stockpile out of the country – had already been on the table as bargaining chips in return for Iran’s right to enrich, prior to the introduction of the US/UE sanctions.  But even if sanctions wrenched concessions, it would not justify their legitimacy; it merely demonstrates the supremacy of gangster politics in international relations and the moral bankruptcy of the west in its criminal disregard for international law and the UN Charter.

The ORG’s absence of neutrality and its advocacy for ‘coercive diplomacy’ against Iran is further demonstrated in its concern about the “weakening [of] the resolve on the part of key members of the international community, notably Russia and China”.  This presumably refers to Russia and China’s refusal to impose further unjustified Security Council sanctions or not to accept the US/EU’s illegal and inhuman sanctions on the lifeline of the Iranian economy.

Although the ORG has in the past laudably warned against the consequences of military attack on Iran, it does not propose the removal of the military option by western powers.  Even worse, the ORG envisions an alternate scenario should diplomacy fail, of the use of force on the one hand or Iran’s acquision of nuclear weapons on the other.  “This briefing is based on the conviction that opportunities exist for a comprehensive settlement, avoiding the inevitably destabilizing use of force or the development by Iran of a nuclear arsenal”. It is not surprising then that the ORG quoting the hawkish British Foreign Minister, William Hauge, promising “serious consequences” and that “Iran could be responsible for a new “Cold War” if it insisted on pursuing nuclear weapons”, does not warn against the FM’s warmongering and dangerous lies, of the sort that led to the illegal and immoral invasion and war in Iraq, and does not propose  the removal of the military option.

The ORG’s theoretical framing of the US-Iran stand- off and the understanding of the nuclear issue erroneously applies group relations theories and conflict resolution principles in a geopolitical context of wars of dominance and balance of power.  “The absence of diplomatic relations has created a profound sense of misunderstanding about the motivations and intentions of each side”.  Thus it disregards the power imbalance and the actual history of the stand off rooted in the geopolitical ambitions of the US – from the overthrow of the popular nationalist government of Mosaddegh and the installment of the Shah, to the US’ active participation in the Iran-Iraq war, to the imposition of sanctions by Clinton when Iran was trying to open up to the West after the devastation of Iran-Iraq war, to the Axis of Evil designation in 2002 following Iran’s cooperation in the overthrow of Taliban, to the rejection of President Khatami’s ‘Grand Bargain’ of 2003 and the “total war” and “full spectrum dominance” policies  of the Neo-Conservatives which have guided the US foreign policy [5] since the mid-1990s.  The reshaping of the map of the Middle East which began with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, has continued under Obama with the invasion of Libya, intervention in Syria, and with the eyes on Iran as the “ultimate prize” [6] long before the manufacture of the nuclear stand-off.

In relation to the uranium swap deal, the ORG proposes that if Iran agrees “to a single shipment, this would demonstrate to the E3+3 that Iran was negotiating in good faith and had confidence in the commitment of the other parties”. Again there seems to be a problem with wrong framing of the issue, as if Iran’s absence of trust in the good faith and commitment of the other parties, is a matter of Iran’s perception rather than a justified concern based on historical precedence of the West’s disregard for international law and its total impunity.  The US’s three decades of violation of Article IV of the NPT, sabotaging Iran’s lawful contracts with other countries, such as Germany and China, to develop a civilian nuclear technology, with total impunity, is an example amongst numerous serious violations of international law with total impunity. The US’s covert war of destabilisation and its cyber war against Iran are the running examples of such violations, not to mention the illegal invasion of Iraq based on fabricated evidence, and without the UN Security Council authorisation, which destroyed that country’s infrastructure and slaughtered and displaced millions of defenceless civilians.

The suggestion that “The deal should also be seen by all parties as “equitable” and “just””, is again framed in error.  This is not a dispute between two equal adversaries with legitimate rights.  Rather, it is a geopolitical strategy by the superpowers for balance of power and hegemony.  What is an “equitable and just” outcome to this crisis for Israel or the US?!

Finally in recognition of a possible “asymmetry in negotiations”, the authors comment that “the negotiating table is structured in such a way that the E3+3 outnumber the Iranians”. To resolve this “unequal power relationship around the table”, the ORG proposes that “A smaller group could sit around the table in order to create a more symmetrical relationship”!  It is an interesting slip that the denial of the unequal power relationship at the root of the larger conflict in the analysis, manifests itself in the concrete and absurd  attempt to put right the sitting arrangement of the adversaries!

Neo-conservative think tanks played a crucial role in manufacturing consent about Iraq’s WMD and politicians’ consent for  war.   The apathy towards sanctions that killed over a million people and destroyed Iraq’s infrastructure before the 2003 invasion, could not have existed without the insidious influence of pro-war think tanks.   It is in this context that the Oxford Research Group, as a reputable and trusted think tank for its neutrality and expertise, must revisit this analysis for unwitting errors and shortcomings, particularly so in the light of the developments and revelations since the negotiations between P5+1 and Iran began.

This post was originally published by CASMII on 22 June 2012.

Mehrnaz Shahabi is an anti-war activist and independent researcher. She lives in the UK. She can be reached on mshahabi@blueyonder.co.uk

References

1.http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/iran’s_nuclear_impasse_breaking_deadlock

2. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02194:@@@D&summ2=m&.

3.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all

4.http://www.politicaexterna.com/11023/brazil-iran-turkey-nuclear-negotiations-obamas-letter-to-lula

5.http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20454950?uid=3738032&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=47699095496497

6. http://www.counterpunch.org/2006/01/17/real-men-go-to-tehran/

This article provides looks more specifically at the factors impacting upon food insecurity in the DRC and the actions Projet Riz is taking to combat them.

To see the first in the series click here.

In 2009 Bralima SARL – a subsidiary of Heineken International NV– and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (Eucord) launched Projet Riz, a development project targeting rural poverty, food insecurity and access to primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Specifically, the project aims to improve smallholder farmers’ productive capacity and catalyse the commercialisation of rice production by facilitating workshops detailing modern farming techniques, improving access to agricultural inputs such and crucially, by integrating smallholder rice farmers into the Bralima brewery’s supply chain.

By Bastiaan Huesken, 9th July, 2012.

1. The Importance of Workshops

The local partners also organize workshops for the field extension agents, such as pictured above. The workshops are intended to train Projet Riz field extension agents in numerous facets pertaining to rice cultivation and the commercialisation hereof so that they are better able to support other smallholder rice farmers. Workshops touch upon subjects including book keeping, marketing and of course modern methods of rice cultivation.

2. Increasing the Growing Seasons

Several aspects of local methods of production can be improved upon. In the Province Equateur and the Province Orientale, two seasons of rice could feasibly be cultivated. Local practice, limited – but improving – access to fast growing seed varieties and seasonal pests mean however that most farmers choose to grow rice during only one season. The project aims to provide local farmers with the means and know how to increase the number of seasons smallholder rice farmers cultivate per year.

3. The Pests

One of the pests, a grasshopper. The biggest pest to producers throughout the Province Equateur and the Province Oriental is the weaver bird which in flocks can ravage entire fields.

4. Sharing Modern Methods

The importance of sharing modern methods of rice cultivation with smallholder rice farmers is further underscored when considering the environmental sustainability of rice production. Local practice is to clear a plot of land every season.

5. Preventing Deforestation

Emphasis is being placed upon the need to preserve and the inherent value of the DRC’s rain forests. By outlining the environmental and economic benefits of environmentally sustainable production and providing the knowledge to do so the project aims to reduce the rate of deforestation.

6. High Yield, High Gain

Another aspect of the work of local partners pertains to the provision of access to high yield seed varieties. High yield seed varieties produce markedly higher yields compared to local seed varieties and take considerably less time to grow. The picture shows a rice field at the CAPSA research center outside of Kisangani. The center is used to test and maintain and produce high yield seed varieties which smallholder rice farmers can purchase at a reduced cost or acquire by means of a loan. The terms of the loan: After the first harvest, the smallholder farmer is required to return a small percentage of their produce, which is in turn distributed further.

In this film essay, Yayaati Joshi looks at The Namesake and considers it to be a mixed bag of emotions-cultural shocks, an unusual name, and a very hard attempt to replicate the book.

The Film Corner is a series on InPEC by Yayaati Joshi. Yayaati is a blogger and a short story writer whose work can be found here and in his book, ‘The Recluse and the Rag Picker’. He specialises in cinema of all kinds including commercial, arthouse and foreign films. This collection of film essays looks at the nature of film in society and the purposes that it serves.  The first article in the series, a review of Mere Apne, is here.

By Yayaati Joshi, 6th July, 2012.

The Namesake starts in a train, where Irrfan Khan (Ashoke) is busy reading Nikolai Gogol’s collection of short stories. From there on, so many incidents happen that it becomes hard to decide what the film is about. In two hours, a smorgasbord of emotions is spread for one to devour-but as appetites go, one can only have so much to eat. So an excess of something-whether for the appetite, or for the emotional magnitude in a film, is not good.

Nair pays such minute attention to details that it seems as if Lahiri (on whose book the film is based) herself supervised the direction-a sort of a ‘ghost direction’. We get to see minute things-that would otherwise go unnoticed. The built up of the plot, the feel of the cities, the emotional stances of the characters-everything is presented with such precise detailing that by the time we’re half way through the film, we’ve seen more than we can remember. This detailing, in particular, takes some joy away from the experience of watching the film. What, for example, is to be concluded from the scene in which just before giving birth to Gogol, Tabu asks the nurse to give her longer clothing, which covers her legs completely? It has already been established that Tabu’s character is a traditional Indian woman-and to belabour that seems superfluous. That sort of a thing suits a book-a reader has to ‘imagine’ events as they take place. But in a medium which is primarily dependent on visual perceptions, the need to over emphasize is a waste of resources.

Along with the multitude of detailing, the themes also, are too many. Immigrant’s culture shock, a kid growing up with an uncommon name, the same kid’s angst as he grows up, death in the family, the grown up Gogol’s break-up and marriage (and break-up again)-and somewhere in the middle of the potpourri of events, it is for the viewer to remember that the film’s pièce de résistance is Gogol’s struggle with accepting his name-and his father’s reason for giving him that name. Ironically, in a detail clad film, the scene in which Ashoke tells Gogol about why he chose the name, is dismissed hastily. The father and son moment takes place when they’re on their way to buy ice-cream for Gogol’s girlfriend-very uncharacteristic of an Indian father to choose a mundane and unceremonious way of sharing a secret.

A lot is said about how the acting in a particular film can compensate for other failures. Unfortunately, that principle doesn’t apply very well to The Namesake. The performances are good, no doubt, but because the film is plot centric, even powerful performances do not aid a meandering plot. After Ashoke’s death, Ashima wants to resume singing. But why was she waiting? She could have sung just as well, while Ashoke was alive. Actually she does sing a lullaby for him, when he wakes up after an unexplained nightmare. The last we see of her is her singing melodiously, having sold her house inNew York, and having declared that she wanted to be free. And Gogol, eventually does warm up to the fact his name held some emotional importance-we see him reading Nikolai Gogol’s collection of short stories that his father gave him as a present. Gogol’s disposition, by the end of the film is unknown to us-break up, death of his father and his wife’s infidelity seemed to have weighed little on him-but he smiles as he reads the writer Gogol’s short story-that smile, to my mind was not one that came from unalloyed happiness, it was a smile that is the mark of ambivalence. And ambivalence is what I felt too, by the end of the film-with its excellent performances; it has its unpardonable excesses too. Just as too many cooks spoil the broth, I guess, so too much detailing spoils the plot.

This article provides an overview of food insecurity in the country from the lingering impact of conflicts through investment issues to poor yields.  The subsequent pieces will deal with these issues in more depth before looking at the problems of infrastructure in the DRC and finally the successes of Projet Riz.

In 2009 Bralima SARL – a subsidiary of Heineken International NV– and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (Eucord) launched Projet Riz, a development project targeting rural poverty, food insecurity and access to primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Specifically, the project aims to improve smallholder farmers’ productive capacity and catalyse the commercialisation of rice production by facilitating workshops detailing modern farming techniques, improving access to agricultural inputs such and crucially, by integrating smallholder rice farmers into the Bralima brewery’s supply chain.

By Bastiaan Huesken, 5th July, 2012.

1. Physical Insecurity

Mines still surround the International Airport of Kisangani, a silent yet deadly reminder of the six day war between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies in 2000. Years of political instability and physical insecurity paralyzed agricultural and by extension economic activity in the DRC.

2. The Desperate Demand for Affordable Rice

Rice constitutes one of the staple foods for many millions of Congolese, in particular the ever increasing number of urban Congolese consume large amounts of the starch. Continuous physical insecurity and political instability have meant however that local agricultural and infrastructural capacity is insufficient to provide for national demand of rice (and other agricultural products). Producers and consumers alike suffer under this status quo as producers cannot produce rice for the price that consumers can afford.

3. Beyond the Capacity of the State

The DRC’s agricultural sector was not always in the state it is now. Pictured above is a laboratory at Yangambi. Yangambi was the premiere agricultural, ecological and biological research center in Sub-Saharan Africa between the 1930′s and 1960′s and the faculty of agronomy of the University of Kisangani was based in Yangambi. A lack of running water and electricity meant that it had to be relocated to Kisangani however. Both running water and electricity were available but neglect and theft of the copper wires mean that this is no longer the case. The research center now stands as a testament to the lack of capacity and commitment towards and investment on the part of the national government in (re)launching agricultural production in the DRC. Enter Projet Riz.

4. Sourcing Rice Locally

Bralima uses locally sourced rice to produce an array of their products, including Primus beer. Prior to 2009 the brewery exclusively used imported rice, now 90% of all rice used by Bralima is locally sourced. In sourcing rice locally the brewery fulfills several crucial and previously unfulfilled roles, in particular providing an outlet for rice farmers’ production, thereby stimulating the cultivation of rice.

5. Increasing Smallholder Rice Farmers’ Productivity

Simultaneously, the project works to increase smallholder rice farmers’ productivity. The project aims to do so by facilitating access to agricultural inputs – in particular high yield seed varieties – and by organizing workshops detailing modern methods of rice production.

6. Working with Local NGOs

Bralima and Eucord work together with local NGO’s focused on agriculture to achieve this goal. These local partners are tasked with, among others, enlisting field extension agents – vulgalisateurs. Field extension agents are themselves smallholder farmers living in target areas and provide the local partners with constant contact to the project’s target population. Together, the field extension agents and agronomists working for the local partners set up demonstration sites and organize workshops aimed at demonstrating modern methods of rice cultivation and most importantly, the efficacy hereof.

The Film Corner is a new series on InPEC by Yayaati Joshi. Yayaati is a blogger and a short story writer whose work can be found here and in his book, ‘The Recluse and the Rag Picker’. He specialises on cinema of all kinds including commercial, arthouse and foreign films. This collection of film essays looks at the nature of film in society and the purposes that it serves.  In the first of these Yayaati analyses Gulzar’s 1971 movie, Mere Apne.

By Yayaati Joshi, 22nd June, 2012.

Long before Omkara introduced us to the manipulative, jealousy infested and gun waving antics of student politics, Gulzar, back in 1971, had made a film on a similar subject. This film, called, Mere Apne, a rather ill-assorted title for a film that deals with student politics, had the two macho men of that age Vinod Khanna, and Shatrughan Sinha, pitted against each other as (student) political rivals. The film was released at a time when the appetite of the audience had not been whetted for the out and out action films, where the likes of Amitabh Bachhan or Dharmendra would bash up goons, either out of animosity, or pure rage against a goonda upstart. This was the time of the long locked “heroes”, proposing to the “heroines”, crooning romantic verses to woo the women. But, at the same time, a film in Bengali cinema was garnering appreciation for being daring enough to tread the less chosen path. The film, called Apanjan, was remade as Mere Apne.

Filmmakers, now or back in the 70s, have a persistent, and somewhat sub conscious desire of overloading the character with quirks and foibles-character trademarks, so to say. The result of this is the creation of extremes-either the character is pious, principled and morally upright, or he is flawed, maladjusted and angst-effected. But in Mere Apne, Gulzar created characters that looked real-like the innately flawed human beings one would come across every now and then. It is the assortment of qualities and shortcomings that makes a man-and the characters in the film, exhibit, to a reasonable degree, both. Vinod Khanna’s character, brutish in appearance has a soft touch to his side too-he allows an old lady, played by Meena Kumari, to stay with him-after he has verbally roughened up her relatives who take her for granted and treat her as a maid.

The film has several themes to it, and at the time when it was released, the interpretations could have been variegated. The most obvious, and the palpable thematic inference that one could draw would be that of the eventual fate misguided and misled youth, who take shelter in the metaphorical havens that are created by politicians. (Interestingly, politicians always have been synonymous with criminals/wrongdoers). Vinod Khanna’s character, Shyam, after being jilted, starts a gang and uses his muscle power to do what he couldn’t have done otherwise-gain respect. Chaino, played by Shatughan Sinha, is a cruder version of Shyam-he has all the shortcomings of Shyam, but none of the qualities. Chaino, in a way is the “villain” of the film, which has many morally compromised stances in its plot. The film warns, in a way, the consequences of “wrongdoing”. This wrongdoing, seemingly justified from the youth’s perspective-is shunned by the film-in a subtle way.

The other theme, the one that gets overshadowed by the rivalry and the gung-ho of the gangs is that of motherly pacifism, as depicted by Anandi, Meena Kumari’s character. A widow, who has seen more facets of life than the rebellious kids who shelter her, knows better than to be instigated by circumstances. Fondly called “naani-maa” (maternal grandmother) by the gang member, she understands the men more than they understand themselves. Her wisdom-the result of aging and life’s experience, is ignored by the careless youths, when she urges them not to get entangled in the murky world of politics. Her role is that of the careworn mother, who is unhappy to see the sibling rivalry take ugly proportions.

The film ends, as discussed, without any direct in-your-face ‘moral of the story’ tactics. The youth’s only respite was their “naani-maa”. She dies as the trigger of a gun is accidentally pulled in a fight. With that, the mélange of regret, poignancy and anger is exhibited by the characters. One would have expected the film to carry on after this-showing how the characters have now reformed, and once in a while they still meet to reminisce the adages of their motherly figure, for this sort of an ending, befits the emotion engorged Bollywood film. But the film ends at this point, making us wonder what happens to characters after this. Do they still continue with their lust for power? What becomes of them eventually? But this, apparently, is the hallmark of a moral story-it is left to the listener to decide what happens to the characters. They may reform, or they may sink further into the abyss.

As a viewer, though, one can only get delighted to see the film-despite its sombre conclusion. That is perhaps the single most important purpose of cinema.

In the second part of this interview, Iranian researcher Shirin Shafaie interviews Russian scholar and independent analyst Dr. Nikolay Kozhanov on US/Russian relations over Iran, the implications of UNSC Resolution 1696 and the potential for a peaceful outcome after Moscow. It was conducted ahead of the next round of meetings in Moscow between the P-5+1 and Iran. As tensions rise and negotiating parties stick to their scripts, who will take the first positive step?

By Shirin Shafaie, 20th June 2012.

The Russian scholar and independent analyst Dr. Nikolay Kozhanov shares his in-depth insight into the Russian approach towards the upcoming Moscow negotiations between P5+1 and Iran with Shirin Shafaie. Dr. Kozhanov was an attaché at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Tehran from 2006 to 2009, where he worked on Iran’s nuclear issue among other socio-economic and energy-related issues. He is currently a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, a scholar at the nongovernmental Institute of the Middle East and a visiting lecturer at the School of Economics of the St. Petersburg State University. Dr. Kozhanov’s monograph, Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Aims, Scale and Possible Consequences, was published in Moscow in June 2011. This is part 2 of 2.

Read Part 1 here.

Shafaie: As a signatory to the NPT and under the IAEA Statute, Iran has an inalienable right to enrich uranium on its soil for peaceful purposes. Moreover, there has not been any shred of evidence to date suggesting that Iran has diverted any of its nuclear material to military purposes. Yet, Iran’s nuclear file was reported to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006 and Resolution 1696 was adopted against Iran which demands the suspension of uranium enrichment for the first time. You mentioned earlier that Russia supported the US in the UNSC in a period of amicable relations between the two. What might have been the concessions that Russia gained from the US in that period in return for support at the UNSC against Iran? 

Kozhanov: Well, I am afraid that my vision of the Iranian nuclear program perspectives is slightly different from yours, but I would prefer not to go too deep into it. I also cannot call the UNSC resolutions baseless. The reasons for their adoption are clearly stated in these documents.

From my point of view, at the first turn, Iran has certain problems not with the direct accusations voiced by some countries (you are right here; so far, the Russian authorities have not received any tangible evidence from their P5+1 partners which supports their accusations against Iran), but with the issue of building confidence in the international community regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Tehran’s nuclear program. And there are certain reasons for having some doubts and suspicions.

First of all, almost all the P5+1 members agree that, at a certain stage, Iran was working on a military nuclear program, and Iranian authorities have not yet answered all questions regarding this allegation. Secondly, the majority of countries which have ever had a nuclear program have also conducted parallel military studies. The latter either provided them with a nuclear arsenal or brought them to a stage where they could easily manufacture an atomic bomb if they decided to do so.

So far, there are no guarantees that Tehran will not revive (or start from the scratch) its military program, if it considers this necessary. Even Moscow is worried about this. Accordingly, in one of his interviews the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stated that Russia is “concerned with the shrinking distance which separates Iran from the hypothetical possession of technologies allowing the creation of a nuclear weapon.”

However, and this is the third point that I would like to make here, a revival of Iran’s more active cooperation with the IAEA along with Tehran’s decision to agree to put its nuclear program under the complete supervision of the IAEA (which would include the implementation of the Additional Protocol) and finally a clarification of all existing questions regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program would allay international concerns.

However, the Islamic Republic persistently avoids doing so and, thus, it weakens the position of its international partners and its opponents with additional excuses. In this case, the logic of opponents is simple: if you have nothing to hide, you will have nothing to be afraid of.

As for the Russo-American dialogue on Iran, you should not think about this process as a deal made in the Tehran Grand Bazaar when one person (Russia) is selling an item (Iran) to another (the US). Since the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 1995, Russia has never tried to directly trade the IRI for any concessions from the US. And it is hard to imagine that it ever will – the current political realities are different from those of the 1990s.

The influence of the Russo-American dialogue regarding the relations between Moscow and Tehran is rather complicated. Thus, it is necessary to recognise that the political elites of Russia and Iran each have different perceptions of the US; for Tehran, America is an ideological arch-enemy with whom reconciliation is a complicated question, whereas for Moscow, Washington is an important international player whose behaviour does not always correspond with Russian national interests. In this situation, Moscow is more flexible and ready to engage in a dialogue with the US so long as the American authorities demonstrate a constructive approach towards the resolution of irritations between the two countries.

In other words, it is important that Americans show their readiness for an effective dialogue with Russia on any of the most glaring issues – including the deployment of antimissile systems in Eastern Europe, the presence of third powers in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the limitation of NATO’s eastward advance, and the construction of oil and gas pipelines that threaten the economic interests of the Russian political elite. Such a dialogue on these issues would most likely diminish any anti-American basis for cooperation with Tehran and compel the Russians to revise their views on the Islamic Republic.

Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that, on March 26, 2012 – after President Obama signalled that Washington plans to continue the discussion of a possible win-win solution to the missile defense issue – President Medvedev declared that the level of US-Russian relations was “the highest over the last decade,” and stated his readiness to cooperate in settling the tensions with Syria, Iran, and North Korea.

Russo-Iranian relations are also influenced by Tehran’s attempts to improve its relations with the US. Russian authorities and analysts believe that any US-Iranian rapprochement would constitute a serious threat to Russia’s own presence in Iran. As a result, any sign of such reconciliation would cause immediate intensification of dialogue between Russia and Iran. For instance, official and semi-official contacts between Washington and Tehran during 1998-2000 led to the signing of Moscow’s Treaty with Iran in 2001 (i.e. the Treaty on basic principles of cooperation signed in 2001 by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Muhammad Khatami which is, now, considered as a cornerstone of the Russo-Iranian relations).

However, Russo-American relations are not the only factor influencing the dialogue between Moscow and Tehran. I have already mentioned that there are a number of cases where Russia and the IRI enjoy fruitful cooperation, and this cooperation will never allow Moscow to join the anti-Iranian camp without having very serious reasons to do so (for example, in the event of a sudden discovery of an undeclared nuclear arsenal in the IRI).

Shafaie: And do you think that Russia now regrets having voted for the UNSC resolutions which adopt binding punitive measures against Iran in the absence of “a threat to peace” determination by the Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter? What mechanisms are in place to revert a UNSC resolution once it becomes clear that it requires extra-legal and illegitimate demands from a country? 

Kozhanov: No, Russia does not regret that. As I have already explained to you Moscow’s support for the UN resolutions, especially Resolution 1929 (in 2010) mainly resulted from a number of steps taken by Tehran itself. Here I am referring to the sudden disclosure of Iran’s plans for building a second enrichment facility and Tehran’s refusal to exchange its low-enriched uranium with nuclear fuel in October-November 2009, a proposal which was dearly supported by Russia and Tehran’s decision to replace Russia with Turkey and Brazil as its main nuclear mediators with the West in May 2010. Moscow regarded this step as contrary to its national interests and its role in the region. As a result, Russia could do nothing but support the US and EU in instituting new UN measures against Iran as well as adoption of their own unilateral sanctions.

On September 22, 2010, Medvedev issued Decree 1154, “On Measures to Fulfill UNSC Resolution 1929.” Most of the decree’s wording was based on the resolution. For instance, Russia imposed serious restrictions on the provision of banking, insurance, transit, and transport services to Iranian individuals and entities involved in the country’s proliferation, nuclear, and missile activities. Targeted Iranians were also prohibited from investing in the Russian economy or acquiring Russian technologies necessary for the development of the above-mentioned programs. Russian authorities reserved the right to inspect suspicious goods transported to/from Iran and to coordinate their activities in this field with other countries.

The most effective measures implemented by Moscow were related to military cooperation. Russian companies were barred from selling or transferring tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery systems, rockets, rocket systems, ships, military helicopters, and certain other aircraft to Iran. Special emphasis was placed on suspending sales of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. Despite the fact that Russia’s sanctions only repeated passages of Resolution 1929, their implementation was a serious signal to Tehran.

Previously Russia had never officially adopted any unilateral punitive measures against the Islamic Republic. At the same time, however, Moscow was not persistent in pressuring Iran and gradually softened its position. It did not implement its unilateral sanctions immediately. The Iranians were given some time to adjust their cooperation with Russia to fulfill the requirements of the UN resolutions and other punitive measures. For instance, the Moscow branch of Iran’s Bank Melli was swiftly renamed “Mir Business Bank,” and Tehran resumed studying the use of rubles instead of dollars/euros in bilateral trade with Russia.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of 2011, Russia resumed its attempts to settle the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. In July of that year, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov offered Iran and the P5+1 a phased plan of actions that would allow gradual settlement of the issue. This initiative was cautiously accepted by the West and warmly welcomed by Iran. Although the proposal was not put into action, Moscow continued to support Iran and the West towards the initiation of a new round of dialogues. Moreover, Tehran has recently voiced its interest in returning to Lavrov’s initiative.

All in all, Russia is following one main principle – as soon as the international concerns on Iran’s nuclear program are resolved, it will be a high time to revise the UNSC resolutions. However, the main problem for Iran is currently not the UN sanctions (the mechanism of their cancelation is clear – just have a look at the similar cases in the Security Council), but unilateral punitive measures whose revision solely depends on the political will of the countries who have adopted them.

Shafaie: Speaking of international concerns over the issue of nuclear-proliferation in the Middle East, can you tell me about Russia’s stance on the sole nuclear-armed entity in this region? Does Russia ever press Israel to join the NPT as a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State to allow a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to come into being?

Kozhanov: Russia completely supports the idea of the creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. And that is where the Russian position is extremely close to the position of Iran. Moscow is also extremely persistent and active in persuading both regional and non-regional countries to accept the necessity of the practical implementation of this plan. However, I feel that I do not have enough information to discuss in which way this issue is raised in the Russo-Israel dialogue. I believe that if it has not been raised yet, it will be definitely discussed in the future. At the same time, I would not be expecting Israel to be “pressed” by Moscow. I believe that Russian diplomacy will be more flexible. As in the case of Iran, the nuclear issue is overshadowed by other items of interest in the Russo-Israel dialogue.

Shafaie: Finally, how would you predict the outcome of the Moscow Talks? Could there be an optimal solution for all sides?

Kozhanov: As I have previously mentioned, the Russians believe that Iran should make the first practical step towards the P5+1 group. Accordingly, during the recent SCO Summit, Russia offered an incentive to the Iranian authorities. President Putin stated that the international community should allow Tehran to develop its peaceful nuclear program including its uranium enrichment program under the complete supervision of the IAEA. However, the remaining big question is whether Iran actually believes that Russians truly want this and whether the other (at least the European) P5+1 members support this initiative or not.

Apart from this, as stated by the prominent Russian expert Vladimir Sazhin, it is necessary to take into account the domestic situation in the US and IRI as well when thinking about the outcome of Moscow Talks. Both countries are expected to hold their presidential elections in the near future (the US in 2012 and Iran in 2013), and the room for maneuver is seriously limited for their political leaders. Any initiating action can improve the chances of their political opponents (Ahmadinejad is not supposed to run for elections, but he will probably try to squeeze his protégé into the presidential position). As a result, Sazhin believes that the authorities of each country will probably try to maintain the status quo until 2013. In this situation, no breakthrough in Moscow is expected, although the Russians presumably will try hard to achieve it.

Shafaie: Dr. Kozhanov, thank you very much for sharing your insight with us. 

With special thanks to Mr Ignaty Dyakov for arranging this interview.

Interview originally published in the Fair Observer

Shirin Shafaie is an Iranian researcher and PhD candidate at SOAS. She was educated in Iran (BA in Philosophy and MA in Philosophy of Art) and in the UK (MSc in Middle East Politics). The core of her research is critical war studies in general and the Iran-Iraq War in particular.

In this interview, Iranian researcher Shirin Shafaie interviews Russian scholar and independent analyst Dr. Nikolay Kozhanov ahead of the next round of meetings in Moscow between the P-5+1 and Iran. As tensions rise and negotiating parties stick to their scripts, who will take the first positive step? Will Russia just stand aside and look? And will there be war or peace after Moscow?

By Shirin Shafaie, 15th June 2012

The Russian scholar and independent analyst Dr. Nikolay Kozhanov shares his in-depth insight into the Russian approach towards the upcoming Moscow negotiations between P5+1 and Iran with Shirin Shafaie. Dr. Kozhanov was an attaché at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Tehran from 2006 to 2009, where he worked on Iran’s nuclear issue among other socio-economic and energy-related issues. He is currently a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, a scholar at the nongovernmental Institute of the Middle East and a visiting lecturer at the School of Economics of the St. Petersburg State University. Dr. Kozhanov’s monograph, Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Aims, Scale and Possible Consequences, was published in Moscow in June 2011.

Shafaie: Dr. Kozhanov, you suggested in a policy analysis paper published by the Washington Institute in May 2012 that President Putin will not sacrifice Russia’s relationship with the US for the sake of its strategic partnership with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). You also said that if the US holds back on its anti-missile defence in Eastern Europe, Russia might be more cooperative with the US on Iran’s nuclear issue.

Does Iran have enough reasons to trust either side when they meet in Moscow on June 18? In other words, aren’t Russia and the US playing the “good cop, bad cop” game with Iran ultimately aiming at squeezing maximum concessions from one another as well as from Iran? What concrete confidence building measures has Russia envisioned to gain Iran’s trust, given the bitter history of broken deals between the two countries; for example in the case of Russia’s refusal to deliver S-300 systems to Iran under President Medvedev?

Kozhanov: It is necessary to recognize that the swings in Russo-Iranian relations depend on the state of US-Russian dialogue and this is quite an obvious fact. For example, the period between 2006 and 2009 saw rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran in the form of energy cooperation. It could not be a mere coincidence that this dialogue began when US-Russian ties were experiencing serious troubles. Moreover, the sweetheart relations with Iran ended not long after the start of the “reset” in Russo-American relations initiated by the Obama administration.

The proclaimed reset, which was supported by a number of practical US steps, allayed tensions between the two countries and made Moscow interested in preserving dialogue with Washington. As a result, Moscow supported UN Security Council Resolutions 1887 (in 2009) and 1929 (in 2010), adopted its own sanctions in 2010, and temporarily froze implementation of a contract on exporting S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran. Yet in 2011, the situation changed again – the reset obviously failed, and US persistence in unfolding the antimissile umbrella in Europe compelled Russia to look for asymmetric answers. Among other measures, this implied another revival of friendship with Tehran, including the supply of electronic warfare equipment to the regime. Under these circumstances, it is natural that, as you say, Washington and Moscow will try to “squeeze maximum concessions from one another as well as from Iran” while discussing the nuclear issue.

However, it is probably wrong to think that the US and Russia will be playing the “good cop, bad cop” game. In order to do this, they need to pursue the same goals in Iran and have the same motifs to settle the nuclear issue. Currently, both countries are far from this. Their positions on Iran are different. The main difference was best expressed by Russian ex-President Dmitry Medvedev: “Iran is not a US partner whereas Moscow productively interacts with this country.” It is important to remember that Iran for Russia is not just another neighboring country. For the Russians, the Iranian nuclear program is traditionally overshadowed by other issues in relations between the two countries. Over the last two decades, Tehran has proved itself to be Russia’s friend in times of need, by helping promote peace and stability in the Caspian littoral and in Central Asia, limiting the presence of third countries in regional affairs, counteracting human- and drug-trafficking activities, deterring the spread of internal revolutions, and by combating terrorism. Moscow also has certain economic interests in Iran. As a result, little room is left to confront Tehran over the nuclear issue.

Moscow is also not sure that there is no time left for talks with Iran. Currently, the Russian government and experts do not have an iron-clad that proves that the authorities of the IRI made a decision to create a nuclear WMD. Moreover, they believe that, from mid-range perspective, Tehran is incapable to create it, and all statements by Iranian officials are considered nothing but bravado; it represents a debatable matter which the authorities of the IRI expect to use for bargaining better conditions in its dispute with the West. As a result, the nuclear programme is currently considered to have minor threat for the Russian interests in the region.

It would also be wrong to compare the current situation with the situation of 2010 when the S-300 deal was cancelled. The period 2009-2010 was not very favorable for the Russo-Iranian relations; the idea of the reset was extremely popular in Russia and Russo-American relations were on the rise whereas the dialogue between Moscow and Tehran enjoyed the downward trend. In the second half of 2009, Russia was alerted to the sudden disclosure of Iranian plans to build a second enrichment factory. As in 2002, this raised questions among Russian politicians about the extent to which Tehran should be trusted. These concerns were strengthened in October-November 2009, when Iran suddenly refused to exchange its low-enriched nuclear fuel for high-enriched fuel to supply a Tehran research reactor under European control. Russia had actively backed the exchange deal, believing the fuel swap would not only demonstrate Iran’s peaceful intentions to the West, but also allay Moscow’s concerns about the possible use of low-enriched uranium for the creation of so-called “dirty bombs.” Tehran’s subsequent attempt to replace Russia with Turkey and Brazil as its main nuclear mediators with the West was the straw that broke the camel’s back; Moscow regarded this step as contrary to its national interests and its role in the region. As a result, Russia could do nothing but support the US and EU in instituting new UN measures against Iran.

Now, the situation is different. The Russo-American relations are quite controversial. The continuing “Arab Spring” seriously undermined, if not shattered, the Russian position in the Middle East; the fall of a friendly regime in Libya, the critical situation in Syria, and the rise of Islamists in the region (first of all, in Egypt) resulted in serious political and economic losses for Russia. Under these circumstances, the possibility of the change of the political regime in Tehran or the danger of a military operation against the IRI under the pretext of a nuclear threat posed by this country to the EU, US or Israel urge the Russian government to take active and decisive steps to prevent the development of the situation upon any of the above-mentioned scenarios.

Thus, since recently, Russian officials began to actively send signals that Iran is the traditional zone of Moscow’s aspirations, and that no action should be made without taking into account Russian opinion. On June 7, during the meeting with his Iranian counterpart – Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Beijing – Putin called Iran an “old partner” whom Moscow was not going to leave in trouble. He warmly recollected his 2007 trip to Tehran and actually invited his vis-a-vis to Moscow. Moreover, Russian officials drew the media attention to the fact that the meeting of the two presidents was one of the most important items of the Russian president’s agenda in China.

The Iranians also understand the rules of this game and play on Russian hopes and fears. Thus, in Beijing, Ahmadinejad unobtrusively reassured Moscow that it can still count on Iran in handling regional problems, including the issues of the legal status of the Caspian sea, the NATO advance to the Russian borders, and, obviously, the Syrian unrest. Tehran is also open to the deeper economic cooperation. There is, probably, only one unspoken condition posed by the Iranian authorities; Russia should help their country to change the situation around the nuclear program of Iran. And Moscow indeed wants this.

However, in order to see Russia as a reliable partner in the nuclear talks the Iranians probably should not only ask the question whether they can trust Moscow, but to think what measures should be taken by them to strengthen Russian confidence in them. Thus in Beijing, Putin clearly stated that his government will never protect Iran constructing a nuclear bomb. So far, the Russians believe that this is not on the Iranian agenda. However, the controversial outcomes of the recent IRI-IAEA consultations in June, continuing Iranian refusals to let the IAEA inspectors to visit the military facilities in Parchin, their alleged attempts to hide some signs of previous activities in the site as well as the probable attempts to enrich uranium at the level higher than 20% raise certain concerns.

Shafaie: President Putin emphasized Iran’s inalienable right to a peaceful nuclear program during a meeting with President Ahmadinejad at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Beijing last week. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Sergei Lavrov, reiterated Russia’s opposition to any further sanctions against Iran while calling them “absolutely counterproductive”. Conversely, he advocated the Russian proposal for a step-by-step approach and reciprocity principles while asking Iran to make the first step before expecting any gradual lifting or freezing of the current sanctions. In the light of these statements, can you explain to me:

• How does Russia understand the idea of reciprocity? How is that principle compatible with expecting Iran to make the “first step”?

• In the event that Iran actually makes the first step (for example, agrees once again to voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol and/or sign the agreement with the IAEA for allowing extra legal inspections of its non-nuclear sites, particularly at Parchin), how can Russia guarantee that the US and the EU will freeze or lift their unilateral sanctions against Iran (especially against Iran’s Central Bank and national oil industry)? Can Russia provide Iran with any “concrete assurances” that Iran’s nuclear file will be normalized (i.e. taken back to the IAEA) and the four UN sanctions gradually lifted?

Kozhanov: First of all, it is necessary to make a short note – Putin asserted Iran’s inalienable right to a peaceful nuclear program only if it will be put under the complete control of the IAEA. The Russian government severely opposes Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, believing that such a development would drastically change the balance of power in the region, and not in Moscow’s favor. As stated by some government experts, a nuclear Iran could be expected to conduct more aggressive and independent policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and to serve as an example for Middle Eastern countries with less stable regimes thinking about developing their own weapons of mass destruction. That is why the control of the IAEA over the Iranian nuclear program is a must for Moscow.

Russian understanding of reciprocity does not differ much from that of Europeans and, possibly, Americans; positive and practical steps of Iran will cause the adequate positive reaction of the P5+1 members. However, Moscow stresses that it is not only the UN sanctions which should be revised in case of the positive Iranian behavior, but unilateral measures as well. The reason why Iran is expected to make the first step is, probably, the following: Moscow clearly sees the mistrust existing between Iran and the West and clearly realizes that someone should take the first step to change the situation. Presumably, it is easier for Moscow to persuade the Iranians to do this rather than, let’s say, the Europeans. This step would allow Russia not only to prove that the negotiations are the only solution, but to discuss the revision of existing sanctions. The Russian authorities believe that further unilateral punitive measures against Iran are useless as they are not strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the region but aimed at the change of the political regime in Tehran. On the contrary, the Russians are convinced that the first positive move by Iran could logically pose a question concerning the necessity of the further economic sanctions as a reciprocal response. I am afraid that in this situation no guarantees could be given that the other members of the P5+1 group will be enthusiastic to act, but there is also no other way to find this out.

Watch this space for the second part of the interview

Interview originally published in the Fair Observer

Shirin Shafaie is an Iranian researcher and PhD candidate at SOAS. She was educated in Iran (BA in Philosophy and MA in Philosophy of Art) and in the UK (MSc in Middle East Politics). The core of her research is critical war studies in general and the Iran-Iraq War in particular.

In the aftermath of the Nigerian air disaster, Sardonicus looks at the crises in Nigerian aviation. Poor regulation, corruption, nepotism and a general failure of the system could all have been contributing factors to the tragedy. This article looks in particular at the endemic corruption and nepotism within the aviation authorities.

To provide a pretext for this article here is a brief excerpt from a recent article in the New York Times on flying in Nigeria:

A plane for a major Nigerian carrier was approaching Lagos at the end of a recent all-night international flight. The city came into view – the warren of streets near the airport was below – and the plane seemed to be descending. Suddenly the view changed.

“The plane was flying over fields and swamps. The city receded into the distance. Yet the weather was perfect. The plane was no longer, it seemed, approaching Lagos. After a few minutes, the captain’s voice came over the intercom: “Ah, distinguished ladies and gentlemen” – this is how Nigerian pilots address passengers – “I’m sorry, but I’ve missed my landing. I’m going to have to try again.”

The plane became very quiet. The flight attendants were frozen in their seats, their faces immobile. After 10 minutes, the pilot tried again, and the plane landed without incident.

On a recent domestic flight – again involving a major carrier – the small jet hit heavy turbulence. It went on and on, the plane bouncing up and down, minutes turning into a quarter-hour and a half-hour.

The pilot’s voice came over the intercom – but not to give information about the flight. To sing. In a cracked and wheezy baritone, the (evidently) aged pilot began to intone an improvised ditty in praise of his own carrier: “Oh, I love to fly Air Nigeria! Air Nigeria is the best!”

The plane bounced up and down, and the captain sang.

Eventually the jet landed at its provincial destination. The passengers, almost all Nigerians, disembarked, impassive and silent. They appeared to be used to these ordinary experiences that edge near – uncomfortably close – to the extraordinary.

By Sardonicus, 14th June, 2012.

As the world’s attention is once again drawn to the grisly saga of a major aviation disaster in Nigeria, questions are rightly asked as to the causes behind the Dana Air Crash in Lagos on Sunday 3rd June, 2012. Dana Air reported there were 146 passengers aboard the doomed Abuja to Lagos flight 992, with 1 flight engineer, 2 pilots and 4 cabin crew. With 153 confirmed fatalities the crash is the worst in the world this year and Nigeria’s 3rd worst in history. However, we are not likely to know the true figure as the number of people killed on the ground is hard to establish. The final tally is likely to surpass Nigeria’s worst accident which occurred at Kano in 1973, with 176 fatalities.

What is the cause of the crisis of airworthiness in Nigerian aviation? Is it a failure of regulation? Corruption in the inspection regime? Management pressure on the pilots? Nepotism? One or all of the above? Until the full investigation is completed and the results published we will not know the answers.

What can be ruled out at this stage as the sole cause of the crash is the plane’s age. The Dana Air Boeing MD-83 was built in 1990 and first operated by Alaska Airlines. Even respected airlines like SAS Scandinavian operate 26 MD-80 planes with an average age of 23 years. Provided the Dana plane was receiving its proper maintenance age should not be a factor as widely believed in Nigeria.

Nigerians have witnessed their president weeping at the site of the crash. This will not provide any answers.The arm of the Nigerian government vested with oversight and investigation of the sector is the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) whose head, whom the Nigerian Senate has called for his suspension, is the the Director General Dr Harold Olusegun Demuren.

However, pertinent questions remain about how the NCAA was run under Dr Demuren and whether he used his position to promote his son’s business. Did these outside business interests detract the Director General from supervising airlines? Did it affect the safety culture in the industry?

Sixty-seven year old Dr Harold Demuren has been in this position since December 29, 2005. Answers need to given as to whether he has turned his role as the the NCAA DG into a sinecure to award his son, also named Segun Demuren, a private hanger at the Murtala Mohammed International Airport Lagos. Segun Demuren is 1998 Bachelor of Science graduate in Information Systems from Marist College, Poughkeepsie New York.

Prior to his father’s appointment, Segun had no known track record or experience in the aviation industry. In part through approvals granted by his father, Segun junior’s Evergreen Apple Nigeria (EAN) Ltd has managed to secure an investment of $25 million to open its Fixed Based Operator (FBO) and associated hanger jet business at Murtala Mohammed Airport International, Ikeja Lagos.

EAN was incorporated in January 2009 and commenced operations in July 2011 to service private jets in Nigeria. Since his appointment as the Managing Director of EAN Ltd, Segun Demuren’s only know industry specific qualification is attending the IATA Advanced Management Program, Air Transport in Nanyang Technical University. However this was obtained in 2011-2012 when the business was already running and had secured funding.

EAN’s european partner, Maintenance Centre Malta, also received approval from the Harold Demuren led NCAA to be an Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) for Nigerian registered aircraft in Malta.

The question is simple. Should Nigerian regulators be allowed to use their positions to facilitate business dealings of their immediate family members?

Does Dr Demuren have any direct financial stake in Evergreen Apple Nigeria Ltd? Is there not a clear conflict of interest of a regulator giving approval for his son to open a hangar at Nigeria’s main airport, in the industry which he oversees? How did EAN Ltd manage to source funds for its operations with no prior track record? What, if any, collateral was offered to banks to secure borrowings?

Nigerians need answers to these questions. At the core is this question: is it right for a government official to use his position to secure benefits amounting to $25 million for his son’s business? Never can Nigeria allow the lines between government oversight and private gain be blurred again, especially in such a safety critical industry.

This article was originally published on Sardonicus’ website, ‘All Things Nigerian‘

Addendum: Yesterday Nigeria’s second largest airline was ordered to ground all of their planes immediately for checks.  Their planes have been described by the aviation authorities as ‘flying coffins’.  Despite being banned from flying, Air Nigeria denies that their planes there are safety concerns and have continued to fly.  Some pilots have refused to to board the planes due to the danger.

Andrew Lebovich analyses the popular attitudes on the security situation in northern Mali to look at the potential risks to international security and the risks that are, at present, overstated.

Mr. Lebovich is a contributor to the popular foreign policy blog The Washington Note, and his work has appeared at ForeignPolicy.com and The Atlantic Online. He also writes a formerly weekly, and now twice-weekly brief with Foreign Policy on legal issues in the struggle against terrorism, the Legal War on Terror (LWOT).

By Andrew Lebovich, 13th June, 2012.

The title of this post is a question I’m seeing more and more, and it reflects the growing concern in Washington, Paris, and African capitals that the security situation in northern Mali is spiraling out of control. In this kind of environment, bad news tends to echo loudly and quickly. The most recent example of this is the strong reaction in the international press to an interview Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou gave to France 24 this week, in which he said that Afghans and Pakistanis were in Mali training fighters, in addition to confirming that French hostages held for nearly a year and a half by AQIM were in “good health” and still alive. This news has garnered quite a bit of attention, especially in the Francophone media, though it should be noted that RFI reported the presence Pakistani trainers in Timbuktu and in Kidal a month ago, to considerably less attention. Still, this and other signs of the degradation in the security environment in northern Mali and the growth of AQIM have spurred speculation about whether or not northern Mali was becoming a “West African Afghanistan“, a new Somalia, or a jumping-off point for terrorist attacks elsewhere.

While I think some of this concern is warranted, I think some of this language and concern may be, for the moment, a bit overwrought, as I will explain in this piece. This post is my attempt to sort through some of the current popular attitudes about the security situation in northern Mali, the very real risks to regional and international security that may be looming in the north, and the equally real constraints on militant groups attempting to impose shari’ah in northern Mali or project force beyond Mali’s already porous (or nonexistent) borders.

First, the bad news

Long before the Tuareg rebellion and the birth of Ansar Al-Din, AQIM and its predecessor the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) were using Malian territory to strike other countries. The period from 2005-2011, in addition to seeing a number of kidnappings of Westerners in the Sahel, saw attacks against military, government and foreign targets (including the murder of French and American citizens) in Mauritania, attacks against border guards and customs agents in Algeria, and similar attacks and confrontations in Niger. During this period, AQIM’s involvement in kidnapping for ransom (KFR) and various smuggling networks may have netted upwards of 200 million euro – though these numbers are very fuzzy, and do not take into account the money the group has had to spend to simply operate and survive in one of the harshest environments on earth.

More recently, the AQIM “splinter” group the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), based in Mali, has conducted a suicide bombing in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset and kidnapped seven Algerian diplomats in the city of Gao. Moreover, foreign fighters appear to have reinforced MUJWA, AQIM, and Ansar Al-Din. The latter group in particular has admitted to welcoming fighters from Somalia, Niger, Tunisia,  and elsewhere (though of course this information has not been confirmed independently). AQIM, according to unconfirmed reports, has been reinforced by “Maghrebin” jihadists and steered others, in particular Mauritanians, to Ansar Al-Din. And while reports of more than 100 Boko Haram fighters being present in Gao may be an exaggeration, there is enoughcircumstantial evidence of their presence in Mali (and the alleged presence of AQIM members in Nigeria) to conclude that the groups may be tightening their links.

So to sum up, we now have a situation where at least three-to-four jihadist or hardline Islamist groups are active and “in possession” of much of northern Mali, including the cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. These groups appear to be operationally active and training new fighters for different regional militant organizations, and possibly securing areas of operation for future training or attacks in the region. This is not to mention the role that these groups, in particular AQIM, appear to be playing in enforcing a harsh interpretation of shari’ah law and supporting Ansar Al-Din, which seems to have quickly accumulated a suspiciously large amount of money, weapons and personnel, especially given the much smaller size and less diverse composition of the organization – an issue I previously discussed here – when it was created late last year. Regardless, AQIM and its key leadership in the Sahel are almost certainly active in northern Mali, and will likely stay there, whether they remain deeply involved with Ansar Al-Din or pull back to focus on jihadist activity while allowing Ansar Al-Din to worry about the implementation of shari’ah in Mali, per the recent instructions of the group’s Kabylia-based leader Abdelmalek Droukdel.

This is not the Afghanistan you are looking for

Setting aside for a moment the causes of concern in northern Mali, there are a number of structural and local particularities that may inhibit the emergence of northern Mali as a new “safe haven” for jihadist groups. For one thing, northern Mali is a rather isolated place, with large, relatively barren distances between population centers. This makes it difficult, though clearly not impossible, to bring fighters into the country, and could put groups of fighters at risk if they venture out of the cities, as happened in March when Mauritanian aircraft attacked a convoythey believed to include AQIM members, including Yahya Abu Al-Hammam, the head of one of AQIM’s sub-units, who is reportedly present in Timbuktu. While it is unclear if the aircraft actually found their target, Western aircraft may have more luck, if they end up getting involved in the fighting (NB: This is not an expression of support for the use of manned or unmanned aircraft in the Sahel, simply an observation).

This isolation also means that it is difficult to re-supply fighters, whether with fuel, food, or ammunition. While smuggling networks for these materials are present and well-established in the Sahel, Mali’s neighbors can damage militant groups by tightening their grips on these smuggling routes or by attacking jihadists who expose themselves while trying to obtain supplies. This happened last month, when a rapid Algerian helicopter strike reportedly decimated a column of MUJWA fighters who tried to steal two fuel trucks in Tinzawaten, on the Mali-Algeria border.

In this vein, it is worth keeping in mind that while Afghanistan in the 90′s was bordered by at least one state that tolerated or may have even supported the Taliban, who then gave shelter to al-Qaeda and the numerous jihadist groups who used the country as a training base, northern Mali is surrounded by countries that are not exactly disposed to welcoming a jihadist-controlled state next door. Mauritania has repeatedly attacked AQIM targets in Mali, Niger has been vocally pushing for an intervention to root out AQIM and its allies, and while Algeria has been reticent to commit military forces to a foreign intervention, the Tinzawaten incident demonstrates the latter’s willingness to use force – potentially across the border – if its interests are threatened. And behind all of this is the possibility of European (really French) or American involvement in providing logistical or intelligence support for an ECOWAS or African Union force or direct airstrikes. While such a foreign intervention may have a very negative impact on the overall security situation in northern Mali, something will eventually have to give. As former diplomat and Mali watcher Todd J. Moss told Reuters last week, “Western policymakers will absolutely not allow a jihadist safe haven” in Mali.

Moreover, I believe that Ansar Al-Din in particular and those supporting it remain limited on a local level. While residents of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu appear to have grudgingly welcomed the security and harsh justice Ansar Al-Din brought in the wake of the departure of the Malian army from the north, that appears to be changing. Protests have broken out in all three cities in the wake of the implementation of shari’ah (most recently in Kidal), the banning of soccer and smoking in Gao, and the destruction of a sacred holy site and a national monument in Timbuktu. After suppressing these protests Ansar has pulled back, especially in Timbuktu and Kidal; in Timbuktu, where the group has already put a local face on its actions, Ansar has attempted to show their appreciation for and willingness to protect the city’s patrimony. And in Kidal, after receiving significant pushback for having assaulted female protesters,  Ansar reportedly chose not to intervene during the second days’ protests. While Ansar Al-Din has been able to keep a lid on such protests so far, it is likely that these will grow if the group continues to pursue the implementation of shari’ah in the public sphere. And if protests continue to break out, the group will be faced with a hard choice between allowing the protests or suppressing them, given that violence may provoke protesters further, or push local notables influential within the organization – such as Ifoghas “chief executive” Alghabass Ag Intallah in Kidal – to push Ansar to moderate its behavior.

These local tensions could become more acute in an environment where multiple armed groups could eventually form in opposition. To put a spin on the Weberian expression, for the moment Ansar Al-Din and AQIM, dominant in terms of armament and manpower, have a monopoly on the threat of force in northern Mali. They have used this threat that the two groups used to push the MNLA and then the primarily Arab FNLA out of Timbuktu, as well as toassert their authority in Gao.

However, Ansar Al-Din and AQIM have so far resisted using anything more than targeted force, showing a potential unwillingness to unleash full-scale civil war in northern Mali. And other challengers to their authority may lurk in the wings; the National Liberation Front of the Azawad (FNLA) has threatened to kick AQIM out of Timbuktu; former Malian army commander El Hajj Gamou has formed his own group, the Republican Movement for the Restoration of the Azawad (MRRA); and another group purportedly composed of Songhaï and “black Tuareg”, the Movement of Patriots for Resistance and the Liberation of Timbuktu (MPRLT), has also promised to retake Timuktu. And the first clashes between Ansar Al-Din and MNLA fighters may have taken place in Kidal this week, though a number of people have since denied that any fighting took place. And the Songhai militia Ganda Iso’s members remain in and around Gao, even if the group fell apart after its leader was killed in combat with the MNLA in March.

For the moment, all of the groups mentioned except the MNLA exist primarily on paper, and the MNLA, reportedly lacking in arms and ammunition, has mostly cooperated or at least avoided conflict with Ansar Al-Din, to the point of briefly merging and then splitting with Ansar at the end of May. Still, there is the possibility that one or more armed groups could emerge to challenge or at least provoke Ansar Al-Din and its jihadist allies, especially if armed opposition groups receive support from abroad or from regional entities. Such opposition would again leave Ansar Al-Din and its allies in a position where they might have to actually use force against local populations, which could drastically alter the delicate balance of power and push local populations into open opposition. This would dramatically complicate life for Ansar Al-Din, and could potentially make the “safe haven” in northern Mali a bit less so.

None of this is to undermine or downplay the severity of the threat posed by the security situation in northern Mali, as the presence of hardline militant groups could threaten regional and international security, not to mention the security of the local populations forced to live under their harsh rule. Rather, it is important to keep in mind when analyzing the situation in northern Mali the important limits on hardline militant groups’ freedom of operation. While these factors may not be definitive in the long run, they will be important in shaping how these groups react to endogenous and exogenous pressure in the weeks and months to come.

In this article, Alastair Stewart looks at the role of Queen Elizabeth II and the place of Britain in the modern world.  As many have looked to the decline in ‘red’ regions of map as the simple narrative for defining the trajectory of Britain, it can be argued that recent resurgence of the royalty has enabled it to construct a soft power empire.  Where can real influence be found today, in the distrusted pageantry of politics or in the hysterical reactions to an overt display of grandeur?

By Alastair Stewart, 8th June, 2012

Of all the transformations to have taken place during her sixty-year reign, none can be more apparent to Queen Elizabeth II than the transformation of Britain’s role in the world. But is the story of decline, and fall, of the British Empire as unassuming as it seems?

When Edward Gibbon concluded of the Roman Empire’s decline that there is ‘nothing more averse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination and interest’, he may well have been eulogising the British Empire with hindsight.

While 21^st century military capabilities and the red coloured map are modest compared to their apogee at the time of the Queen’s birth, and even at the time of her ascension to the throne, what of that unquantifiable, oft forgotten, measure of power – prestige? A statesman who dares invoke such a criterion is usually called pretentious, at worst criminally ignorant of power politics, in a nuclear age.

The international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau contended that such anthropomorphic qualities are anachronistic and belong to an age of diplomacy where relations among nations were conducted by kings and queens more often than not related. Qualities like prestige, honour and notions of fair play were personal engagements, not like the secular, rational calculations of national interest that the French Revolution ushered in that we know today.

Nevertheless prestige, more often than not subconsciously, is key to how the British see the world and – for good and ill – how the world sees us. Nowhere is this particular quality greater manifest than in the symbol of the Queen.

Yet despite the confirmation of this by the international enthusiasm expressed for the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee, for the wedding of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and all things ‘Royal’, there is the forgotten oversight of this being an institution that was the centrepiece and symbol of an empire considered taboo to defend or justify.

Jeremy Paxman recently argued that there is a collective British amnesia about the British imperial experience induced by a fear that the future can never measure up to past triumphs and glory. But is this amnesia exclusively British, or is it global?

The supreme irony, and the great accomplishment, of the Queen at her Diamond Jubilee is the rehabilitation of the legacy of Monarchy that has done more for our status among nations than the imperial architects could have ever dreamed. Gibbon was quite correct in this respect: to impose a value system by control is ineffectual and self-defeating when held in sharp relief to the global respect and affection that the British Monarchy has garnered by its own efforts.

This result however is a credit to the Queen as protector of continuity than the Queen as innovator of international diplomacy. Born in 1926, she came of age at a time when the relations between Dominion countries were an equal, multilateral affair. The experience of the First War World, and the subsequent decision by Lloyd George to allow Dominion nations to sign the Treaty of Versailles individually, confirmed the national identity of each Dominion in the British Empire. This precedent was confirmed in 1931 with the Statue of Westminster, which did not so much elevate other nations as demote the United Kingdom as elder son to being ‘but just another of the children’.

The uniting factor that was to hold this empire of equals in the place was the mutual devotion to the Monarchy. It is often overlooked that this arrangement was in effect at the instigation of the Second World War, with no Dominion having an obligatory commitment to Britain’s war effort and with each holding the power to decline participation in defending the Mother Country, as was the decision of the Irish Free State (a Dominion until 1949).

The Queen therefore was not the last Imperial Monarch; that title belongs to her Grandfather, George V. She was the first to ascend the throne with attitudes informed by a specific transformation of Britain’s Empire into a society of states with family and cultural ties centred on the Monarchy. Britain, long before its alleged decline, opted to agree to the self-governing rights of Dominion nations.

It is more accurate therefore to consider specific instances of Britain trying to maintain control, such as Churchill and the Mau Mau rebellion and Eden with the Suez crisis, as an anachronistic misnomer between the continuity of Attlee and Macmillan as continuing Britain’s new multilateral role established before the Second World War. The inference of this is political withdrawal as leader of empire before 1945 that long preceded the military decline that started after 1945. This fact necessities a reappraisal of the label of ‘decline’ when considering the totality of the UK’s Dominion/international experience in the 20^th century.

While history denotes its decline after the Second World War, Britain’s transformation into a position more akin to its present role in the world today was well under way before 1945. While even these cultural ties have been severed or reduced, much is similar now as to then in how prestige and its representation by the Queen still serve an identical purpose in making Britain – as an ancient, proud but powerful nation – unique and centre of a world of many nations. The parallels of this can be seen in the title of ‘leader of the free world’ espoused repeatedly by a succession of U.S Presidents.

The Diamond Jubilee is not then just a celebration of the Queen as a symbol of Britain to the British. It is a reminder that for the last 100 years specifically the Monarchy has been the symbol and centre of countries rallying around Britain.  The original cultural, and indeed emotional ties, have faded but they have also evolved into new ones, most recently and powerfully seen with the Queen’s reconciliatory trip to the Republic of Ireland. The Queen remains an apolitical symbol of something British that can inspire other nations like no political leader. The irony of empire is one can have a greater influence, and possibly more, with apolitical sentiment than conquest. What then is the difference between the UK as ‘fallen power’ and the UK as centre of empire?

In this article, Elliot Ross of Africa is a Country, dissects the ‘Rebranding Africa’ edition of Vogue Italia. The author attacks the concept of outside intervention as a defining characteristic of Africa before dealing with some of the more troubling assumptions made by the magazine.  It is a fantastic read.

This article was originally published on June 6th, 2012 on the website Africa is a Country.

By Elliot Ross, 8th June 2012

Everybody’s trying to rebrand Africa, and it isn’t going so well. Vogue Italia’s latest issue — boosted by great billowing gusts of editorial hot air from both the New York Times and the Guardian — is called “Rebranding Africa”, and as you’d expect the whole thing is an embarrassing and insulting shambles. The images are okay, but otherwise it feels like something a middle-schooler cobbled together for a class project. And then got a “D” for it.

First: you’re re-branding the continent of Africa — as one does — so who do you pick as your cover star? Well, it was the obvious choice. What self-inflating fashion magazine wouldn’t lead their Africa edition with a picture of a South Korean diplomat sitting behind a desk in Manhattan? That’s right, people. The new face of Africa is none other than UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. There are so many way to read this choice. An obvious take is that Vogue Italia, despite their claims of “rebranding” Africa must have decided Africans can’t govern themselves and need UN intervention.

The interview with Ban is very curious reading indeed. Apparently, the man is just world class at regurgitating very precise development statistics. It reads like an annual report of a large multinational NGO. Either that, or what we’re reading is a mashed up press release or a stilted email exchange dressed up as a conversation that actually took place (the latter is most likely the case). He drones endlessly on about the Millennium Development Goals, which is exactly what you’d expect him to do, but is also precisely the opposite of the kind of thing which invites the readers of Vogue Italia to think of Africa in a new way. With Ban Ki-Moon as its new face, Africa is (a) boring and uncool, and (b) a stubborn problem to be managed by foreign technocrats. No change there.

So why is he on the cover? We have absolutely no idea. The man dresses like any other boring technocrat. The Guardian said the Vogue Italia coverage showed that the effort to rebrand the continent “wasn’t just a token effort” and that it made us (in the West, naturally) sit up and take notice. How? To us, all that this shows is that the addled people at Vogue Italia are incredibly unimaginative, and quite weird when it comes to its coverage of the unfamiliar — that is, the dark continent/country of Africa.

One guy they could have picked instead for the cover is Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, whose moribund interview with chief editor Franca Sozzani really ought to be somehow preserved in formaldehyde and wheeled out at journalism school graduations as a chilling example of just how bad journalism can get. Much of the copy is taken up with Sozzani’s worrying whether they can photograph Goodluck the Vogue way.

The “interview” is really long passages of Sozzani generously offering her explanation to Jonathan of exactly what is wrong with Nigeria:

All the richest Nigerians spend their money abroad because there a no shops here, no hotels with a chic African flair, no hip restaurants or clubs. Why not build an African Rodeo Drive in Lagos or Abuja, with boutiques carrying both imported and Nigerian goods?

Finally, there’s a single lonely quote from Jonathan in there, in which he agrees with the long speech Sozzani has made. It’s not often we feel sorry for Goodluck Jonathan, but seriously, poor chap. It’s also not sure when they did the interview. There’s no word of #OccupyNigeria, which showed Jonathan up to be insensitive and dithering.

You also get the sense that the next time Vogue Italia “do” Africa, Nigeria’s notoriously corrupt and terrifyingly incompetent oil minister will probably be the new cover star, as Sozzani drools mindlessly over one of Nigeria’s most detested politicians:

We are joined by the Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani Alison-Madueke, a gorgeous and elegant woman – who also happens to be a princess – dressed in traditional robes, with a Master’s from Cambridge and the distinction of being the first woman to run Nigeria’s most important ministry.

Actually they did already. In the same issue.

Sozzani’s representation of Nigeria’s complex social and political situation is as astute as you’d expect it to be, and thanks to the internet, she gets called out big-style by a Nigerian called “Rachel”, whose comment on the website is by far the best piece of writing in the entire magazine, print or online:

This is possibly this worst piece of journalism on Nigeria I have EVER read. I cannot tell you how angry people are reading this. It is a shallow piece of vanity which glosses over the complexities of the tensions in Nigeria. When you say ‘Muslim’s ultimatum to the Christians’ – do you mean that all the Muslims who make up half of the 158 million people living in Nigeria have a vendetta against Christians? WHAT ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT???? It was Boko Haram’s ultimatum – you can’t just say ‘Muslims’ throwing in millions of people into a sentence who have felt just as much violence and suffering as Christians in Nigeria. It isn’t just Christians who have died during the violence but many Muslims. Sweeping statements like this fuel tensions between Christians and Muslims but of course that is perfect for the American audience who probably believe every Muslim is part of Al Q’aeda.

Your dramatic entrance to Nigeria was completely unnecessary. There are thousands of expats who have lived here for years in complete safety. It is reports like this that do nothing for the country. Do not flatter yourself to believe that you would be of ANY value to a terrorist. You would probably annoy the hell out of them. WHY did the editors think it would be important for readers to hear what you think what should be done in Nigeria? You were talking to the President of the country who is dealing with increasing rates of poverty and a decline in security and you are telling him to build an African Rodeo Drive? Oh yes, please build it so the 5% of the super wealthy population that can actually afford to buy from these sort of shops will no longer travel. The rest of the population can look on with their begging bowls in envy.

And also – the Petroleum Minister is probably one of the most corrupt people in Nigeria who has only added to the poverty, and therefore the security problems in the country. Don’t you know ANYTHING about the fuel subsidy scandal here? Do you know how many people are calling for her resignation? I feel so disappointed. I dread to think what the issue is like. I agree with you on one thing, it is important that people see beyond the famine and death in Africa and see the potential it has to grow but the potential has to be found in communities who are doing what they can to get out of poverty whether it be telecommunications to do banking, solar energy to power their small businesses or community initiatives to support women. What use is a Banana fricking Republic?

Sozzani responded with this rather snippy outburst:

@Rachel: It’s been a long timesince I last received such an idiot comment on my website. When I say Muslims, I never thought that the entire population of muslims is against Catholics as I live part of my life in Morocco and all my friends there are Muslims. I think that you took the negative side of the article and I’m sorry to say that is you who is against your own country, not me, as if we give work to women and we build up new shops and hotels, even for the 5% of the population, it can attract tourism and give job to local people. Is this nothing for you? Is it so unnecessary that I go to see them and try to help them?Iif so, I’m sorry for you, you don’t love your country and don’t want to help it. I don’t care and I go on my own way and certainly you won’t stop me. Just for yuor info, all the people – young designers, tailors and those producing fashion – are very happy and selling well thanks to me. This is the most important thing for me. [sic]

Blimey. It’s a close one, but I think overall we’re with Rachel on this.

Other than that there’s a short piece on El Anatsui which wrongly says he works in Ghana and then miraculously manages to rebrand (why not?) his transcendent genius as yet more developmental gobbledygook:

Forerunner of a big part of the continent’s contemporary art, with his artwork he has shown how a possible solution for his country is that of believing in the concept of recycling as a source of creativity and richness.

Some bearable features on African footballers in Italy and Didier Drogba, they discover Nollywoodagain (The New York Times has done so too recently), the formerly disgraced Kenyan TV journalistJeff Koinange (whose style is something to behold), that country’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Swedish-Ethiopian chef Marcus Samuelson (there are other top African chefs Vogue Italia), a picture of the Rwandan Ambassador to Britain handing his credentials to Queen Elizabeth II who is dressed in what resembles a nightgown, more Presidents, and a few models.

And then there’s Tommy Hilfiger, who gets some great free advertising with an African alibi as the magazine reproduces yet another long, unreadable press release. An unattributed quote explains how the mostly boring fashion scenster Hilfiger is basically the new Jesus Christ:

When Tommy Hilfiger came to the village for the first time, no one knew who he was. But when locals realized how famous he was in the rest to the world, they were very impressed: they were satisfied that if someone so important, rich and privileged could be interested in them and spend time with them, they themselves counted more than what they had been led to believe. They began to have more faith in the possibility of change.

Well, Africa, consider yourself rebranded.

By InPEC Contributor, 7th June, 2012

Who won the Vietnam War?  Who lost it?  These questions are barely touched up in films about the conflict.  Instead we see a very different picture: troops rallying together against adversity of poor leadership, difficult terrain and uncharacterised enemies.  Does this tell the real story of Vietnam?  Were class, race and gender equality the realities of 60s and 70s America?  No.

Popular culture played a key part in reconstructing the narratives of the Vietnam War for the United States of America.  It constitutes a unique form of memorial in which the reality is secondary to the story.  Stories frequently circulate stating that x per cent of children don’t know who Winston Churchill or Neil Armstrong were but what of the rewriting of history?  In these films South East Asia becomes a setting for a collection of films not so much about the history of the war as the re-assertion of American masculinity.

These manifestations carry greater cultural significance now as they reach mass audiences of younger generations who may have little prior knowledge of the war.  For instance, at the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial visitors frequently flock to take rubbings of one name in particular: John Rambo[i].  At the end of Rambo, the eponymous character asks his commander, ‘do we get to win this time?’  The commander responds, ‘this time, it’s up to you’.

Losing is for Losers: Winning Makes You Popular

The films didn’t necessarily have to depict reality in order to be popular, a point proved by the one of the first major films about the conflict.  When The Green Berets debuted in July 1968 there were half a million US troops in Vietnam and the Tet Offensives in January of the same year made the film’s implication of inevitable victory look ridiculous.  At the premiere of the film in New York it was picketed by protesters and denigrated in the New York Times as being ‘vile’, ‘insane’ and ‘dull’.  Despite this it grossed nearly $11 million domestically in its first year making it one of the most successful films of 1968[ii].  Reality was not important

Such retellings of the war simplify its narrative and allow a site for healing of wounds.  The largest of these wounds was defeat.  The realities may be unpopular with viewers and by reconstructing narratives it allows for a different outcome to be created.  Michael Herr, reflecting on his time as a war correspondent in Vietnam, claimed ‘If people don’t want to hear about it, you know they’re not going to pay money to sit there in the dark and have it brought up…So we have all been compelled to make our own movies’[iii].

The construction of narratives involves a process of unification, omission and specific amplification to determine what is perceived to be the status quo and the positioning of gender within this status quo would enable the narratives of the Vietnam War to be rewritten.

The Myth of Unity: Rewriting Race, Class and Gender in 1970s America

John Del Vecchio describes the U.S. soldiers in his 1982 novel, The 13^th Valley, as ‘The restless infantrymen in the trenches and their clustered sergeants and lieutenants and captains on the landing strip represented a collective consciousness of America.  These men were products of the Great American Experiment, black brown yellow white and red, children of the melting pot’[iv].

This ‘collective consciousness of America’ is a prominent motif of the films and novels that focus on the Vietnam War.  The implication is that the war was a binding experience for those who fought and that social and racial boundaries were removed by the more important value of survival.  Even when the tensions are openly acknowledged they are usually concluded with an act of brotherhood when fighting.  In William Eastlake’s The Bamboo Bed (1969) ‘Black Sergeant Pike’ claims that ‘there is no greater honour on this earth to a black man than to hand white men to yellow men for killing’ but reassesses his views after a white soldier sacrifices himself to save the Sergeant.  His process of change is completed in his realisation that ‘a man can’t help being born the colour he is born’[v].

As with race, class barriers are also forgotten as an accident of birth.  The eradication of class divisions can be seen in Taylor’s letter to his grandmother in Platoon (1986) in which he creates an apotheosis of the ‘grunts’, the working class soldiers: ‘a grunt can take it.  Can take anything.  They’re the backbone of this country grandma, the best I’ve ever seen, the heart and soul’.

This concept of the unifying nature of war is a recurring theme in the novels and films about Vietnam but it should not be mistaken as the primary narrative of the pieces.  The emphasis is instead the constructions on which this unity is based and what it unifies itself against.

Losing is for Girls

The unity that is depicted in the popular fiction is based upon the universalism of masculinity.  Women can never included as a part of this collective.  The differences between the men can be overcome as a result of this masculine bond while the differences between men and women are accentuated by it.  Dissimilarities between men are perceived to be circumstantial and these social divisions are overcome by the ‘collective consciousness of America’.  However, gender, unlike the other social constructs, remains static.

The selective depiction of women can be found in one of the most famous films about the conflict, Apocalypse Now (1979).  The unity of the eclectic soldiers on the Naval Patrol Boat is juxtaposed with the fleeting appearances of individual women.  The first is a seditious, Vietnamese grenadier who is disregarded as a threat due to her gender; the second characterisation is of U.S. Playboy models at a U.S.O. show; the third is of an innocent Vietnamese woman who is killed for attempting to protect a puppy.  All three of these depictions rely on gender stereotypes to display the homogeneous construction of the female worldwide.  This implies a biological unity amongst women compared to the circumstantial divisions between men.

The difference is that the social divisions between men can be overcome while the biological differences between men and women are portrayed as being incommensurable.  War is reduced to being an entirely male experience in this respect while women play passive roles.  The unity of the soldiers therefore plays a crucial role in the narratives of Vietnam War films due to the groups that they align themselves against as the opposition to the ‘grunts’ were feminized.

Vietnam as a Little Girl

Vietnam itself is the most obvious opposition to the unified U.S. troops in the portrayals of the war.  The discourse of race can be detected in the lack of Vietnamese protagonists inVietnam.  This is worth considering for a second.  There are shocking few Vietnamese characters in films about the war in Vietnam.

Those that were represented were often deprived of dialogue such as Co in Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985) who speaks to U.S. soldiers in English but any interaction with other Vietnamese citizens is untranslated.

Instead, the Vietnamese are portrayed with feminine characteristics as they are not seen as victorious but passive and violated.  The brutality against the Vietnamese people in films such as Apocalypse Now and Full Metal Jacket (1987) casts the inhabitants as victims of U.S. aggression.  At the conclusion of Full Metal Jacket the squad surrounds a female sniper who has killed several soldiers.  The absurdity of the war is demonstrated by the director, Stanley Kubrick, not only due to the fact that so many U.S. soldiers could be killed by one person but that the one person is a woman[vi].

The killing of the innocent Vietnamese woman for protecting a puppy in Apocalypse Now further supports the portrayal of the Vietnamese as merely effeminate and therefore undeserving of victory or indeed characterisation.

The victimization of the Vietnamese means that they are not presented as the principle enemy.  If they are not presented as the principle enemy they can not take an active role and can therefore not be seen as the victors of the war.  Thus, the feminization of the depiction of the Vietnamese in the wars about the conflict helps to remove one of the most damaging realities: the fact that the Vietnamese won the war.

When Losing Doesn’t Mean Losing

The depiction of the Vietnam War is one of a war that the U.S.A. lost rather than a conflict which the Vietnamese won.  Those identified as the causes of this outcome change in character from baby-killing soldiers to career-orientated bureaucrats but their identifying features remain the same: unpredictability, weakness, indecisiveness and dependence.

These characteristics are all traditionally perceived as feminine characteristics in American culture against which the unified masculine character is defined.  The films about Vietnamcan then be perceived to be a way to regenerate the victimised American masculinity from the defeat in the war and the recent feminist challenges to patriarchal structures[vii].  In order to accomplish this, the veterans of the war must first be absolved of their association with the loss of the war.  The way in which this is accomplished is the portrayal of the veteran as the victim of the mismanagement of the war.

The Veterans as the Victims

The portrayal of the veteran as a victim followed their persecution for their role in the war.  During the war there were some protests that marked the return of Vietnam War veterans to theUnited States.  Buffy Sainte-Marie’s song ‘Universal Soldier’, released in 1964, reflects the antimilitarism of the period by claiming that every soldier is ‘really to blame’.  The first ‘television war’ had produced images of endless bombs falling on forest landscapes and soldiers laden with guns walking through burned-out villages thus projecting the soldiers in a negative light.  Such images were important in the portrayal of the veterans as victims of opposition from within theU.S.A.and the rehabilitation of the masculine veteran.

The subsequent victimisation of the veteran can be found in the punk music of the 1980s in songs such as The Ramones’ ‘53^rd and 3rd’ in which the veteran has become ostracised in his home town by the police and resorted to homosexual prostitution, the antithesis of the projection of masculinity.  This victimisation of the veterans would be used in the regeneration of the soldiers and of the masculinity they represented.

You Had to Be There, Man

In Rambo’s speech at the end of First Blood (1982) the blame is on ‘those maggots at the airport, protesting me, spitting, calling me baby killer and all kinds of vile crap’.  The catalysts for the loss of the war are therefore those who did not fight.  War is seen as a classic male experience in much the same way that having children is seen as feminine.  In Eastlake’s The Bamboo Bed this gendering of life and death is articulated: ‘Every soldier hears death ticking off inside him…Not only every soldier…but every male human male being.  Not every female human being.  They don’t hear death ticking off inside them because they feel life ticking inside them’[viii].

Only those who are masculine and have experienced the war are then allowed to legitimately comment on it.  The ‘warrior’ had become the only role in American society that was now exclusively men’s and the apotheosis of this function meant that all opposition would be portrayed as feminine[ix].  The rehabilitation of the veteran and the primacy placed on experiencing the war meant that those who were seen to personify the attributes of masculinity would triumph over their enemies: the feminine characteristics within the U.S.A.

The concern with defeat and the blame on the feminine anti-war protestors and authorities is best summarised in the finale of First Blood.  Rambo’s concluding speech is polemic against those on the home front who opposed the war with emphasis on the need to experience the war in first person.  He laments ‘Who are they to protest me?  Who are they unless they’ve been there and know what the hell they’re yelling about?’.  The prerequisite of experiencing the war is also depicted in the revisionist film, Hamburger Hill (1987) when a sergeant insists that ‘You don’t have to like the war, but you have to show up’.

Once again it is posited that the only way to understand the war is to have participated in it meaning that only the masculine soldiers can be the victims of the war.  The enemy to masculinity was not the Vietnamese but the American public and theU.S.government that would not let the soldiers succeed.  The victimisation of the united veterans and the accusation that those who did not fight were responsible for the defeat is vocalised in Rambo’s cry that ‘Somebody wouldn’t let us win’.

The charge that an element of the home front was the reason for the defeat in Vietnam absolves the men fighting the war of any responsibility and implies that if the war had been conducted by men such as Rambo the outcome would have been different.  The masculinity of the ‘collective consciousness of America’ is thus absolved of losing the war while creating an unbridgeable gap between the victimised veterans and the selfish protest movement that denies the fact that many veterans protested the war[x].  The implication is that once the unmasculine elements are removed from theU.S.A. the wounds of the Vietnam War will be healed and the nation would be united again.

Feminine Authorities

At the end of Platoon, Taylor claims ‘we did not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves’.  The central conflict is between the masculine troops and feminine authorities,Vietnam is merely the setting.  The ‘grunts’ become the true victims of the Vietnam War films as they are portrayed as the paradigms of masculineAmerica.  Their initial naiveté is followed by disillusionment with the upper echelons of the administration and ultimately their betrayal.  This victimisation of the veterans would be used in the regeneration of the soldiers and of the masculinity they represented.

In Rambo: First Blood Part II the veteran is forced to work against his own government in order to rescue his comrades that are still held captive in POW camps in Vietnam.  The authorities react out of fear of negative public opinion in theU.S. and lie to hide their own reluctance to free the prisoners themselves.  The authorities in the film are portrayed as being protected by their comforts of air conditioning and advanced computer technology to display their unfamiliarity withVietnam and their ignorance of the requirements for succeeding there.  Their shirts and ties are juxtaposed with Rambo’s masculine bare chest and when confronted with the image of masculinity at the end of the film they acquiesce quickly to his demand, ‘Find them (the POWs) or I’ll find you’.

The lonely veteran at the end of First Blood that is marginalised and pacified has become a symbol not just for the victimised veterans but for all of the U.S.A. at the end of First Blood Part II: ‘I want what they all want, and what every other guy who came over here and spilled his guts and gave everything he had wants.  For our country to love us as much as we love it’.  The accusation is that the ‘grunts’ have been abandoned by the feminised government hierarchy, the real reason for the defeat.  The masculinity itself is not a system but rather an emphasis on the individual.  When Rambo asks ‘Do we get to win this time?’ Trautman demonstrates the ideology of individualism by responding ‘This time, it’s up to you’.

If the masculinity itself is not institutionalised within the system it is not responsible for the failures of these establishments, such as the loss of the war.  The representation of Rambo in First Blood Part II therefore absolves those who embody the values of masculinity in the U.S.A. and places the blame for the defeat on the feminine characteristics of the U.S. authorities[xi].  The solution to the problems of the Vietnam War is therefore constructed to be the removal of these feminine characteristics by a new administration that embodies the masculinity of Rambo.

Reagan Wins Vietnam

The historian Susan Jeffords has claimed that the masculine ‘hard body’, such as that of Rambo, is intended to stand as an emblem for Reagan’s philosophies as opposed to the soft, feminine years of the Carter administration[xii].  Reagan’s America is portrayed as strong in its bid to battle ‘evil empires’ and therefore needed to distance itself from any semblance of the defeat to the small and comparatively weak nation of Vietnam.

In First Blood, at the beginning of the Reagan Presidency, Rambo is the sole victim of Teasle’s victimisation whereas by First Blood Part II, following the re-election of Reagan, the victims are the anonymous and collective body of soldiers that Rambo is determined to save.  The image of the masculine body becomes a projection of the national body itself with a capacity to control their environments, immediate or geopolitical.  The feminine Carter administration is therefore the final government to be burdened with guilt of the defeat as the strong Reagan administration is victorious and the unity of masculinity puts theU.S. self-perception in a position of global strength once again.

Conclusion

The representations of the Vietnam War reinstate the privilege of the American white man following the failure of foreign policy and the success of the women’s movement on the home front.  Political motivations for the war are removed as the audience is rarely engaged with what the soldier is doing but instead with how he is doing it.  The gender narrative glorifies the unified masculinity against the factors that are seen to be the reasons for the initial defeat.

Vietnamese participation in the war is seemingly removed as the conflict becomes one of masculinity against the feminine characteristics that corrupt the home front including the administration.  The gender narrative in the popular culture about the Vietnam War therefore enables the rehabilitation of masculinity in theU.S.A.following the damaging impact of the feminist movements and the Vietnam War meaning that the white American male ‘gets to win this time’.

Primary Sources

Bibliography

Del Vecchio, John, The 13^th Valley, Bantam (New York, 1982).

Eastlake, William, The Bamboo Bed, Avon (New York, 1969).

Herr, Michael, Dispatches, Picador (London, 1978).

Discography

The Ramones, ‘53^rd and 3^rd’, The Ramones, Sire (1976).

Sainte-Marie, Buffy, ‘Universal Soldier’, It’s My Way, Vanguard (1964).

Filmography

Apocalypse Now (1979)

First Blood (1982)

Full Metal Jacket (1987)

The Green Berets (1968)

Hamburger Hill (1987)

Platoon (1986)

Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985)

Secondary Sources

Bibliography

Beattie, Keith, The Scar the Binds. American Culture and the Vietnam War, New YorkUniversity Press (London, 1998).

Jeffords, Susan, ‘Debriding Vietnam: The Resurrection of the White American Male’, Feminist Studies, 14 (1988), pp. 525-543.

Jeffords, Susan, Hard Bodies. Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era, Rutgers University Press (New Brunswick, 1994).

Jeffords, Susan, ‘Things Worth Dying For: Gender and the Ideology of Collectivity in VietnamRepresentation’, Cultural Critique, 8 (1987-1988), pp. 79-103.

Ryan, Michael, and Keller, Douglas, Camera Politica. The Politics of Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film, IndianaUniversity Press (Indianapolis, 1990).

Shaw, Tony, Hollywood’s Cold War, Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh, 2007).

Sturken, Marita, Tangled Memories. The Vietnam War, The AIDs Epidemic and the Politics of Remembering, University of California Press Limited (London, 1997).

In this interview, Carmen Gallano, an experienced psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, analyses the relevance of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical philosophy in contemporary politics and culture.  It covers the importance of a single ‘like’ on Facebook, the combination of narcissism and cynicism as well as the mental ‘concentration camps’ of modern capitalism.

The interview was originally conducted in Spanish (click here to read Part II in Spanish).

Read Part I here.

4 June, 2012

This interview was conducted at the private practice of Ms Carmen Gallano in Madrid, Spain, in early March. Ms Gallano studied medicine and psychiatry and worked several years in hospitals and mental institutions before training in psychoanalysis at the Paris School of Jacques Lacan. She is a member of the International School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field (EPFCL), and she has worked for many years in her private practice in Madrid. Ms Gallano combines her work with teaching and has published extensively in Spain and abroad including books titled “The feminine alterity” and “Desire, texts and conferences” (available only in Spanish: “La Alteridad Femenina” and “Deseo, textos y conferencias”).

Q. You have previously noted that family and social bonds are diluting. Based on your 30 plus years of clinical practice, what role do you think social networks and the rapid emergence of virtual life are playing in human life?

A. Individuals use social networks in order to compensate for the breach of social bonds. New means of technology offer virtual connections that facilitate the establishment of global networks of contacts. These, in turn, may or may not bring about local and territorial connections with physical individuals. In order to better understand the rising impact of social networks I have sought guidance in the works of Lacan, in particular his studies on the move from a discourse of the Master to a capitalist discourse and his theory of the subject.

Lacan’s theory of the subject can help us understand how contemporary subjectivity correlates with signifying networks that contribute to global capitalism. That said, a network is not a structure. A signifying structure exists as long as a signifier organizer of a signifying limited chain exists. This is what Lacan referred to as the “Master signifier”. According to Lacan, the “Master signifier” represents the signifying order as a whole and guarantees a nexus between the subject and the knowledge derived from a signifying chain, having an effective bearing on the latter. In contrast, a network is a random signifying chain with multiple connections. These, in turn, are not subject to a principle of legibility capable of organizing a particular/determined meaning. Nor are they subject to any control capable of limiting and ordering a system in its entirety. In other words, internet has created global networked societies where binary logics of horizontal signifying interrelations bear no hierarchy amongst themselves.

Sociologists and other theorists agree that contemporary subjects seek to socialize via internet in order to create an identity in relation to an “other”. This is because individuals can no longer form an identity through the incidence of a hierarchic “Master signifier”. Instead, the human mass has become a crowd that weaves connections in order not to be reduced to a swarm of isolated individuals. This is seen in contemporary advanced societies where individuals live and communicate via the internet and the ‘apps’ found in their smart phones.

Thinkers have defined internet as a phenomenon that does not respect private boundaries. Users share their affections in the web knowing that others might see them. Personal diaries are shared in blogs in order to attract followers. This tells us something: contemporary subjects seek to build their own identity through social platforms. Insofar as their affections and libidinal life are publicised in public networks, they are capitalised. As a result, popular affections become capitalised, in turn leading other users to reproduce the same pattern.

Accordingly, the place and role of individuals in society is also determined by their presence, or lack thereof, in social networks. This is especially the case with young people. Many girls have cried in my private practice because no one left them a comment or ‘liked’ their status, therefore leading them to feel segregated. Others, instead, get agitated as they seek to interpret the comments that other users post in one of their photographs.

It is not without affection that contemporary subjects, especially those born and raised in the internet era, seek personal and social promotion via a “second life”. But those fast and plural connections generate a floating, erratic state where bonds are ephemeral and outsourced. I wonder if the language of internet (where we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of “verbal writing” including the increased use of emoticons and signs), is the way contemporary subjects seek to be heard and to attract the gaze of an “Other” who navigates adrift and who is increasingly less and less embodied. Indeed, one could argue that subjects seek to become “audible” and “visible” through social networks in order to be able to lead a life in which the absence of organizing bonds gives no meaning to their own existence. Of particular relevance here is the emergence of so called online dating websites or platforms which subjects increasingly visit in search for love. This increasing phenomenon reinforces Freud’s dictum that ‘the greatest happiness of life is the conviction that we are loved’. Subjects do not content themselves with the self-erotic enjoyments promoted by the system and aspire to be something more than just an object in the eyes of an “Other”. That said, without a personal and physical encounter love and desire are reduced to a fiction of words, a mere enjoyment of the imaginary. As MIT Professor Sherry Turkle points out, “man-computer symbiosis is impossible, we feel lonely yet we fear privacy. Turn off your phones and computers and start living. Give a meaning to your loneliness”.

Q. “Start living”. Interesting comment and one that I am sure many people are starting to take very seriously. This makes me think of what has been happening since Tunisians took to the streets in late 2010. As you know, 2011 was a year marked by the emergence of several revolutions and social movements, from Northern Africa and the Middle East through to Europe and North America. Lacan himself is widely recognized as one of the prominent thinkers of the May ‘68 generation that followed the early Daniel Cohn-Bendit into a pseudo revolution. What would Lacan say of the movements seen in 2011 and beyond?

A. Social movements like those that led to the Arab Spring and those that followed, like the 15-M in Spain and the Occupy Wall Street in the US, are the result of a social symptom found in young and not so young people: that is, the destruction of social conditions in the hands of greedy financial markets and corrupt political leaders. Whilst the system pushes the masses to new modes of mass consumerism, these revolt against the power of the new indestructible and anonymous Masters. Such social movements form a new polis, woven horizontally, that generates new bonds of solidarity and identity. The most widespread slogan of Spain’s 15-M, “we are not merchandise in the hands of bankers and politicians”, reflected the feeling of thousands, perhaps millions of people. Social movements revolt against the idea of the contemporary subject losing its place in the market place, fearing being left with no future. In some sense, this was the subject of study of Richard Sennet, a sociologist from the London School of Economics, who described this process in his book ‘The Corrosion of Character and the Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism’. The difference, however, is that such corrosion is taking place today with even more strength. Moreover, protesters do not necessarily object being reduced to consumers. Rather, they feel consumed by the system.

So, what can Psychoanalysis tell us? I can still remember what Lacan told his students in May ’68: “the reason you vomit[1] the objects of consumption is because these cannot replace the cause of your desire. If you decide to revolt against the family and society, and throw yourself into sexual liberation, you will realise that doing so will not satisfy you either. In fact, quite the contrary”. Furthermore, he told students that their ‘revolution’, as with any other revolution, would only result in a shift of the discourse of the Master. In other words, after completing their revolution they would find themselves facing yet a new Master. He then added that they played the role of Spartan slaves or helots, as the system displays them saying: “Look how they enjoy”. I remember the days in which subjects sought to fight against the oppression of the family and the system by adopting new forms of hedonism and individual liberty. May ’68, with its experience of “freedom of speech and action”, failed to change the political system of the moment. However, it changed an entire generation by prompting us to explore beyond the conventional and to elaborate new discourses about the social place of the individual in the capitalist society. In that respect, May ’68 was a success that had a tremendous impact in many thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century.

What would Lacan say of the social movements seen recently? He would probably not repeat what he said in May ’68, although I am certain that he would warn about the naïveté of any “revolution” seeking to overthrow the capitalist power of the financial markets. There is a tremendous difference between the massive ‘68 rebellions, bred in the explosive cauldron of North American beatniks and European situationists, and those that broke out in 2011 in so many world squares.

Contemporary social movements do not seek to free the individual from the bourgeois modes of life. Quite the contrary.  They do not want to lose the conditions of life brought about by the rise of the welfare system. They denounce the weakness of the state and of their political leaders in the face of the power of the financial markets. I would even venture to say that they claim the opposite of those who took to the streets in May ’68: they seek more employment, better housing, a decent life, a bright future, and a real democracy for themselves and for their children. A good example of this is one of the signs most commonly seen during Spain’s 15-M camp in Madrid’s main square: “We are not against the system; the system is against us”.

Those who gather in Spain’s public squares to protest against the unfairness of the system feel threatened by increasingly precarious work conditions[2]. In short, they fear the system will turn them into non-renewable labour. Public outrage goes hand in hand with private fears that may result in psychological troubles in those who lack subjective support, emotional bonds, family ties, or compassionate colleagues. They feel ashamed and even guilty of being seen as “losers” by society at large.

What is more concerning here is that the system has crossed the point of no return. According to Lacan, the processes of segregation resulting from the later stages of capitalism produce a “generalised camp of concentration”. Lacan provided two diagnoses: on the one hand he talked of a generalized camp concentrating those spared by the system as a result of not being profitable; on the other hand, he predicted the emergence of a “universal capitalist immersion”. These two diagnoses led many psychoanalysts to explore how psychoanalysis could help subjects combat the capitalist discourse. This, I argue, while not impossible, cannot be achieved through the utopian channels of “revolution”. There are indeed many ways of combating the system from within the system therefore preventing its exactions. For instance, in Spain we have seen the emergence of several initiatives such as popular mobilisation to protect those threatened with eviction, the emergence of good-for-services exchanges amongst those who cannot afford rising prices, or social activities in urban neighbourhoods.

Based on psychoanalytical practice we can say with confidence that consensual, horizontal democratic practices lacking an organizing discourse cannot prosper. To expect large masses in a spontaneous congregation to decide and take action on a particular point is utopian. Subjects may share the same or similar social symptoms but without a signifying Master they may not all meet in a same collective symbolic discourse.

The recent movements of Western Europe and North America will vanish unless they result in collective forms of organization with a particular and shared understanding and knowledge of what has led them to the current situation. This is not the matter of psychoanalysts but of citizens themselves, and psychoanalysts are also committed as citizens. What psychoanalysis can do, however, is help us understand the workings of the human psyche and the relationship between subjects and the context in which they operate. In other words, it can help us understand the formation of subjectivity and the ‘libidinal economy’ that makes us all different from each other.

Q. One final question Ms Gallano. Upon reading your writings on the breach of social bonds and its effects on human subjectivity I was particularly captivated by the term coined by Colette Soler, “narcynicism”. How does this mix of narcissism and cynicism translate in practice? What are the origins of this phenomenon, and was this not always the case (i.e. did we not find this in earlier epochs)?

A. French Psychoanalyst Coletter Soler joined the words “narcissism” and “cynicism” to form the word “narcynicism”. In doing so, Soler condensed the narcissism and cynicism found in contemporary individuals. By narcissism we understand the personality cult found and promoted in the society of the spectacle where social success is what ultimately defines individuals. Contemporary neurotics wear themselves out for never achieving their ideals. They suffer for not being sufficiently cynics, even as they try hard. Neurotics, after all, find pleasure in pleasing others. Cynics, on the other hand, are no longer like a Diogenes defying a Master. Contemporary cynicism is self-promoted by the system. It seeks to adjust to the new Masters of capitalism where individuals, corporations and governments (which are made of individuals) seek their own benefit at the expense of others. It is a shameless cynicism where the dignity of the subject is no longer taken into account.

What is the origin of the current narcynicism? In short, its origin is to be found in the capitalist dissolution of a past symbolic order that helped put aside the self-interest of the individual in order to promote the social interests of civilisation. Politicians are a good example. They promise something during their electoral campaign, yet they do nothing to implement their promises once they are elected. Even worse, they deny they promised anything in the first instance, and they do so without visible traces of a subjective conflict. The concept and practice of narcynicism is reflected in inconsistent discourses. In psychoanalytical practice, we see how these new forms of narcynicism tyrannise the subject by pushing it to abide by the rules of success, as well as personal and professional promotion, which often takes the shape of making more earnings. Furthermore, we see how through this intoxication, the subject sacrifices his intimate wishes, desires and feelings, as if trying to delete his particular subjectivity in order to play by the rules imposed by society at large and private corporations in particular. Yet the art of suppressing one’s own subjectivity leads many subjects to develop mental and physical illnesses. They feel divided and develop symptoms that cannot be treated with psycho drugs or therapies intended to reverse so called cognitive errors.  They cannot be treated either through the application of standard “protocols”.

On the other hand, although absent from pervasive discourses and public and media attention, psychoanalytical treatment allows subjects to experience the knowledge of the unconscious. Indeed, it allows them to experience and verify in their intimate and social life that which psychoanalysis will have changed in them. Instead of perpetuating a self-defeated rhetoric and lament, psychoanalysis allows subjects to shape their fortunes. Instead of the pragmatism found in emerging forms of narcynicism, psychoanalysis offers subjects new ways of finding a “praxis” through which they can experience and apply their analytical lessons in real life, as well as engage in a new responsibility towards themselves and the others.

Thank you very much, Ms Gallano, for taking the time to answer our questions.

In this essay, the author attempts to assess whether war assists in constructing or deconstructing state and nation building. An example of constructive war and deconstructive war is given by assessing Afghanistan and Vietnam and the role of the three causal mechanisms ‘Capital, Coercion, and Nation building’ . The author concludes by examining Syria and Lebanon as case studies to see if the causal mechanisms could also be extended to explain state and nation formation in the Middle East.

By Abd Al-Aziz Abu Al-Huda, 29th May, 2012

Throughout history, war has often been portrayed and remembered for its capability as a destructive force. Yet looking at the beginning of many states in early modern Europe, we tend to find war as the means by which independence was acquired. Such observations, analysed by Charles Tilly and Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea, has then led to the interpretation that war can also be a constructive force, particularly in aiding the formation of states or nations. The opposite is equally accurate, for war historically has also proven to create conditions for the demise of many states. We can then understand and assume that war is a highly ambiguous instrument requiring specific settings and conditions to promote state and nation formation or lead to state destruction.

This paper then attempts to outline the conditions that promote the constructive abilities of war. The paper will begin with a brief definition of the state and nation to clarify the difference and role they each provide. The paper will then attempt to explain “constructive war” through the three causal mechanisms ‘Capital, Coercion, and Nation building’ using Vietnam and Afghanistan to explain their applicability. The discussion will conclude by examining Syria and Lebanon as case studies to see if the causal mechanisms could also be extended to explain state and nation formation in the Middle East. Following the examination of the literature, one can suggest that war can provide conditions to assist state and nation building but only if specific foundations and materials are present.

The State and the Nation:

Many explanations have been provided to explain the origins of the state. Yet consensus has mainly revolved around the theory of coercion to explain the beginning of the state (Careneiro, 1977). The theory holds that “war is the father of things”, basically implying that war created the state, not the surrender of sovereignty which is claimed in philosophical literature (Careneiro, 1977: p.6). Regardless of the theory chosen, definitions of what constitutes a state are similar. In short, the state is categorized as an entity which is able to maintain territorial control and implement its will within a given territory (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Max Weber provides a similar observation by defining the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Tilly, 1992: p.70). Only when control is fully established, should states attempt to foster solidarity between its inhabitants.

The ‘nation’ could be regarded as a complimentary tool which could be accessed by successful states. The emphasis on successful states is because we can presume that failed states are more likely not to meet the needs of their population and so people look towards their community identity to safeguard self interest rather than the state. Hence once security of a state is ensured, a state can extend to create the sense of common identity (Berger, 2008). This is usually easier to implement with countries that contain inhabitants speaking the same language and adhering to the same religious beliefs or historical experience (Bean, 1973). Even without the presence of these aspects, nationhood could still be fabricated through the “imposition of common language and culture in a school” (Ottaway, 2002: p.17). A perfect example is provided in Eugen Weber’s “from peasants into Frenchmen” where the French government imposed a uniform French language in all schools since the late1800’s in order to bolster French nationalism (Weber, 1976).

However, the ‘nation’, should not only be seen as tool to bridge divisions within a territory. The nation can also fulfill a practical purpose because it offers legitimacy to the existence of the state and more importantly, it makes the process of extraction and taxation easier for the government (Tilly, 1992). The process of extraction can be advanced when states highlight the possibility of threat (Tilly, 1992). The result is successfully persuading the citizen that supporting collective interests is also in the favourable to the individual. Additionally, highlighting threats could benefit a state because it presents the furtherance of government interests as national goals (Bean, 1973).

Constructive wars: what are the conditions?

War can assist state and nation building in several contexts. Traditionally, war in early Europe assisted state building and fostering community sentiments because there was a public desire for security (Berger, 2008). To achieve maximum security gains, the state was chosen as a viable entity because of its size (Berger, 2008). States are most likely easier to protect because their size was limited which facilitated the monopoly on violence (Berger, 2008). Additionally, war has been able to support state building when used by governments as an extension of policy to achieve political ends (Tilly, 1992). The same analysis could apply to communities that use war as a means to express the desire for independence (Tilly, 1992).

However, regardless of the context, Taylor and Botea assert that war will not contribute to state or nation building with the absence of one of the three causal mechanisms derived from Tilly. The first mechanism is the ability of war to develop an administrative capacity which would facilitate the extraction of resources and taxation of the population (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Second, war should lead to the establishment of a coercive force or military within the given territory to enforce the process of taxation and extraction (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The last mechanism is the ability of war to construct a national identity to ensure the persistence of taxation and more importantly decrease internal threats (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

Furthermore, Taylor and Botea have added their own conditions for the success of war in creating states and nations. Beginning with the presence of a core ethnic community, Taylor and Botea argue that the existence of an ethnic majority provides a basis for nationalism (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The second condition, revolution, contributes to the aspirations of independence and nationalism particularly when the ideology tends to address public concerns and outlines similar viewpoints (Taylor and Botea, 2008). So from these additional conditions, we can identify that some degree of political and national coherence needs to be present to strength the state and nation building capacity of war (Taylor and Botea, 2008). How long a war should last to allow state or nation building is not addressed by most of the literature, but the assumption could be that the amount of years is irrelevant as long as the prior conditions have been met.

So what occurs in states that have internationally recognized sovereignty but are deprived of these conditions? Tilly would argue that the state is likely to fail, particularly if the three main conditions are not met. Hence, judicial sovereignty alone is not enough to create a strong state (Tilly, 1992). It is then important that differentiate between negative and positive sovereignty and which one is essential to achieve a state. Negative sovereignty simply implies legal recognition from the international community, but does not guarantee internal recognition of the state (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Positive sovereignty on the other hand, implies the effective control of a government body in extracting, taxing, and repressing rivals within a territorial area (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

However, many negative factors often hinder a state’s ability in ascertaining power. The most obvious factor is the military might of neighbouring entities and the geographic location of the state (Centeno, 2002). Quite often, failed states also tend to be at a disadvantage geographically because there are no natural defense borders to prevent invasions. But difficultly in establishing control could also be applied to states with hostile geographic conditions. Taylor and Botea in addition add ‘regime type’ as a negative factor; however the nature of the regime seems irrelevant if the state is still able to maintain effective control (Taylor and Botea, 2008). This assumption is probable considering that the strong Europeans states we have today are the byproduct of “primitive accumulation of power” (Taylor and Botea, 2008: p.31). But does that mean that wars today are the continuation of a natural and constructive process?

There is no doubt that the present political context has changed considerably since early modern Europe (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Wars still play a crucial role in determining the fate of states, but do wars still provide conditions to establish states or nations? Critics like Lustick argue that war today has its limits because the international community supports the maintenance of established borders (Lustick, 1997). So despite the outcomes of any war, the international community would not allow the expansion of one state to cause an existential threat to another (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

Nevertheless, Tilly’s logic still seems to apply in explaining the conditions created by war in the developing world regardless of its Eurocentric focus (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The three causal mechanisms of Capital, Coercion, and Nation building shall now be examined with reference to Vietnam and Afghanistan.

Capital:

Similar to the drastic change in political context, the internationaleconomic setting has also been through severe changes (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Yet as Tilly articulated, capital was and still remains “the artery of war” because capital finances its continuance (Tilly, 1992: p.33). In order to gain capital, states had to successfully tap into their natural resources and labour for manufacturing power (Tilly, 1992). Capital acquisition also included using any coercive means to extract taxes successfully from the entire population as well as the positioning of forces along strategic roads and borders to ensure monopoly on taxation (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

Additionally, successful wars could be fought if the political rulers of a state are successful at accumulating credit from businessmen or other states (Tilly, 1992). Since war can be a prolonged process, states often suffer the financial burden of funding enough money (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Taxation and extraction could only reach to a certain point until the state is in need of more to gain a strategic advantage. Borrowing can allow states to separate the costs of militarization from national income and so allow a state to pay faster for mobilization (Tilly, 1992). Hence, successful states will be able to call upon credit at anytime, but that would then depend on the state’s reputation in paying its debts to its creditors (Tilly, 1992).

The ability of a state to borrow capital to finance wars is also highly effected by the condition of its national economy (Deutsch and Foltz, 1966). For states with a significant barter system, borrowing is less likely and so we are more likely to find the physical extraction of resources and active surveillance of the territory (Tilly, 1992). The positive aspect to this condition is that it allows states to become self sufficient and hence less reliant on foreign credit (Tilly, 1992). As for economies that were based on cash flows, states could station forces on roads and borders in order to collect customs tax (Tilly, 1992). However, regardless of the economic condition, no government would be successful in accumulating capital if it did not use war to mutually build the state apparatus needed to fulfill important transactions (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

Analyzing Vietnam, it is easy to explain the endurance of the North Vietnamese (Viet Cong) in the face of South Vietnam. The Viet Cong were clearly able to be self sufficient when it came to extracting resources and enforcing taxation (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The Viet Cong presided physically over the direct taxation of their population and maintained the use of the old financial structures placed by the French (Tonnesson, 2010). Those who did resist payment were either jailed or killed for failing to pay (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Yet forced taxation was not always applied by the Viet Cong because they were equally efficient in justifying taxation as a method to continue the Vietnamese resistance against foreign occupiers (Tonnesson, 2010). Additionally, at times of need, the Viet Cong were also successful in borrowing money from the USSR and China (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

South Vietnam on the other hand maintained the same taxing system throughout its existence from 1950 till 1975 (Taylor and Botea, 2008). This was essentially due the heavy reliance of the government on receiving foreign assistance, particularly from the U.S (Tonnesson, 2010). When attempts at taxation were later made, the government proved to be useless at convincing the population after taxation had been neglected for so long (Tonnesson, 2010). After the unification, the Viet Cong immediately took over remaining government functions and nationalized the majority of land and industries (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The coercive means of extraction continued to take place and served to fulfill payments for security tasks throughout the country (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

The same problems experienced in South Vietnam could also be observed in the case of Afghanistan. In fact one could argue that no efficient state exists in Afghanistan because no group attempted to monopolize taxation (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Even prior to the USSR invasion, resources and taxation were not consistently collected by the government (Shahrani, 2002). The result was growing doubt amongst the population over the legitimacy and durability of their state (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Throughout the Cold War, the government continued to rely heavily on funding from the USSR while the Islamists (Mujahedeen) looked towards the U.S and Pakistan for support (Shahrani, 2002).

Once the Taliban was in control of government, they failed to apply what the Viet Cong had directly managed to achieve. The Taliban continued their reliance on foreign aid while taxation was carried out on a voluntary basis because the government lacked any economic infrastructure to keep track of taxation (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The same shortage of government infrastructure also extended to other necessary government facilities concerning health and education (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The result was the alienation and isolation of different communities in Afghanistan who then with time established control of their region through building militias (Shahrani, 2002).

Coercion:

The use of coercion by states is often understood as the use of legal armed forces to disarm the population within a given territory (Tilly, 1992). Historically, coercion has been carried by the confiscation of weapons and introducing measures to limit the ability of civilians to bear arms (Li, 2002). Achieving disarmament also occurred through imposing licenses or generally banning the use and production of weapons through the constitution (Tilly, 1992). Once this monopoly on the use of force is realized, the state then attempts to develop its military capabilities to counter possible external threats (Tilly, 1992).

Like Capital, coercion also assisted in constructing governmental institutions to carry out state functions (Taylor and Botea, 2008). As capital required an economic institution, the military establishment required institutions to govern conscription, services, and money supply to ensure that the armed forces continued to function with no delay. However, Tilly warns that coercion has a twofold effect. This is because states fear the ambiguous reaction of another state when responding to threat (Tilly, 1992). As weapons become more elaborate and deadly, states are equally worried about war as they are about developing military capabilities (Tilly, 1992).

In Vietnam, fear of an ambiguous reaction was constantly a problem for the Viet Cong. It was one thing to recruit a significant amount of the population; it was another thing to supply them as well (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The U.S had the ability and the money to supply the South with weaponry, but the Northern forces were fortunate that the South lacked volunteers and admiration from the masses (Tonnesson, 2010). Hence internally, the Viet Cong were able to organize a stronger civil army which took on the role of the military upon achieving independence.

Within Afghanistan, the traditional tribes and communities greatly hindered any formation of a coercive force in the country (Shahrani, 2002). Conscription was widely avoided even prior to the coup d’état and Soviet invasion because certain tribes received exemption from performing military services (Taylor and Botea, 2008). The government responded to this situation by relying on private militias to continue security functions (Shahrani, 2002). Even after the accession of the Taliban, little or no effort was taken at conscripting Afghans to retake control of the country (Taylor and Botea, 2008). By then, all the years of war seemed to have cemented Afghani decentralization and autonomy which led the Taliban to rely on volunteers from Pakistan to carry out coercive functions (Taylor and Botea, 2008).

Nation building:

As mentioned previously, nation building tends to be a complementary aspect available to the use of successfully established states. However, varying degrees of nationalism exist and sometimes, despite war, nationalism is never fostered (Taylor and Botea, 2008). A sense of nationalism can even precede the existence of a state (Ottaway, 2002). Such nationalism tends to rely heavily on negative historical experiences which then create the desires for independence. Nevertheless, a strong sense of belonging can be fostered by a state which houses a population with a similar language, ethnicity, religious and historical experiences (Ottaway, 2002). On the other hand, nationalism could also be fabricated, which is true in case of Europe which developed its national narrative after independence (Tilly, 1992).

But why should successful states fabricate or promote nationalism if the state already has the monopoly on the use of force? The reason is that nationalism creates psychological support for the state and more importantly it defends the existence and legitimacy of the nation should any invasion of the state be successful (Ottaway, 2002). Nationalism is also equally crucial in establishing a strong military because it affects the moral of soldiers and even citizens (Tilly, 1992).

Vietnamese nationalism began long before the existence of the state and was maintained by the successful expulsion or absorption of various neighbouring groups (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Tilly argues that such ethnic homogenous states are likely to be more successful for multiethnic states and clearly, the assumption applies to Vietnam (Tilly, 1992). Furthermore, Tilly assumes that states which forgo a revolution are also more likely to create strong states based on coercion which was the case with the Viet Cong and their ruthless enforcement of taxation and conscription (Tilly, 1992).The Viet Cong was also aided because it promoted a political ideology that appealed to the majority of the unprivileged masses.

Unlike Vietnam, Afghanistan has been free for much of its existence (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Arguably, no exposure to war never created a context for the numerous tribes and clans to come together and develop a partnership or understanding (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Even after the USSR invasion in 1979, no development in the sense of community occurred because the previous Afghani government failed to represent the various ethnicities and provide a strong platform for dialogue (Shahrani, 2002). When Taliban came to power, they attempted to advocate Islam as a unifying ideology but failed to bolster nationalism because Islam was seen as a broad category which promoted no exclusivity which is the essential function of nationalism (Shahrani, 2002).

Case Study 1: Syria

Like many countries in the Middle East, Syria is the product of British and French imposition of arbitrary borders in the Levant prior to the mandate period (1920-1946). After independence in 1946, the political and financial elites of Syria failed to fulfill the socioeconomic needs of the country which led to regular uprisings and changes in parliament until the Ba’ath coup d’état in 1963 (Devlin, 1983). Following the coup, the country has been ruled under a regime which imposed secular ideology (Choueiri, 1993). Arguably, this has greatly contributed in encouraging the assimilation and mobilization the population which gained the government legitimacy and popularity (Choueiri, 1993).

Capital:

Massive changes in the Syrian economy followed the coup of 1963 (Choueiri, 1993). Yet the Syrian regime was fortunate since the country already had some credit readily available for use by the military establishment (Devlin, 1985). The regime was also successful in borrowing finances throughout the 70’s and 80’s from the USSR, the U.S, the World Bank, and Arab countries (Devlin, 1983). Additionally, the new government’s socialist aspect allowed them to limit privatization of land and take over industries which increased state assets (Choueiri, 1993). Also, Syria’s manufacturing and agricultural industries were booming and bringing in the population to learn different skills other than farming which had been the predominant occupation (Hinnebusch, 1979).

Capital also began to flow into government hands after oil discoveries were made in the north in the early 1970’s (Devlin, 1983). Also, with an effective army and governmental institutions in place, the Ba’ath regime was able to begin immediate enforcement of taxation throughout the country and to collect customs tax on borders (Choueiri, 1993). Successful taxation was enabled because the government focused on building roads in the provinces and linking them to cities with the most economic activity (Devlin, 1985). This helped spur economic activity and made it easier for the government to be everywhere to implement proper taxation and projects.

Coercion:

Coercion in Syria right after independence was no voluntary matter. In 1948, the Syrian government joined its neighbouring Arab states in invading the newly created state of Israel. The decision to enter the war meant that an army had to be founded immediately and set to patrol borders. The establishment of an army was relatively easy in Syria considering that the majority of citizens are ethnically Arab and saw the war as their religious duty (Devlin, 1985). At the time, Syria still had a low population rate which assisted in the quick and easy patrolling of the state (Hinnebusch, 1979).

Since the coup in 1963, the Ba’ath has also been able to wield power from the provinces because its main members came from there. Specifically, 12 out of 14 founders of the regime had rural backgrounds which gained them popularity amongst the majority of the population (Devlin, 1983). Yet despite rural popularity, the Ba’ath also established a secret service in the 1970’s to locate people who were dissatisfied with the system (Devlin, 1983). The power of the secret police and army was portrayed in 1982 during the Hama massacre which led to the killing of an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 civilians and almost wiping out the entire city (Choueiri, 1993). As for police forces, the regime was able to recruit 12,000 to 25,000 men from the Alawites region which the President Hafez Al-Assad came from (Choueiri, 1993).

Nation building:

Like Vietnam, Syria is ethnically homogeneous with a predominant population of ethnic Arabs who follow the Sunni Muslim tradition (Devlin, 1983). Yet the regime still had to be careful of what identity they were promoting to make sure that no internal group would be alienated. Hence, Syria chose Arabism as its narrative to define its existence. The category of ‘Arab’ was a broad enough to include most people considering it’s mainly a linguistic identity (Hourani, 1946). The Christians in Syria did not seem to resist Syria’s promotion of Arab identity because they were assured of the regime’s commitment to secularism which countered religious movements (Hourani, 1946). In fact, Christians played a huge role in the formation of Pan-Arab ideology. The founders of the Ba’ath party itself, Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, were of the Christian faith.

Ba’athism was also a successful ideology to promote because its aims touched upon concerns and aspirations of the population. The most immediate concern was the war against Israel which was seen as an extension of Western colonialism (Devlin, 1983). Syrians jointly saw Israel as the obstacle to establishing a single Arab entity which Syrians regarded as their natural right (Hinnebusch, 1979). Arabism was also able to draw massive support from the youth since the regime promoted slogans of ‘Arab resurrection, freedom, Unity, and Socialism’ in schools (Devlin 1983: p.46). The socialist aspect of Ba’athism was extremely popular with the majority of rural Syrians who resented the traditional domination of wealth by certain families. Hence, the Ba’ath also administered land reforms to provide labourers with better conditions (Devlin, 1985).

Case Study 2: Lebanon

The State of Lebanon which was formed in 1920 is also a byproduct of European divisions in the Levant. But unlike its Syrian neighbour, the imposition of arbitrary Lebanese borders had profound political consequences because it entrapped numerous minorities. The Lebanese government attempted to resolve the dilemma of minorities by establishing confessionalism as a mode of governance. Under the National Pact of 1943, confessionalism was defined as a system that divides political and institutional control proportionately among religious communities (Zamir, 1985). Yet ethnic and religious tensions remained exacerbated by internal and external influences. There was still major disagreement amongst the Lebanese over the identity of the state and more importantly its role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Firro, 2003). With time, these unresolved debates caught momentum leading to the civil war (1975-1990).

Capital:

It’s safe to say that Lebanon, up until the civil war, was neither short of credit nor prosperity (Gordon, 1980). The country attracted investment and secured because of the open banking system modeled similarly to French banks (Zamir, 1985). The gross national product of Lebanon was nearly twofold compared to most Arab countries while its population was less by half (Gordon, 1980). Additionally, Lebanon’s attractive geographic location bolstered the tourism industry which brought in 70% of the country’s national income (Gordon, 1980). Most of this money poured in by neighbouring Arab countries, particularly the Gulf which was benefitting from oil boom during the 1970’s (Choueiri, 1993).

However like South Vietnam, the Lebanese government neglected imposing a proper taxation system because it relied heavily on foreign aid and investment (Firro, 2003). Traditionally, taxation was administered by clan officials and little was done to change this situation because the government felt that imposing a centralized tax system was too difficult (Hourani, 1946). But this meant that the government spent no money to improve roads and infrastructure throughout the country to implement proper taxation. Additionally, the government failed to distribute the fruits of prosperity amongst the population (Gordon, 1980). Gordon asserts that “income was not distributed equitably between either individuals or between different religious communities” (Gordon, 1980: p. 110). This was to form one of the sources of tension throughout the 1970’s which was exacerbated by the 20-30% yearly inflation rate (Gordon, 1980).

Coercion:

It could be argued that the lack of coercion was always the main weakness of the Lebanese state. The government was able to form a military force, however it proved useless because members maintained religious allegiance (Zamir, 1985). In fact, the civil war in Lebanon only broke out because the armed forces failed to maintain unity as opposing factions fought. This meant that the national pact of 1943 failed to dissolve the tribal divisions and representations in Lebanon and instead helped solidify the power of the clan system (Firro, 2003).

Gordon rightly proposes that the confessional system of Lebanon most likely made it more immobile and autonomous than it had been before (Gordon, 1980: p.138). This was because the National pact institutionalized and legitimized the clan system and so clans no longer had to fight or negotiate for control in their community (Gordon, 1980). The inhabitants of the region in return maintained their allegiance to clan representatives who were now cemented in power. This situation is particularly true in the case of the Shiites who had to look towards their religious community for welfare and protection because the government failed to provide security against Israeli incursions in the South (Firro, 2003).

Nation building:

Studies on Lebanon suggest that a certain collective memory and culture was formed in the mountain prior to Ottoman takeover (Salibi, 1976). Maronite explanations imply that the collective memory was due to the relative isolation of Christians in Mount Lebanon following the spread of Islam (Salibi, 1976). Since then and up to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Christian isolation was maintained with very little interference in political or economic life which helped preserve a separate national and religious identity (Zamir, 1985). Such autonomy presumably fostered desires of independence which materialized with the establishment of the mandate.

Achieving independence is relatively an easy task compared to the burden of explaining the state’s existence. This proved to be a particularly difficult task in Lebanon which housed eighteen religious communities that abided by different laws and customs (Choueiri, 1993). Additionally, the Maronites desired to maintain French protection which appeared to contradict the notion of independence and imply heavy reliance of the government on the West (Choueiri, 1993). Yet, the Maronites justified Lebanese independence by claiming Phoenician ancestry. The decision ultimately alienated a significant amount of the population because it left no room to encompass the religious and cultural diversity of the country (Firro, 2003). To the remainder of the population, Lebanon and Phoenicianism were exclusively Christian projects since the Maronites put more effort into advertising Phoenicianism in Mount Lebanon (Zamir, 1985).

Alternatives:

Before ending the discussion, it should be noted that that states and nations could sometimes exist without any prior war. This claim also applies to the developing world, for example Jordan and most if not all of the countries in the Gulf Cooperative Council.

In conclusion, state and nation building today has changed considerably from early modern Europe and we should be careful of the implications of generalizing its applicability. However, it is apparent from the Vietnamese and Syrian case that war still has conditions which allow its constructive abilities to be used. Yet war alone is not a condition for state or nation building. War alone remains an ambiguous force which can become constructive if the essentials of capital are available and the ability of coercion is seized. Only then could states focus on nation building and cementing identities using language and culture. Without these conditions, war is bound to deteriorate states and nations as it has done with Afghanistan and Lebanon.

Bibliography:

Books:

• Berger, M. T. (Ed.). (2008). From nation-building to state-building. London: Routledge.
• Centeno, Miguel Angel (2002): Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America (Pennsylvania State University Press).
• Choueiri, Y. M. (Ed.). (1993). State and society in Syria and Lebanon. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
• Deutsch, K. W., & Foltz, W. J. (2010): Nation building in comparative contexts. New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction.
• Devlin, J. F. (1983). Syria: modern state in an ancient land. London: Westview Press.
• Firro, K. M. (2002). Inventing Lebanon: nationalism and the state under the Mandate. London: I. B. Tauris.
• Gordon, D. C. (1980): Lebanon, the fragmented nation. London: Croom Helm.
• Hinnebusch, R. A. (1979). Party and peasant in Syria : rural politics and social change under the Ba`th. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press.
• Hourani, A. (1946). Syria and Lebanon: a political essay. London: Oxford University Press.
• Salibi, K. S. (1976). Cross roads to civil war: Lebanon 1958-1976. London: Ithaca Press.
• Tonnesson, S. (2010). Vietnam 1946: how the war began. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Weber, E. (1977). Peasants into Frenchmen : the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914. London: Chatto and Windus.
• Zamir, M. (1985). The formation of modern Lebanon. London: Croom Helm.

Journals:

• Bean, R. (1973). War and the Birth of the Nation State. The Journal of Economic History, 33(1), 203-221. Retrieved December 5, 2010
• Carneiro, R. L. (1977). “A Theory of the Origin of the State.” Studies in Social Theory Menlo Park, CA 3-21. Retrieved December 5 2010
• Li, J. (2002). State Fragmentation: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of the Territorial Power of the State. Sociological Theory, 20(2), 139-156. Retrieved December 3, 2010
• Lustick, I. S. (1997). The absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political “backwardness” in historical perspectives (Vols. 51 – 4, pp. 653-683). International Organizations. Retrieved November 29, 2010
• Ottaway, M. (2002). Nation Building. Foreign Policy, 16-24. Retrieved December 3, 2010
• Shahrani, N. M. (2002). War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 715-722. Retrieved December 3, 2010
• Taylor, Brian D & Botea, Roxana (2008): ‘Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World’, International Studies Review 10:1, 27-56.
• Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, Capital, and European States. Blackwell publishing. Retrieved October 20, 2010

Abd Al-Aziz Abu Al-Huda is a Middle East and North Africa expert analyst and researcher whose work has covered a variety of topics such as state formation, Security and Energy Policy. His specialization focuses on Water Security and Hydropolitics in the Middle East, as well as the role of Virtual Water in mitigating conflict and aiding socioeconomic development.

This essay puts forward the argument that without several revolutionary ‘black swan’ innovations, technological advances will need to be supported by strategic planning and a restructured energy market to tackle climate change.  The current market ‘lock in’ of high-carbon energies and high cost of low-carbon technologies mean that the potential for new technologies to gain widespread adoption are highly restricted.

by Jack Hamilton, 24th March, 2012

‘Environmentalists are fiddling while Rome burns’.  This is the claim of Vinod Khosla, the founder of Khosla Ventures, a venture-capital firm that is currently investing over $1 billion into low-carbon technologies in the hope that a ‘black swan’ innovation will be a key to tackling climate change.  In Khosla’s estimations the green technologies of electric cars, wind turbines and smart grids will not be enough and rather there needs to be a ‘1000%’ change if the whole world is to enjoy the energy-rich lifestyle of the Western world.  Until the green technologies are available at a price which is affordable in the developing world, ‘everything is a toy’[i].  Others maintain that existing technology will be sufficient if market factors facilitate its widespread adoption.  Joseph Romm, the editor of Climate Progress, argues that the way to tackle climate change is through the ‘accelerated deployment of existing technologies’ in order to move down the cost curve more rapidly than a breakthrough[ii].  These two opposing views set up two fundamental questions: are advances in technology alone able to tackle climate change and if this technology exists why has it not been adopted?

How can advances in technology tackle climate change?

Stop Falling Through the Grid

One example is the current inefficiency in the electricity field.  Chris Huhne, former Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in the UK, stated that there will be a huge increase in the demand for electricity in the coming years.  He claims that it could double by 2050 and that this demand needs to be met with an affordable low-carbon energy supply.  Despite this he recognises that one fifth of the UK’s generating capacity will be lost over the next ten years due to aging power plants and the inefficient transport of electricity over long distances and relents that ‘our current energy system is not up to the job’[iii]. 

A new generation of demand-side products could help to lessen the dependence on fossil fuels.  An example of this would be the ‘smart grid’.  This new grid would be a massive two-way network that is flexible and secure.  It would help to reduce the cost of grid failures and power outages as well as reducing the 20% of energy that is wasted by being transmitted through the old clogged arteries of copper wiring[iv].  The impact of real-time pricing has been shown to lower energy consumption at household levels as customers change their load.  If they don’t need it, consumers are potentially helping the utility to avoid building a whole power plant by shifting their loads[v].

Putting Policy First

The dominant approach towards emissions reductions in the US transport sector has been to rely on technology to reduce emissions from personal transport.  This is no minor issue.  Transport in the US is responsible for around one third of the nation’s GHG emissions or around 8% of global emissions[vi]. 

Technology has failed to reduce carbon emissions as consumer choice remains firmly rooted in the high-emission options.  Aggressive anti-mitigation lobbies composed of producers and marketers of energy-intensive goods and a weak polity governed by short-term choices means that the electorate remain largely misinformed about global environmental security[vii].  While social change can help to overcome the political barriers of climate policy the exigent nature of climate change may require a more rapid solution.

We Have the Technology: Blaming the Market Lock-In

Technologies could certainly help to reduce emissions and increase energy security in the areas in which they are implemented but are they enough to tackle climate change alone?  It is not only Mr. Khosla who disputes their potential for widespread implementation.  Many of the technologies that are put forward as solutions to climate change already exist. 

Bjorn Lomborg claims that ‘technology isn’t the problem in the sense that if cost didn’t matter, then we can do it today.  We could do it with 1950s technology’[viii].  This idea is backed up by auditors such as KPMG who point to the energy market as the catalyst for change rather than technological innovation.  The firm states that the only factor required to make solar energy affordable is an economy of scale: ‘Even in a relatively small, cloudy and rainy country such as the Netherlands, there is an enormous potential for solar panels.  If this entire potential were utilised, solar energy could provide three-quarters of the Netherlands’ electricity needs’[ix].  The argument is that market forces will allow for cost reductions to be achieved in low-carbon technology meaning that grid parity for energy can be achieved.

If market forces are the solution to adopting low-carbon technologies, why has it failed so far in scaling up the production of these technologies to reduce the price?  The reasons for this are the current market ‘lock in’ of conventional energies, the nature of the short term contracts involved and fluctuations in funding detracting future investment.  These problems are compounded by the predatory practices of energy firms and the desire of industries to stick to their core missions to avoid financial risks.

Securing Market Penetration: Private vs Public

Market penetration by new technologies can take anywhere from fewer than ten years to more than seventy years for energy projects[x].  Incumbent technology systems act to ‘lock in’ conventional technologies despite the presence of superior substitutes.  The utility industry in question invests less than 1% of its revenue in R&D putting it far behind most other industrial sectors.  Utilities embrace change in a very slow and careful manner.  In the words of Ron Pernick, ‘if utility were a lover, it would be better known for its dependability than its passion’[xi].

The current polices on energy support this ‘lock in’ as many are designed to cope with the rising demand for electricity rather than looming spectre of climate change.  These policies support the development of new coal and gas power plants rather than promoting energy efficiency.  To combat this there is a need to decouple profits from generation and include externalities to overcome this perverse incentive for utilities.  Inconsistencies in policies have also plagued the implementation of efficient energy technologies.  Unlike communications, which was deregulated in the US with a single pen stroke in 1984, generation and distribution have been deregulated in an uneven and jerky fashion[xii].

The market ‘lock in’ of conventional energies is also due to the impact that a paradigm shift may have on a private innovator.  If private research was to create a paradigm-changing technological breakthrough there is the potential that the market design may be changed to benefit the public rather than the private innovator.  This would reduce the incentive to fund R&D privately.  It is therefore accepted that state support is required to achieve the optimum R&D level.  Despite this, the investment in R&D remains low in most cases.  The US devotes 0.5% of sales revenue in the electricity sector to R&D compared with 3.3% in the car industry and 15% in pharmaceuticals[xiii].

Relying purely on the market is clearly not the best way to ensure that paradigm-changing technologies are implemented and adopted in any widespread manner that may combat climate change.  While Lomborg is a firm advocate of market forces providing the solution to climate change, it appears as if it complies with his disdainful remark that the current trend is ‘fashionality over rationality’[xiv].  The current fashion is to stick to the status quo for large utilities who do not wish to have to overhaul their systems.  Technological development is therefore restricted by the pre-existing global system of investment cycles.  The next twenty years will see an unprecedented increase in energy investment as the developed nations replace the power plants that were built in the 1960s and 1970s and the rapidly industrialising economies accelerate their construction of energy systems[xv].  A failure to provide an alternative to the conventional forms of energy will mean that the world will continue to be ‘locked in’ to carbon intensive development.  This may be too late to tackle climate change.

Changing the Market: Including the Externalities

The market is clearly inadequate to push the technological revolution forwards by itself due to the ‘lock in’ of conventional energies.  For technologies to provide an alternative to climate change the market must be altered.  This can be achieved through strategic planning to include the negative externalities of high carbon energies through command and control methods and to incentivise the use of low carbon technologies through economic imperatives.  The policies that are currently in place are insufficient to tackle climate change by themselves and so it is important to first look at the existing limitations.

Updating Legislation

In the current market, it is almost guaranteed that the regulations for low-carbon energies will not have been designed with the new forms of energy in mind.  Paul Gipe describes an example in which wind turbines were classed as power stations and therefore were required to withstand an earthquake without experiencing a total mechanical failure[xvi].  It is justified that a power station at ground level should not topple but it is quite different when the structure is made of fifty tonnes of steel atop an eighty metre high tower.  The consequences of an unmanned tower falling in a field are substantially different to the collapse of a nuclear power station full of workers.  These current polices help to exacerbate the ‘lock in’ of conventional energy forms and thereby prevent the development and adoption of low-carbon technologies that would be more adept at tackling climate change.

The Lobbies

The problem of the ‘lock in’ continues on the political stage through the power of lobbies.  German successes in creating a renewable energy market were supported by powerful lobbying coalitions with links to both industry and political parties.  Cross-reference this to the lobbies for conventional supplies of energy in the UK which proved to be too strong for the market to overcome the ‘lock in’ at any great scale[xvii].  The problems of the ‘lock in’ are further strengthened in the policy sector by inconsistent allocations of subsidies which dissuade potential investors.  Unlike the consistent incentives for carbon-based technologies, policies encouraging renewables are changed frequently which arrests widespread adoption.  The recent slashing of fit-in-tariff incentives available to solar installations in the UK provides a grave reminder of this[xviii].  This announcement arrived only one week after the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change had delivered a speech on the importance of Britain’s low-carbon future[xix].

Political Life-cycles vs Energy Life-cycles

Stability is a key issue in supporting low-carbon technology as the projects generally have a long lifetime.  The problem is that most of the investment and industrial activity needs to take place at the start of their lifetimes.  A parliamentary term can last for around four years.  Bearing this in mind a vision of two terms into the future is seen as guesswork while looking twenty years into the future is merely a problem for another administration.  Such short-termism needs to be overcome to tackle a problem such as climate change as new technologies will struggle to gain R&D investment or gain widespread dissemination while ostracised by myopia.  If the technology in itself it insufficient thus far and the ‘free market’ is obstructed by ‘lock ins’ the solution can perhaps be found in governmental strategic planning.

International Standards

The rate of innovation and the diffusion of new technologies is impacted upon by market conditions such as the scale and certainty of the market, the size of R&D investment and the rate of turnover in each sector.  The balance of these factors determines where the barriers to the diffusion of innovation exist.  UNFCCC frameworks have the potential to restructure the market to circumvent these barriers for low-carbon technologies.  Setting international standards could help to restructure the markets away from the current ‘lock in’.  A higher fuel tax may be largely after the fact.  People have already ‘bought in’ to the current system with large amounts of user technology in their houses and vehicles.  Fuel costs would have to be increased significantly if consumers were to reassess using their current facilities at all as the cost of fuel and electricity is usually a minor item in an overall budget[xx].  Tradable emissions permit systems such as REGGI and EU-ETS have shown some regional successes in incentivising the lowering of emissions which is facilitating movement towards low-carbon technologies.  However, this movement is painfully slow and without one of Khosla’s ‘black swans’ the technologies are beyond the budgets of developing countries.

Is it already too late?

As the competition between current fuels and new technologies intensifies, the role and nature of energy is going to change and so is society.  However, principle-agent problem means that by the time the shift in society changes, it may already be too late for many parts of the world due to the impact of climate change.

Out of €1.3 billion worth of projects under the EU’s Framework 6 research programme with Chinese participation, only €35 million went to Chinese researchers[xxi].  Collaboration on public R&D between developed nations is little better despite various cooperative agreements at the IEA.  China estimates that 85% of its patents on high tech economic sectors are owned by companies in developed countries[xxii] and in the case of IPR some companies have strategically withheld technologies from emerging markets to maximise profits[xxiii].  This concentration of innovative capacity in developed countries does not reflect the diverse adaptation that the technology needs to meet the threat of climate change.  Public technology transfer has generally taken a narrow approach of limited funding and capacity building with the private sector focusing on balancing market access with licensing to local industries.  These approaches are unlikely to facilitate the speed at which technology needs to be transferred globally, especially to those without rapidly growing markets.  For technology to combat climate change strong incentives must be provided for developing country innovation, cooperation and sharing rather than the narrow technology transfers that currently exist.

By 2050, eight billion of the nine billion people projected to be living on the Earth will reside in the developing world[xxiv].  For this reason developing countries will need to be at the heart of any process that redesigns the global ideal.  Obtaining the necessary reduction in emissions requires developing nations to commit to binding national targets as well.  However, for developing nations to give this commitment the developed world must first prove that low carbon, high economic growth is possible and that low carbon technologies can be affordable and available.

Marginal changes would not be enough to stabilise temperatures so that the most substantial risks from climate change can be reduced according to Dimitri Zenghelis, an energy expert at the think-tank, Chatham House[xxv].  Instead it requires a radically transformed policy path through strategic planning as well as technological revolution.  Delayed actions and old technologies can only exacerbate the current problems while reducing growth and curtailing the future market choice.  Khosla is correct in his assertion that the current technologies are not sufficient but unless he unfurls several revolutionary ‘black swans’ it will take more than mere advances in technology to tackle climate change.

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In this article the author questions whether the methods being used to combat domestic terrorism are in fact contrary to the values they seek to protect. Using the case studies of the US and Pakistan, Camille Maubert looks at the discrepancy between democratic ideals and the often scandalous actions of intelligence agencies.

By Camille Maubert, May 15th, 2012

The superiority of democracy as a political system has become paradigmatic. In effect, it is known to be the best way for a state to simultaneously assert authority on its citizens and protect their basic rights from excessive uses of power. Yet, intelligence agencies are democracies’ Achilles’ heel. Scandals – from Watergate to Abu Graib – penetrated the layers of secrecy and exposed the discrepancies between democratic ideals and intelligence activities.

The Democratic Social Contract – a US case study

The democratic social contract is based on the fundamental assumption that the relation between the state and its constituency – and by extension between intelligence agencies and citizens – must be one of reciprocated duties. In other words, the people accept to relinquish their power to the state on the condition that the latter guarantees to protect their rights. As a result, intelligence agencies in democracies are both empowered and restrained in their autonomy. It is the balance between the apparent diverging interests of the executive – who needs to implement policies – and other branches of power – who want to maintain control – which determines the level of democratization of a given intelligence agency.

In order to assert democratic control on intelligence agencies, a number of measures – constitutional, legislative or administrative – can be taken. Those sets of laws are designed not only to punish rogue behaviors but also to shape the agencies’ work environment in order to prevent invasive policies. Such organs of oversight are backed by interests groups like the media, lawmakers and civil society who provide Congress with direct and indirect monitoring in order to provide assurance of legality, proportionality and propriety for activities that are necessarily conducted in a classified environment. Lastly, a crucial element which differentiates agencies in democracies is their separation along the lines of domestic and foreign activities, drawing on the democratic principle of separation of powers. Indeed, it prevents a potential over-centralization of power which could lead to a rapprochement between intelligence agencies and policy-makers and jeopardize the “firewall” which protects the agencies from partisanship.

Intelligence Agencies in Non-democracies – a Pakistan case study

In non-democracies, intelligence agencies are characterised by a high level of autonomy and intrusion in the state’s political life, as well as unchecked powers to collect and disseminate information for their own interests. The absence of safeguards to protect citizen interests from state power is particularly telling in the case of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which has been blamed for its repeated failures to democratise and its unbalanced civil-military relations. In an environment shaped by ethnic, political and religious disorder and insecurity, the army has come to play the main role in safeguarding Pakistan’s interests against internal division and external aggression. As a result, the ISI has become the army’s unrestrained executive arm. Its standard operating procedures – bribery, intimidation, surveillance, assassination – reveal two processes at play: the politicization of the military and militarization of intelligence agencies. In effect, the leitmotiv tension between national interest and citizens’ rights is being solved by prioritizing state security over democratization. Such predominance of the military, for which the ISI acts as an instrument of control, underscores the weakness of the civilian governments and their inability to assert authority over intelligence and military agencies.

Also, one crucial distinction between intelligence agencies in democracies and in non-democracies is the separation of foreign and domestic activities. While democracies implement a strict separation of agencies, which are subjected to different sets of rules, non-democratic states are often characterized by an overlap between domestic and foreign policies. This means that safeguards that normally protect citizens’ privacy and civil liberties are rendered redundant. Theoretically, the different branches of the ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) have separate foreign and domestic agendas, but in practice, because Pakistan’s ruling elite has a very wide definition of the national interest, intelligence agencies deal with an ever expanding set of issues. Indeed, domestic intelligence gathering – which is supposed to be marginal in democratic societies – seems to have taken precedent over the foreign activities, and methods such as kidnappings, harassment, disinformation and torture have been widely used in an attempt to muzzle political actors unfavorable to the regime.

All attempts to reform the intelligence agencies have failed given the entrenched interests of the – corrupt – Pakistani leadership in preserving the agencies’ autonomy. Indeed, most governments have had a hands-off approach to the ISI issue because civilian regimes cannot afford to alienate the military whose support is crucial for its survival. To this day, Pakistan has yet to see any significant move towards democratization, as the crucial role – and funding – given to the ISI in the War on Terror is likely to further cement the discourse on the indispensability of intelligence agencies’ control over state politics, and cause long term damage to the legitimacy of the state.

Wartime: Closing the Gap between Intelligence Agencies in Democracies and in Non-democracies

From a normative standpoint, intelligence agencies in democracies and non-democracies differ in the capacity of civilian governments to assert authority over their activities. Yet, in the context of war – real or perceived – their relations with the state and civil society are put to a test. Because state interests need to be protected, the question of whether agencies should prioritize national security or democratic principles, stability or justice, is at the center of the debate.

The American discourse in the War on Terror systematically draws on democratic values in order to justify its fight against terrorism. According to the CIA, “Ultimately, our fight against terrorism will help foster an international environment where our democratic interests are secure and the values of liberty are respected around the world”. However, scandals regarding disappearances and deaths of detainees in US overseas custody suggest that this discourse is very weak and that it is used as a facade for a more complex reality. Indeed, there has been a clear rapprochement between the executive and intelligence agencies and an erosion of democratic oversight. The US administration created a rationale which could justify the use of un-democratic and unlawful methods by intelligence agencies on the grounds of protecting the homeland and American citizens from an existential threat. This process also creates acceptance of practices that would be unconceivable by a democracy in normal times.

As a result, the Department of Defence was empowered proportionally to the presidential supremacy, and grew closer to the CIA, which has been diverted from its unique intelligence mission and now behaves like an independent actor with increased authority, its own clandestine bureaucracy, and whose un-accountability seems to be institutionalised. This reduced distinction between intelligence and decision-making, and the transformation of the CIA as the direct arm of the executive, is exemplified by the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force, which grants the president and intelligence agencies with broad authority to use necessary power and to secretly gather intelligence on Al Qaeda, opening the way for the abduction, torture and extraordinary rendition. Arguably, the War on Terror corrupted the fragile democratic balance between state security and civil liberties, deforming the very notion of democracy that serves as an infinitely expansible grant of authority; empowering the US to do whatever it wants because by definition its acts on freedom’s behalf.

Lastly, the transnational terrorist threat brings a new dimension to the issue of the separation of intelligence agencies on a foreign vs. domestic basis. Indeed, the War on Terror is intelligence-intensive, which means that the government’s data-mining capabilities must augment considerably, especially given the fact that intelligence agencies target both home-grown and foreign terrorists. In fact, the firewall that separates foreign and domestic activities has been dissolved by executive orders like the Patriotic Act, and the cooperation between foreign intelligence agencies (CIA) and law enforcement agencies (FBI) has increased to enlarge the scope of material available to the services. This new approach to domestic counter-terrorism, some fear, would allow the use of intelligence and military methods against individuals, including citizens, found in the US and fully protected by the Constitution. In a context whereby the 9/11 intelligence failure is omnipresent and in which the government needs to be seen in control, methods used to counter domestic terrorism seem to be at odds with the very society they attempt to protect.

Camille Maubert is an international security researcher based in London. Her work focuses on security, intelligence and counter-insurgency, with a specific interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. She is currently completing a Masters degree at King’s College War Studies Department.

This article first appeared on Open Democracy on May 11th 2012.

By Dan Plesch and David Franco, 14th May, 2012

In a recent article on the progress of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament talks now under way in Vienna, Rebecca Johnson notes that the newly formed coalition of pro-humanitarian states has the potential to become a game changer. Of all that has happened thus far in Vienna the most exciting news is the statement ^↑ by a coalition of 16 non nuclear weapons states, including Switzerland and Norway – an ally of the nuclear weapons states, that nuclear weapons and programmes have catastrophic humanitarian consequences and that they should be abolished.

This initiative is the first involving western states to apply to nuclear weapons the thinking that has moved humanitarian disarmament on land mines, cluster munitions and the arms trade.  President Obama’s ^↑ cry for nuclear disarmament in Prague in 2009 may have had more effect than skeptics and critics believe. But more needs to be done as disarmament has long suffered from some kind of lethargic paralysis. Paraphrasing Richard Moyes and Thomas Nash, if disarmament were like an old PC it would need to be restarted. Indeed, restarting disarmament is a must, and not only at the nuclear level. The consequences would be immense, including a boost to democratic development as highlighted by Andrew Lichterman ^↑ .

So how can disarmament be restarted? To begin with, we need to realize that compared to tackling climate change the technical issues are simple. Unlike combating climate change, disarmament can tremendously benefit from past achievements. We need not reinvent the wheel. Cost-efficiency and time-effectiveness are the road to success, especially in times of global recession.

The dilemma for civil society activists is to find the effective measures within the complex political and technical world of weapon systems. All too often NGOs can become ensnared in this world and lose touch with a wider public. A fabulous example of how to get technical while keeping a radical agenda can be found in the work of the century old global feminist organization, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom whose ‘Reaching Critical Will’ ^↑ is a key resource on the official documentation of disarmament talks.

So how can the majority in the world get some new energy to pressure the nuclear haves? After all, much as we would like to ban the bomb, it’s impossible, right?

The noted communitarian Amitai Etzioni endorsed this approach in a recent message  which referred his supporters to a denunciation of ‘nuclear utopianism’ by one Keith Payne. ( Readers might be interested that the same Payne once wrote in the days of Ronald Reagan that ‘Victory is Possible’ in an all-out nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union).

The ban the bomb majority in the world can use a forgotten but tried and tested means of eliminating a nation’s WMD. This the system of inspections in Iraq from 1991-2003 led by Rolf Ekeus, Hans Blix and Mohammed El Baredei. This effort did its job and there were no WMD in Iraq, despite the slurs of Dick Cheney and the Neo-Cons that legitimated the whole invasion of Iraq on the basis that the inspectors were merely naive UN folk – easy pawns for the evil and sophisticated Saddam.

In our concept for achieving complete world disarmament in the SCRAP ^↑ project we offer precision tools for the most rapid and effective disarmament measures for the use of non-specialists seeking to be able to hold their own with specialists. Unsurprisingly it is not in the interests of those favouring the status quo to advertise most of the good practice we are offering. Older readers may remember that before the end of the Cold War in the Reagan–Gorbachev era great disarmament agreements were made, and that the the UN did complete the WMD disarmament of a quintessential ‘hard case’, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

The ‘best practice’ for governing and eliminating WMD can be found in the mandate and work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC ^↑ ) in Iraq between 1999 and 2003 (UNMOVIC took over from the work of its predecessor UNSCOM ^↑ ) and in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA ^↑ ). Drawing on this work would benefit from more than sixteen years of expertise and on-the-ground experience (UNMOVIC continued to be effective until 2007) with great results in Iraq – despite the calculated denigration of the inspectors that enabled the Iraq war to be launched.

Using the UNMOVIC and IAEA work as a model provides a proven method to do away with the nuclear and other WMDs of all nations, including those of the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) as well as those of the nuclear powers outside the NPT (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea). Research results from VERTIC ^↑ concerning warhead dismantlement should also be integrated into disarmament procedures to render them effective as well in restricting terrorist access to nuclear technology and fissile material stocks.

The nuclear haves always argue that while disarmament is a fine ideal it is not practical. They also tend to argue that it is unenforceable and unverifiable. However, when faced with the idea of having to go through the processes that disarmed Iraq, officials from these countries tend to make the opposite argument – that the Iraq processes are too intrusive! Arguing to apply the Iraq inspections globally would not just be practical but presents a delicious irony that can perhaps foster further support from the wider public. Non nuclear weapons states, especially the more vocal ones, could therefore incorporate this argument in their demands for the denuclearization of the haves.

They should also intensify their offensive by demanding more transparency from the nuclear powers. Enhancing confidence security building processes, regionally and globally, can only result in more trust and less security dilemma. This and calls for universal adherence to the Open Skies Treaty ^↑ would corner nuclear weapons states as they run out of excuses to maintain their nuclear arsenals. The Open Skies Treaty permits aerial inspections of military activity across the Euro-Atlantic region and could be extended globally. Here again the work of UNMOVIC and IAEA could be of unprecedented value as they join to coordinate potential cooperative projects amongst the nuclear states as proposed by the International Panel on Fissile Materials ^↑ .

Technology and science will play an ever increasing role in disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and international security. Drones and automated planes could be used for peaceful not bellicose purposes – as is already happening in certain parts of the world. New ideas are necessary, new thinking is primordial, but most of the work has already been done. One may cite for example what a senior Obama official, Rose Gottemoeller ^↑ has coined “public verification challenge”. As states engage in disarmament talks and action citizens can get involved in helping them meet their reduction commitments.

The 2012 round of non-proliferation talks in Vienna is drawing to a close. Divisions persist but the non nuclear weapons states have the chance to continue to push nuclear weapons states towards denuclearization. Attention will now shift to the coming NATO summit in Chicago where the alliance clings to its Cold War strategies. Civil society’s role is crucial – coalescing and cooperating is the way ahead. Restarting disarmament will be achieved not by reinventing the wheel but by building on the best practices of the past and present times.

By Dan Plesch and David Franco, 14th May, 2012

About the authors: Dr Dan Plesch is the Director of the SOAS Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (CISD) and a longtime disarmament activist. David Franco is a research assistant in the Disarmament and Globalisation programme at the CISD where he also coordinates SCRAP.

In an April 2012 issue of Open Magazine, the editor Manu Joseph wrote a provocatively titled essay, “Sorry, Kashmir is Happy”. Unsurprisingly, this article became the subject of heated discussion. In this InPEC article, the author – Sualeh Keen, a Kashmiri writer, poet and cultural critic – brings some perspective to the issue.  

By Sualeh Keen, 7th May 2012

Trauma in Kashmir is like a heritage building—the elite fight to preserve it. ‘Don’t forget,’ is their predominant message, ‘Don’t forget to be traumatised.’ They want the wound of Kashmir to endure because the wound is what indicts India for the many atrocities of its military. This might be a long period of calm, but if the wound vanishes, where is the justice? India simply gets away with all those rapes, murders and disappearances? So nothing disgusts them more than these words: ‘Normalcy returns to Kashmir’; ‘Peace returns to the Valley’; ‘Kashmiris want to move on’.

When Manu Joseph wrote these words in the Open Magazine article ‘Sorry, Kashmir Is Happy’, it was but expected that ‘they’ would get disgusted and outraged. ‘They’ are the intellectual writers and online activists that constitute the second generation of Kashmiri Muslim separatists, the first generation being the Pakistan-trained mujahideen who fought with AK-47s, grenades, rockets, and bombs against ‘Hindu India’ in search of Azadi (literally, ‘freedom’). While originally Azadi meant the valley’s accession to Pakistan, after the Pakistan-sponsored armed uprising in the early 90’s failed and with the onset of internal turmoil in Pakistan, the meaning of Azadi has shifted from accession to Pakistan to independence from both India and Pakistan. This demand is largely confined to the Kashmiri Muslim community of the Kashmir valley, while finding little or no support in the Jammu and Ladakh regions of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) State. Even in the valley, opinions are divided in favour of independence, accession to Pakistan, greater autonomy or self-rule within the Indian union, and political status quo.

That the people of Kashmir have suffered in these two decades of militancy is an undeniable fact. Terrorism imposes a price on everyone including the non-combatants. In Kashmir, even a failed grenade attack can make life a nightmare for the people living or working in a locality—through crackdowns, identification parades, frisking, beatings, interrogation, torture—making the people resent this abnormal intrusion of fear, hurt, and death into their lives. Their resentment turns to hostility, which takes the shape of resistance to the State, and to military and paramilitary personnel, because that is all that they can react to. It is difficult to open a front against shadowy enemies (terrorists) who don’t wear uniforms that would identify them and who can take anyone down anywhere with no accountability whatsoever. This threat of random violence is what makes terrorism so successful. And when the State responds forcefully with counter-terrorism measures, again, the special powers accorded to the armed forces pave the way for the abuse of those powers. So, not just the costs of terrorism, the subsequent costs of counter-terrorism are also borne by ordinary people caught in the crossfire. Ironically, the violent Azadi movement and the misery it unleashed in society provided the raw material for the new generation of largely non-violent separatists to justify their demand for Azadi. Towards this effect, the separatists base their political narrative entirely on the “oppression and human rights violation by the armed forces of India.” While seeking justice for the fake encounters, custodial murders, etc. committed by the men in uniform (armed forces), the separatists are silent about the murders, rapes, abductions and extortions committed by the so-called mujahideen. In other words, there is an attempt to distort or redefine truth in a way that the effect becomes the cause.

After the mass mobilization during the Amarnath Land Row in summer 2008, the separatists have become louder and shriller. Over the past few years, there has been a significant shift in the position of the separatist intellectual ranks. Those who were ‘balanced’, ‘moderate’, and ‘diplomatic’ have suddenly taken a more extremist position and become more vocal in their tone. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, in an extremist camp, the loudest voices are readily hailed as the voices with ‘real pain’ for the people. As such, many formerly objective and moderate voices are becoming louder by the day, so as to be seen as the ‘legitimate’ representatives of the people. But secondly and more importantly, this pandemonium is strategic from their side. The separatists have for the first time in many years, after they picked up guns, been able to garner some sort of wider public attention and interest in Kashmir, and begun to extract solidarity from other groups in India and the West—mainly Leftist groups, which in my opinion may be well-intentioned but have a severe lack of understanding of the local complexities of the issue. The separatists feel that for the first time in years they have gained the moral upper hand on India (during the terrorist phase of this movement, morality was thrown to the wind) and they want to drive this in every time, not letting their guard down ever for once, not admitting any slippage, no room for doubt, no room for self-critique, no room to entertain those who exhibit less than complete service to the cause. This is a war that they need to win at all costs and they are encouraged by imagined signs of victory. However, not all of them personally think that Azadi is achievable, but they hope to achieve something lesser with this posturing and by playing hardball. But they dare not declare their scepticism about the achievability of Azadi publicly, lest it be seen as a sell out by the separatist crowd.

It is easy to see why ‘peace’ and ‘normalcy’ is their kryptonite. Last year, lest a literary festival ‘Harud’ that was to be held in Kashmir be seen as a ‘sign of normalcy’, the shrill online Azadi supporters, including a few pro-azadi Kashmiri writers based abroad, launched a boycott movement that succeeded in convincing the organisers to cancel the event. But sorry, Kashmir is normal and happy. Anybody who visits Kashmir will agree that the scene has changed drastically from 2010; not just in public space but in private conversations as well. “Azadi is gone!” is the verdict of almost all the people one meets – in Kashmir’s villages and in towns. What are the people happy about? Happiness is a relative term. The people are happy that, after the three successive years of unrest (2008 to 2010) that brought life to a standstill, they can breathe again in a free atmosphere, live a normal life again, attend to their businesses, go to their educational institutions, without stone-pelting protestors taking to the streets, without deaths, without protracted shutdowns and curfews imposed by the separatists and the State respectively.

I have often criticized the extremism of the Azadi supporters, who, after the brouhaha over Manu Joseph’s article, can be called “The Unhappiness Factory”. The separatists are only interested in exaggerating the figures of victims, demonizing India, and exhorting people to make sacrifices at the altar of Azadi, while acting as fire starters or as torch-bearing cheerleaders standing outside the fire or as pall bearers and mourners. The most notable characteristic of the workers of the “The Unhappiness Factory” is that they are not content in seeing human rights violations (HRVs) being put to an end or seeing that victims get justice. No, they want nothing like that to happen, because justice for the victims and an end to HRVs would portray “Endia” (India) as a responsive and responsible “Demon-crazy” (Democracy), and that will undermine and devalue the sacrifices of the martyrs. They are very clear that they want nothing less than secession from India, even if India’s human rights record improves to become the best in the world, which is fine, because people may seek secession from a larger country for one reason or the other. But the aspiration of which ‘people’ do the separatists represent? The separatists are unable to or refuse to accept the hard reality of the divided opinion of the people of J&K State.

The cumulative positive contribution of the separatists towards the betterment of Kashmir draws a blank. Rather than supporting, the separatists can be seen pooh-poohing the local movements about RTI, corruption, environment, etc. They even try to morally pressurize victims against taking compensation from the State. These “Einsteins” think that switching off and rebooting the main power switch would make every malfunctioning appliance in the house function properly on its own, miraculously, as soon as the light of Azadi dawns. That Kashmir may on the contrary get plunged into darkness is a risk this vocal minority is willing to take on behalf of every Kashmiri, even those who don’t agree with them, because according to them “Azadi is for everybody,” notwithstanding the differing opinions of some Kashmiri Muslims and religious and ethnic minorities in the valley, the entire Pandit community that fled away from the violent Islamist Azadi movement in 1990 and the people of the Jammu and Ladakh regions of the J&K State. And until thy “Free-doom” has come, every other enterprise in the valley should be suspended, cynically mocked, or termed as inconsequential. Only Azadi is of value and only the separatist knows what is good for the people whether they agree to it or not.

Yoginder Sikand, in his candid article ‘Why I Gave Up On ‘Social Activism’, gave an apt description of such negative disseminators of unhappiness:

“The hatred that often passed for ‘progressivism’ in ‘activist’ circles was truly astounding, and I fell lock-stock-and-barrel for it. One was trained only to look for the negative in every nook and corner, and, if it didn’t exist where one looked, to imagine and fervently believe that it did. One’s whole life became one great protest. Protesting against real or imaginary injustice was almost the only respectable thing to do. It was as if there was nothing at all good in the world to celebrate, and even as if celebration and joy were themselves an ‘unnecessary diversion’ or a ‘unaffordable luxury’ that truly committed ‘activists’ had to carefully shun. That explained why many ‘progressives’ and ‘radicals’ were horrifically negative as human beings, many of them being irritatingly obnoxious, judgemental, cantankerous, dour and sullen. Their penchant for protest made them only more so. Believing themselves to be somehow morally superior to others because they had, so they thought, devoted themselves to the ‘oppressed’ made many of them painfully sanctimonious and proud.”

Some of the shrillest proponents of Azadi operate online from urban Kashmir, elsewhere in India, or from abroad. Beneath their veneer of Leftist ‘progressive’ and ‘liberal’ word salads resides a foundation of xenophobic regional-religious chauvinism they can barely conceal and is hardly an improvement over that of their gun-wielding Islamist predecessors. Using what is essentially a Leftist jargon, they warn of the “occupying forces” using “progress, development and peace” to undermine the Azadi movement, even though a better education or a career in a peaceful setting is what took many of them to places outside the valley. Those who warn of the “capitalist consumer carrot” should go to a Kashmiri wedding and Waazwan (wedding feast—no carrots on the menu) where ordinary Kashmiris can teach them (and the rest of India) a thing or two about consumerism that is very much indigenous! It becomes a futile task of imposing and seeking to universalize the unfettered-capitalism debate (legitimate in other contexts) to a localized phenomenon and to individual choices to the point of absurdity. It is extremely patronizing and hypocritical of the computer-savvy city slicker or a non-resident Kashmiri to tell people that they did not need decent jobs and infrastructure.

No wonder, Manu Joseph’s interview of the top ranking Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officer from the valley, Dr. Shah Faesal (which forms the backdrop of his ‘Sorry, Kashmir Is Happy’ article) was harshly criticized of by the online separatists, which compelled the target of criticism to respond in a Facebook group (Dr. Shah Faesal’s comments on Facebook group ‘Moderate Voice Of Jammu, Kashmir And Ladakh’ can be found here and here). The separatists conveniently turned a blind eye to the pioneering work done in the area of RTI (Right To Information) by Dr. Shah Faesal. Incidentally, one of his first RTI cases was about finding the whereabouts of a civilian picked up by the Border Security Forces in 1990 and never seen again. But the separatists are not interested in all these ‘charades’ of justice or making heroes out of individuals who work within the ‘system’. How dare Dr. Shah Faesal say that to love peace and normalcy is commonsense and commonsense is winning in Kashmir.

When Manu Joseph criticizes the non-resident online separatists, it makes him sound more like a writer who is just getting to know Kashmir. By no means are a few non-resident Kashmiris the only intellectual cheerleaders of street violence and ideologues of separatist sentiment. The very same Kashmiri youth residing in Kashmir whom Manu Joseph interacted with and who want peace, normalcy and KFC in Kashmir are the ones who become votaries of street violence and anti-State sentiment. The reason cannot be generalized because each person has his own motives. Reasons could range from some young people going for a radical chic image, the emotional contagion of the vocal separatists, guilt-laden psychodynamics, occupational hazards of being an aspiring journalist in the valley who wants to be noticed, of being a victim of the ‘victimhood’ propaganda, being paid or instructed to write with a certain slant, not to mention the instant fanfare among mutual back-patting Azadi supporters. Indeed, the main bulk of the output of “The Unhappiness Factory” is home-made and not manufactured on the laptops of non-resident ‘intellectual stone-pelters’.

Also, Manu Joseph’s article is to be faulted for doing a superficial symptomatic diagnosis. It does not address why the same people who want normalcy now, were in the streets three years in a row, and, given a suitable stimulus, may well come out on the streets again in the future. The article does not offer solutions for ensuring that normalcy is not disturbed by the forces of unhappiness in future. Yes, many people have moved on, but to where?

The ball is in the State’s court and it is up to the State to ensure that the dividends of peace are not squandered away with its habitual apathy, complacency and inefficiency. I recommend that Manu Joseph’s article be read in conjunction with the nuanced piece by Praveen Swami and by Ajai Shukla, which I feel should be taken seriously by the State. The committed workers of “The Unhappiness Factory”, a vocal minority, are not the same as the majority of Kashmiris. Many of the latter also have no love lost for India due to the high-handedness of security forces and the political machinations of the Centre, but they simply wish that the rule of gun would end and they could live life normally, like people anywhere in the world, including India. While “The Unhappiness Factory” is inconsolable, the majority of Kashmiris will settle for something less than Azadi or make do without political restructuring. They do not appear to be so keen any longer on utilizing the blood of martyrs but in seeing that blood is shed no more. The State needs to address the desires of these people rather than a loony fringe.

In a nutshell, the State also needs to get a move on. After all, “The Unhappiness Factory” will do what it does best and that is not going to change, perhaps never. Oppositional politics derives its raison d’être from the wrongs of others, and if the state is farsighted and forthright, the “Factory” will shut down on its own. In any case, negativity has diminishing returns, and finally the quest for happiness and affirmation of life wins the day.

So here is to happiness and normalcy. Here is to life!

Sualeh Keen is a Kashmiri writer, poet, graphic artist, and cultural critic. He works as a marketing communications professional. He created the Facebook group “Moderate Voice Of Jammu, Kashmir And Ladakh” as a platform to promote dialogue between various stakeholders of the State.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect InPEC’s editorial position.

Also Read: Heyns, the Final Straw for AFSPA in India? - This article discusses the controversial Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) of India. A United Nations Human Rights Council report is set to be released on this in the near future.

Bibliography

• Sorry, Kashmir Is Happy’ by Manu Joseph, Open Magazine, 21 April 2012.
• “Why Should Suicide Bombers Buy Life Insurance?” by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics blog.
• ‘Victory For A Vocal Minority’, Outlook Magazine, 29 August 2011.
• ‘Why I Gave Up On Social Activism’ by Yoginder Sikand, Countercurrents.org, 19 April 2012.
• ‘Face of Hope Reflects Calm in Kashmir’ by Manu Joseph, The New York Times, 29 February 2012.
• ‘In Kashmir, some hot potatoes’ by Praveen Swami, The Hindu, 23 April 2012.
• ‘Charging ahead in Kashmir’ by Ajai Shukla, Business Standard, 1 May 2012.

In this essay the author attacks the idea that modern conflicts are more driven by economic motivations than those in the past. Romantic ideals of gentlemanly European conflicts have masked the harsh realities of war. Even in the most egregious cases of greed and ‘warlording’, the political motivations can never be fully amputated from the criminal behaviour.

If modern conflict is to be understood the language of ‘new wars’ must be avoided. In the case of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the concept of economic determinism was taken to the extreme and led to the subsequent collapse of the peace. Future peacemakers must keep this simple message in mind: money is not the only form of power.

By Jack Hamilton, 4th May, 2012

The Worst of Times, The Best of Times

In 2007 the Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers described the links between economics and politics in conflict regions as ‘something out of Dickens: you talk to international relations experts and it’s the worst of times. Then you talk to potential investors and it’s one of the best of all times’ . This idea that modern warfare has evolved into a new era in which economic motivations have overtaken political ambitions has become popularised in the post-Cold War era. The notion has led Carl von Clausewitz’s aphorism to be rephrased to claim that ‘war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means’ . This substitution of ‘politics’ in favour of ‘economics’ poses the question: have economic incentives created a situation in which there is now more to war than winning?

Of course it is dangerously reductionist to divide economic and political motives absolutely and no theorist ultimately falls into that trap. If this were the case military conflicts would be most common in nations where poverty is at its most abject and the reality is not as simple as this. The problem is that an overemphasis on economic incentives for war can oversimplify the motivations behind modern conflicts. Economic motivations should themselves be seen as multifaceted and in constant interaction with socio-political factors to avoid essentialism. A more useful practice to analyse the cause of modern conflicts is to attempt to find predispositions that can lead to war. These predispositions are a combination of economic, political and social factors that include: state failure, dependency upon primary commodity exports, regionalisation and the role of diasporas.

In order to evaluate the claim that ‘new wars’ should be seen as a continuation of economics by other means, the concept of ‘new wars’ must first be addressed. If these ‘new wars’ are an intensification of economic motivations it is necessary to investigate how this is manifested. The role of globalisation is key to this as it is seen as a facilitator for the more violent and economically driven facets of ‘new wars’: shadow states and the actions of warlords. The data supporting these theories will then be evaluated to determine whether it is useful to essentialise the motivations of the conflicts as being a continuation of economics.

What is meant by the term ‘New Wars’?

At which point did ‘new’ wars become ‘new’? Was it at the end of the Second World War or perhaps at the end of the Cold War ? Martin Van Creveld points to the rise in ‘low intensity conflicts’ that began in the period of decolonisation and which continues today as a result of the inability of the newly independent states to maintain a monopoly over the use of force . Others put the threshold at the end of the Cold War using controversial labels such as ‘post modern wars’ or the term coined by Mary Kaldor, ‘new wars’ . If the exact origins of ‘new wars’ are disputed it necessitates an analysis of which factors constitute the conflicts in order to determine whether they are truly a continuation of economics by other means. In order to do this it is first necessary to outline the positions of the key theorists on ‘new wars’ and their ties to economic determinism.

Paul Collier’s theory of ‘greed’ posits that social and political grievances are merely a front that is provided by rebel organisations to justify the economic motivations for warfare. The causes of politics are therefore framed in this argument as being a form of ‘international public relations’ as they are formulated as a justification for predation . According to Herfried Münkler, ‘new wars’ can be differentiated from ‘old wars’ by three factors: the privatisation of warfare; the asymmetry of military force and affiliated guerrilla tactics; the atomisation of violence (decentralised conflicts). He derives from this that ethnic and religious oppositions are not the causes of wars but rather reinforce the underlying economic motivations of corruptible political elites . Economics therefore becomes the key motivator in ‘new wars’ as older forms of grievance become superseded by greed. This economic emphasis is echoed by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman who propose that economic motives are not just crucial for instigating conflicts but for sustaining them through an ‘alternate system of profit, power and protection’ . The dominant theme of these arguments is that in ‘new wars’ economic motives take precedence over political objectives both in instigating and sustaining the conflicts. However, the question remains as to how these motivations translate to the way in which the wars are conducted.

The general assertion is that the new conflicts are characterised by an increase in violence and duration . The ‘new wars’ concept has four main themes with regards to the nature of war: (1) the severity of battle in civil conflicts is increasing (2) the number of civilians killed in these conflicts is increasing (3) the number of civilians being displaced in these conflicts is increasing (4) the ratio of civilians killed to combatants is increasing . The increased economic motivation permeates the conduct of warfare through techniques of pillaging and the exploitation of labour. These conclusions have been drawn from a plethora of case studies and the conclusions have been hotly contested but the assertions are crucial for the idea of ‘new wars’. According to ‘new wars’ theorists the increased influence of economic motivations have created a clear shift away from older forms of conflict which were underpinned by political grievance. This has allegedly manifested created a more violent and decentralised style of warfare characterised by an increase in civilian casualties. It is therefore important to determine how the transformation in global economics has come to be intrinsically tied to these ‘new’ forms of barbarism.

The ‘New’ Economic Incentives for War and Their Manifestations

‘Globalisation’ is the term that is generally used to describe the new economic trends that are said to underpin the ‘new wars’ of the postcolonial and post-Cold War era. International capital flows and regionalisation as a result of the liberalisation of markets have facilitated a comparatively inexpensive form of warfare, supported by ‘shadow states’ and conducted in some cases by warlords.

The term ‘globalisation’ is highly imprecise and needs to be defined. Susan Willett puts forth the ambiguous definition that it is the ‘widening and deepening of economic, political, social and cultural interdependence and interconnectedness’ . This includes changes in global economics such as the greater mobility and ease of access to capital and finance, improved communication and transportation as well as partial deregulation of industry. The term has taken on a role of describing a period of universal and irreversible change that has enabled a shift to ‘new wars’. Global economics have transmogrified the dynamics of conflict through financial liberalisation, industry deregulation and the ease of private capital flows and as the old forms of European wars burnt out, new forms continued as a result of ‘shadow globalisation’.

‘Shadow globalisation’ has had an indirect negative impact on some societies as it has contributed to a burgeoning ‘cleavage between rich and poor [that] represents a deep form of structural violence’ . Thus, Willett’s description leaves out several key features of globalisation which have furthered the notion that it has helped create and exacerbate civil war. Some parts of the world economy have failed to benefit from globalisation and have in fact become victims of it due to an increase in poverty. There is an unambiguous connection between economic globalisation, socioeconomic dislocation and the outbreak of violence . New technologies that have aided globalisation have also helped to facilitate the transmission of economic and social tensions which can then lead to instability. The liberalisation of markets and economically porous borders have therefore facilitated the creation of the ‘shadow states’ which perpetuate the conflicts.

The technologies of states have sprung up in areas where no officially recognised state exists. These manifestations of power have been labelled ‘shadow states’ and help to explain the relationship between economic corruption and politics . Globalisation provided opportunities for non-state actors within weak states to connect to global trading networks and without state interference and capitalise upon the lack of states control on resource extraction . William Reno contends that further misdirection of state funding through networks of patronage leads to the creation of a ‘shadow state’ that significantly increases the risk of civil war. ‘Shadow states’ are therefore the political manifestations of clandestine economic transactions. Liberia provides an example of how a state may collapse politically but extend its economic influence as an informal economy comes to dominate. Every Liberian warlord of any substance had alliances with foreign businessmen and at least one foreign government . To use Summers’ words, globalisation is the best of times (for those benefitting from the kleptocracy) and the worst of times (for those who desired political coherence).

A further incentive for conducting war for economic benefit is the low costs. The ‘new wars’ are cheap to wage as they are generally fought with light weapons and use civilian infrastructure. Furthermore, the troops themselves are inexpensive to recruit and can fund themselves through the use of extortion and pillaging . The availability of troops is bolstered by the availability of child soldiers in some regions, such as Sierra Leone, as it is a ‘rational choice’ for them due to economic incentives. The exclusion from regular economic activity, hunger and lack of opportunities can help drive them towards those waging the war: the warlords.

Warlords are defined by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz as ‘businessmen of war’ who use ‘violence as the main instrument of their economic activity’ . For warlords war is an economically attractive proposition as they can control distribution of costs as well as the privatisation of its profits. Violence therefore becomes a means of income and political conflicts can transform into conflicts that are sustained by economic motivations. In Afghanistan the gradual transition to an ‘open economy’ permitted the growing production of raw opium to yield considerable profits on the trade routes of the eastern Mediterranean. This trade in illegal goods allowed Afghan warlords to access global markets, even if this took place through a ‘shadow economy’.

This state of affairs incentivises the use of violence to allow for criminal activity that would be otherwise unacceptable during peacetime. Such economic determinism is perhaps best demonstrated by examples of collusion in which warring parties forgo their supposed political motivations in favour of collaborating for mutual economic benefit: in Angola during the war, UNITA traded weaponry with government forces . Collusion is a prime example of the theory that ‘new wars’ are a continuation of economics by other means as the warmongers are willing to eschew any former political motivation when profits can be made, even if this entails the mutual benefit of the opposition in an ongoing conflict.

‘New Wars’: The Continuation of ‘Old Wars’?

The aforementioned studies provide some evidence for the theory that new wars are a continuation of economics by other means. Private aspirations to wealth and power, reasons of state and identity politics predicated upon shared value all contributed to the ‘new’ manifestations of conflict. However, the novelty of the factors that are said to constitute new wars have been contested. Intense conflicts with mass civilian death rates, international funding and mercenary armies have not been confined to the post-Cold War civil wars. In fact, examples of such barbarism can be found in seventeenth century Europe.

Commanders in the Thirty Years War in the Germanic states frequently lost control of their troops while they were engaged in warfare. During these instances there were no limits to the cruelty or violence that was perpetrated against civilians such as the greed and bloodlust that characterised the attacks on Magdebug in 1631. In these conflicts there was no intended swift military resolution as war itself became part of an economic life that is no longer under political control or subject to political limitation. Furthermore, subsidies were received from external sources such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands which helped to prolong the war and shift it from being an internal conflict to a transnational conflagration. The participants were not patriotic soldiers but professional mercenaries who had served previously in several theatres of war as well as lower classes seeking a way to make a living . These characteristics bear a striking resemblance to the ways in which ‘new wars’ are conducted. In this case, economic motivations take precedence and ultimately lead to a much more brutal form of conflict that has a devastating impact upon civilians. The question must therefore be asked: are ‘new wars’ a continuation of economics by the same means?

The answer to this is no. A recent meta-analysis has demonstrated that the activities may actually have gone into decline in the post-Cold War epoch and that the initial claims were merely based upon case studies and anecdotal evidence . Instead, Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg and Jonathan Hall have conducted a meta-analysis of these factors to demonstrate that the human impact of civil conflict has actually diminished in the post-Cold War age. Battle severity, if measured in battle deaths, has significantly declined while violence against civilians has also decreased. The patterns for civilian displacement are slightly more complicated as there is an increase in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War but more recent analysis shows that there has been a decrease in forced migration flows.

If the characteristics that support the idea of ‘new wars’ are inherently flawed, there is a need to investigate the claims of economic determinism in the modern era beyond case studies and anecdotal evidence. The economic motivations remain significant from the Thirty Years War to modern conflicts but the manifestations of this are not as widespread as analysis based on case studies would imply. This suggests that economic motivations are not a single entity and can manifest themselves in a variety of ways depending upon the socio-political contexts in which they emerge.

The Importance of Multifaceted Motivations

Collier makes the bold assertion that social and political grievances are merely a front that is provided by rebel organisations to justify the economic motivations for warfare. This research was the result of quantitative statistical analysis based upon probabalistic statements of conflict risk. It therefore fails to take account of descriptions of specific real-world instances that preoccupy policymakers . The methodology allows for broad generalisations to be made predicated upon case studies rather than explaining the whole picture. For example, it fails to differentiate between the varying motivations for such ‘greed’. Without a full analysis of the motivations the ‘continuation of economics’ theory is too limited to be useful in identifying possible solutions to the conflicts it seeks to explain.

There is a need to identify which groups may be impervious to economic sanctions as a result of ‘shadow economies’ and groups that participate in such economies out of necessity and whose livelihoods may suffer as a result of the predatory actions of others. The costs and benefits of war are borne differently by different participants in war economies and so too are the costs and benefits of peace . For example, Nepal is an impoverished nation with few natural resources therefore placing it outside the model for resource warfare. Instead, the economic incentives for conflict are derived from ethnically based frustrations, inequality, corruption and the democratic deficit. There is still evidence of groups resorting extortion and plunder but this has come as a result of desperation rather than a predatory action . It is reductionist to conflate such activities to be commensurate with the plundering of warlords as these groups are resorting to economic means of warfare for their mere survival.

The question of motivations becomes crucial when looking at conflict resolution. If the perceived motivation is incorrect, it is likely that any peace proposals by third parties will ultimately fail. This was demonstrated by the failure of the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999. The peace pardoned all combatants of the RUF in Sierra Leone and allowed them continued access to the nation’s diamonds. The motivations of the RUF were deemed to be predatory and therefore the pardon and the diamonds should have acted as an appeasement. However, instead of contentment, the RUF launched an attack on UN peacekeepers and attempted to capture full political power in Freetown . Thus, even where economic predation takes on its most egregious forms, the political dimensions of the conflict are never entirely amputated from the criminal behaviour.

A further variation in motivation can be detected when conflicts are broken down into various types. Civil wars and conflicts in developing countries are not the same everywhere and even if economic motivations underlay them all, they are never isolated from social and political factors. Separatist conflicts are generally explained using identity politics as the variable whereas insurgencies tend to involve the wholesale capture of state power. However, economic motives were clearly evident in the secessionist attempts of the Katangan movement in the copper-rich regions of the DRC and similar desires can be found in the ambitions of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in the oil-soaked south-west of Nigeria. Each case therefore needs to be analysed individually to determine the precise motives. Reducing a conflict to Clausewitzian political motivations can direct a conflict resolution towards accidently funding warlords with no desire for peace while a similar economic essentialism can create misdirected payoffs with the same consequences. Motivations are never static and conflict dynamics are incredibly fluid. The longer that a war sustains itself, the more likely it will be that it will encapsulate a wider range of motivations. For example, the civil war in Angola oscillated between political and economic motives at varying stages .

Economic motivations must be seen as fluid and multifaceted in order to establish the origins and the reasons for the continuation of a conflict so that possible solutions can be reached. It is too myopic to claim that economic motivations, whether predatory or not, take precedence in every conflict. Instead each conflict must be interrogated individually to understand the complex interplay between economics and socio-political factors. A more useful way of analysing conflicts is to derive clear predispositions that may lead to the forms of ‘greed’ conflict which engender the most brutal forms of violence.

Predisposition to Conflict: Which Factors Help to Facilitate Wars of ‘Greed’?

The fluid and multifaceted motivations for conflict mean that it is impossible to determine that any single factor is more useful than another when describing conflicts in general terms. Instead it is more efficacious to draw up a small number of predispositions to the brutal forms of conflict which are described by the theorists of ‘new wars’. The conditions of state failure, dependency upon primary commodity exports, regionalisation and remittances can all contribute to the proliferation of predatory players.

State failure is a critically high risk factor for civil war. Mohammed Ayoob claims that the erosion of legitimate authority and the lack of a state monopoly on the means of coercion within its territory is the best explanation for the outbreak of civil wars in developing countries. However, the relationship between state failure and civil war is cyclical rather than a linear progression from one to the other . For example, the rise of the shadow state in Angola may have primarily been the result of rather than the cause of the internal conflict. Political factors such as a lack of governance therefore contributed to the outbreak of war in this case rather than economic factors. Furthermore in Kosovo, Nepal and Sierra Leone the outbreak of violence occurred at a time when both the legitimacy and the military capacity of the states were severely diminished.

Alice Hills argues that warlords and militias can only exist in states in which structure, authority, power, law and civil order have fragmented . The devolution of power from the centre to the periphery enables the non-state actors to provide their own form of security and act on their own behalf beyond the realm of the coercive force of the state. Insecurity then begets insecurity as the planting and harvesting of crops, for example, stops as a response to the conflict thereby exacerbating the economic impact upon the civilian population. Once again state failure comes before economic opportunism occurs in this case rather than economic factors begetting state collapse.

The most important predisposition according to Paul Collier is that of dependency upon primary commodity exports. He claims that objective measures of social grievance in fact have no systematic effect on the risk of conflict. Instead the key factors are economic: dependency upon primary commodity exports and low national income . These primary commodities can be virtually worthless until introduced to the globalised marketplaces. De Beers has a history of obtaining ‘conflict diamonds’ for resale in western nations while the main commodity in the war in the DRC was coltan. This was for use in mobile phones which could not be made in the nation . These commodities have little intrinsic worth within the state but when exported to the global markets value is added. The idea that greed motivates all of the ‘new wars’ and that grievance has a minimal effect is an overstatement but his evidence does suggest that there is at least a strong correlation between a dependency upon primary commodity exports and conflict.

A further risk factor is regionalisation and the subsequent erosion of territorial sovereignty. The fate of Sierra Leone and Liberia are interlinked as demonstrated by Charles Taylor’s support for the RUF insurgency and the intervention of the regional hegemon, Nigeria, via the ECOMOG peacekeeping effort. The regionalisation of conflicts is significant as it permits tensions in one state to facilitate the outbreak of conflict nearby. It does not necessarily require violence. For example, Kabila’s insurgency was initially triggered by refugee flows from neighbouring states . In this case the pre-existing grievances were mobilised by warlords demonstrating once again that socio-political factors were the spark rather than the over-simplistic explanation of a dependency upon primary commodity exports.

The role of remittances from diasporas can also change the opportunity structure to favour conflict. Politicised diasporas such as those funding the Tamils and Ibrahim Rugova’s Kosovo Republic helped to sustain the unrest. Communal solidarity helped bolster the ‘shadow economies’ of these groups as well as providing them with increased international social capital . However, the global currents can reverse as quickly as they form. The flow of arms and funds from the United States that helped to bolster the PIRA in Northern Ireland is a thing of the past which means that the terrorist organisations are forced to raise money through smuggling drugs and extortion. At least two of these recent economic efforts have been disrupted by MI5 sting operations . While the economic manifestations of the conflict, (smuggling and extortion) remain, the international social capital of the dissident organisations has been diminished. As states gain legitimacy and become stronger, the shadow economies become more difficult to sustain due to the lack of insecurity, as shown by the example of Northern Ireland.

Each of these individual cases demonstrate different motives being used at different times while the predisposition remains a risk factor. There is no set checklist which every new conflict will pass through before exploding into a brutal attack on civilian populations. It is important to recognise that the aforementioned predispositions are also the result of a combination of economic, social and political factors which have manifested themselves in different ways at different times. This highlights the fluidity of the conflicts in question and invalidates the argument that there can be any single determinant behind them while remaining negligent of other factors.

Conclusion

Economic incentives and opportunities are not the only or the primary source of the ‘new wars’ but instead interact to varying degrees with social and political grievances and security issues to trigger or sustain hostilities. Even where economic predation takes on its most egregious forms, the political dimensions of the conflict are never entirely amputated from the criminal behaviour. There is no doubt that some new conflicts are driven primarily by economics and will continue to be in the near future. Two threats which meet the criteria of the predispositions set out are the possible problems regarding the division of oil if there is a division between Northern and Southern Sudan and the new iron ore extraction deals in Sierra Leone . However, there is still a need to take other factors into account as well as combining case studies with broader meta-analysis to avoid oversimplifications. This will enable us to better understand the multifarious motivations behind the modern conflicts learn from the mistakes of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

Jack Hamilton is a Northern Irish journalist and researcher based in Washington, D.C. and London. He reports on energy, security and African politics for Sky News in addition to his research on West African security and conflict resolution. He can be followed on Twitter @jmhamilton

Email: jack [at] inpec.in

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