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In this essay, the author reviews the Sino-US relationship during the George W. Bush administration. Specifically, this paper discusses whether or not the countries should be viewed as strategic partners or competitors.

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By Anna Rabin, 1 February, 2012

Whilst fluctuating during the early stages of George W. Bush’s presidency, China and the United States (US) maintained a fairly stable strategic partnership throughout the two terms of the Bush administration. The idea of a strategic partnership was advocated through the signing of the Sino-US Joint Statement during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin. The document set the foundations for the two countries to ‘work together to set up a constructive strategic partnership.’ This essay will discuss the transition in the Sino-US relationship from Clinton to Bush and the status of the relationship throughout Bush’s presidency.

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In this article the author assesses the view that democracies can never be successful in fighting a counterinsurgency. Taking the case studies of Afghanistan and Northern Ireland it is clear that the power of the propaganda war inhibits the capacities of democracies to act freely and that every military leader must understand that their actions will be perceived as an act of political warfare.


By Jack Hamilton, 16 Nov, 2011

General Sir Gerald Templer claimed of counterinsurgency that “the shooting side of this business is only twenty five percent of the trouble”[i]. Due to the nature of democracies and modern warfare, counterinsurgency may well now be one hundred percent political.

The political vulnerability of accountable democratic leaders, omniscient media presence and the potential propaganda exploitation of all combat actions mean that military officials at every level now need to understand that their every action can be construed as an act of political warfare in which political outcomes are more important than battlefield success. This issue creates huge problems for democracies when engaging in counterinsurgencies but can also open up opportunities.

This essay will posit that the inherent challenges that democracies face when engaging in counterinsurgencies can be turned into opportunities by using the democratic nature of the state, the local population and the open media to their advantage. However, these practices have their limits and the overemphasis on any one of these factors has the potential to seriously undermine the counterinsurgency effort.

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By Matthias Pauwels, 7 Oct, 2011

When an uneasy coalition of religious leaders, secular intellectuals, and bazaar merchants spearheaded the anti-Shah movement in Iran, the Iranian revolution would cause ripples well beyond the Middle East as the new regime began alienating once close western allies, mainly the United States. In the Khomeini era, US foreign policy toward Iran would shift from one of total commitment to one on the defence, embedded in Iran’s rampant anti-Americanism.

As Khomeini’s triumph was a blow to America’s credibility, it encompassed a boost to Soviet diplomacy in the region, especially in the early days of a nascent revolution. However, Iran’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union would prove to be extremely bipolar, ranging from Moscovian hopes of fruitful development of good neighbourliness to large-looming mistrust in the Moscow-Tehran relationship.

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By Abdulaziz Al-Mossalem, 27 Aug, 2011

The ideological world views of Al Qaeda and the Neo-conservatives are reactionary to moral decadence. Both maintain premodern epistemologies. They share the conviction of holding the moral high ground and seem to distrust rationality. However there are also some notable differences between them in that the Neo-conservatives are “more marketable” than AQ to the rest of the international community. While AQ is obsessed with the past, the Neo-conservatives are forward looking.

The evidence supporting AQ as a global organized network of Islamic fundamentalists run by some puppet master is flimsy. How this evidence was propagated will be discussed in another section below. There is no real evidence that such an organized network of Islamists with global terrorist cells exists. Jason Burke more accurately describes AQ as a “tripartite” consisting of around a dozen core members, a network of co-opted (most of which remained autonomous) groups and an ideology. In the following sections as I look at the group’s ideological antecedents, I also analyze this tripartite and its dynamics.

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